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STUDIES 
Vilmos PESCHKA The Retroactive Validity of 
Legal Norms 
"Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past." 
(T. S. Eliot) 
Time 
Time is a hard taskmaster, permeating as it does our life, the life of the 
individual quite as much as that of society. It is an element of our existence, 
of the existence of individuals and society alike, and hence one of personal and 
social reification. Temporality is a determinant factor of life. It is an interesting 
phenomenon: while in philosophy time presents a substantial and mysterious 
problem from Aristotle through Kant and Hegel down to Bergson and Heidegger, 
in the philosophy of law it is, one might say, a peripheral issue, a rather rare 
subject of discussion and analysis.1 What may account for the disinterest of legal 
philosophy in respect to the link between law and time, indeed, for the marginal 
importance of the relationship between law and time for the philosophy of law? 
Law is primarily concerned with practice and, in this sense, forms an organic 
part of daily life, naturally living as such in the dimensions of the past, the 
1 For a noteworthy exception, see HUSSERL, G.: Recht und Zeit. Frankfurt am Main, 
1950. 
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present and the future in the context of time, whereas these three dimensions 
constitute a piece of evidence, a self-understood, unproblematic contention for 
all: "Obviously, any past is chased by the future and any future ensues from 
the past, and any past and any future have their genesis in the omnipresent, 
issue forth from it".2 Yet time carries in itself a range of unresolved problems, 
the questions of time and space, objective and subjective time that are always 
with us. In everyday life, law apparently presents no problem for us in the 
dimensions of the past, the present and the future. Still, when one looks down 
in the giddy depth of time, the link between law and time involves as many 
peculiar and interesting questions, above all that of whether the temporality of 
law can be elucidated at the level of daily life, in the dimensions of the past, 
the present and the future, or whether it would perhaps not be amiss to delve 
deeper and rasp the fact that the past, the present and the future are mere 
external existence and that what we have is actually no other than "the unity 
of existence and nothing", notably the transition of existence to nothing and the 
transition of nothing to existence. "The non-existence of existence replaced by 
'now' is the past; the existence of non-existence embodied in the present is 
the future. In the positive sense of time, therefore, one can say that only the 
present exists, there being no previous and no posterior, hut this concrete 
present is the result of the past and is pregnant with the future."3 This 
Hegelian statement reveals the real substance of time correctly and more 
profoundly than both earlier and later philosophical conceptions do, for if one 
looks at either previous or subsequent philosophical disquisitions on the 
subject, the difference, apart from the more or less identical results, lies only 
in that, with Hegel, the objective process of time passes to the terrain of 
subjectivity and is manifested in existence, in the mind, in memory.4 As we are 
speaking of the relationship between law and time, let us hasten to add that the 
relevance of subjective time is by no means negligible in regard to law. 
In dwelling on the distinction between objective and subjective time we are 
concerned with this problem mainly in relation to law. The question is 
primarily on of how law appears in objective time, since law emerges from the 
process of objective time, lives, functions and ceases in it. This is objective 
2 AUGUSTINUS, Д.: Vallomások (Confessions), Budapest, 1982. 365. 
3 HEGEL, G. P.: A filozófiai tudományok enciklopédiájának alapvonalai. II. rész. A termé-
szetfilozófia (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. Part II The Philosophy 
of Nature), Budapest, 1979. § 259. Függelék (Appendix), 57. 
4 See AUGUSTINUS: op. cit., 365, BERGSON, H.: Idő és szabadság (Time and Free 
Will), Budapest, 1923. 113-125 et seq. 
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time, and existence in it is nothing but than the history of law. In brief, the 
problem concerns law in time.5 However, in relation to law, time assumes 
paramount importance in another quality of it, too, which is subjective time. 
The idea is that objective time becomes subjective in respect not only of an 
individual, but also of his products, especially of intellectual objectification, 
just as it does in relation to, inter alia, law. Law as a social objectification has 
a specific time, a subjective one. Briefly, the concern of this problematic is 
with time in law. The case here is that objective time appears in a social, 
mental, intellectual objectification, in an intellectual, mental product, in legal 
objectification, and this in accordance with the specific function and purpose 
of such legal objectification. Time alters in this special legal sphere, peculiarly 
becoming subjective in legal objectification. The present analysis is dealing 
basically with this process, with how objective time appears in the realm of 
law, how it changes, how it becomes subjective in a certain sense. And, 
considering that law as a social-mental objectification is of several layers, 
consequently that time in these segments of law appears in different ways, 
differently in legislation, in legal relations and in the application of law. At his 
juncture we shall confine ourselves to examining one aspect of the appearance 
of time in law, namely the way in which time manifests itself in the validity 
of laws and regulations or, more specifically, in the retroactive validity of legal 
norms. 
Nevertheless, it will not be out of place to emphatically point out well in 
advance that the following discussion will inquire into time, not in respect of 
legislation, but as regards the way in which time appears and its meaning in 
relation to the product of law-making, the legal norm, as a legal objectification. 
Nor should it be overlooked that the profound philosophical definition of time 
at a philosophical depth, according to which "time is such as exists, but is 
concurrently non-existent, and it is non-existent while being existent...",6 is a 
social objectification that is a determinant of law as well, just as the fact, 
which otherwise suggests a subjective temporality of law as a mental 
objectification, that "a thing in itself cannot be made into one for us except by 
elevating the past and the future to the present, while the non-existent, in its 
5 For an extensive study, see KULCSÁR, К.: Történetiség a XX. század jogtudományá-
ban (Historicity in the Jurisprundence of the 20th Century), in: Kritikai tanulmányok a 
modern polgári jogelméletről (Critical Studies of the Modern Bourgeois Theory of Law), 
Budapest, 1963. 89-149; SAJÓ, A.: Társadalmi-jogi változás (Social and Legal Change), 
Budapest, 1988. 
6 HEGEL: op. cit., 258. § 52. 
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absolute postulation, naturally can but rise to be a thing for us alone, rather 
than to be a thing in i tself ' .7 All this is a mere philosophical abstraction and 
generality, which this discussion is called upon to credit with real philosophical 
meaning and significance. The point is that on the basis of the following 
amplification on time we shall try to bring light to bear on the relationship 
between law as a social-intellectual reification and time in a single aspect, in 
regard to the retroactivity of laws and regulations. It should be stressed that at 
issue is the link between legal, social and ideological objectifications and time. 
For, to avoid misunderstandings, we wish to avoid even the appearance of the 
following exposition looking like, as it were, the antipole of G. Husserl's work 
"Law and Time".8 That is out of the question, however, as we are to explore 
a topic concerning one of the relationships between law and time. The two 
approaches quasi complement rather than oppose each other. While Husserl as 
a true existentialist starts from the individual, from the person of the law-
.maker, from Iiis concrete activity and determines the essential temporality of 
legislation f rom his point of view, viz., f rom the question of whether the past 
or the present or the future is decisive to law-making, on which dimension of 
time is the focus thereof, of which aspect of temporality is predominant therein, 
our discussion will not, as noted, bring into focus the person and activity of the 
law-maker, but will analyze the product of Iiis activity, the law as the 
objectified result of that activity, in the context of time in which that result 
exists and appears, and, even so, merely one of its aspects, the retroactivity of 
legal norms. 
Duration of validity 
The fact that a legal norm appears as one to be followed and realised in society 
is called the validity of the legal norm. Validity should be neither abstract nor 
some sort of a theoretical social substance, but a concrete social substance 
organized in a legal teleological-normative structure, legal in substance as the 
norm is. The validity of the legal norm means its specific mode or form of 
existence, while pointing to its objectively existing specific feature which, once 
the norm has come into existence, becomes independent of the minds, of the 
subjects of individuals, is not a psychical or subjective phenomenon in the least. 
7 LUKACS, Gy.: Az esztétikum sajátosságai (The Specificity of Aesthetic Quality), vol. II., 
Budapest, 1965. 329. 
8 HUSSERL, G: op. cit. 
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The validity of the legal norm is a specific mode of existence thereof as a special 
social objectification, which is an aspect of all-social existence. It is a complex 
phenomenon which comes about as the special result of the combined impact of 
several social factors and processes. In its complexity, the validity of legal 
norms results from these formal and substantive aspects as ingredients thereof. 
As is evidenced by legal history and practice, the validity of legal norms 
is not unlimited, but has well-definable personal, territorial and temporal 
scopes. Our present concern is in particular with the historicity, the temporality 
of validity, or retroactivity as an aspect thereof, for validity emerges at a 
specified point of time, exists during a specified period and ceases at a 
specified date. In other words, validity has a specific temporality, there are 
temporal limits to it. This is designated in legal literature as the temporal 
validity of law or its scope of application. 
We cannot avoid touching on a clarification of an essentially terminological 
question implied in distinguishing the validity and the applicability of legal 
norms. Validity and applicability (scope) are by no means synonymous in tradi-
tional doctrinal study of legal norms. By distinguishing them, jurisprudential 
conceptions seek to express and illustrate frequent cases in which the law-
maker enacts and publishes a legal norm but extends its force to a time 
preceding its adoption or brings it into effect at a later date. Accordingly a 
legal norm is valid upon the act of the legislator adopting and promulgating it, 
but it becomes operative or applicable at or from the date either previous or 
subsequent, as determined, to that of validity. Under these conceptions, a legal 
norm exists, viz., is valid as of the moment of its creation from or up to the 
time of its coming into force. Validity is thus a property or quality of the legal 
norm existing during the period between its creation and entry into force. This 
jurisprudential concept uses the term "validity" to qualify an undoubtedly 
special, temporary, intermediate state of the legal norm, a state that, one might 
say, immediately precedes the existence thereof. Consequently there are legal 
norms which momentarily are not binding on anyone anywhere, but will be so 
only at a later date, while being valid as such. In this case, therefore, the term 
"validity" denotes but the fact that the law-maker has drafted a norm, accepted 
its content and published its text, yet the norm cannot be regarded as a rule to 
be followed and observed, as one imposing a legal obligation, except from an 
earlier or later point of time. Nevertheless, this special pre-state of the legal 
norm can in no way be considered to mean a valid norm. We can speak of a 
legal norm only if it really exists, is valid, that is, it is binding on a specified 
group of persons at a specified time and place. What we have until that state 
occurs as a result of legislative activity is but a text of a legal norm, of a future 
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norm, as a legislative product that is to become a legal norm valid as from a 
specified time. 
This has practically brought us to our subject proper, to the temporality of 
the validity of legal norms, to the fact that validity is of a specified time, with 
a beginning, duration and end. Depending on the legislator's will, this 
temporal validity can be either specified or unspecified. "The principle that a 
norm of a legal system is valid until its validity is terminated by the legal 
system in a specified manner or is replaced by another norm is the principle of 
legitimacy".9 That the temporality of validity emerges at all as a problem of 
legal theory is due to the ontological fact that the legal norms as a social 
objectification exists not merely in objective time, but in its special, homo-
geneous medium, subjectively reflecting time and being applied, which at times 
shows no small differences from the objectivity and irreversibility of temporal 
processes. To avoid misunderstandings, it should be emphasized, of course, that 
the duration of validity beings at a basically objective, specified time and lasts 
for a specified period. However, this determinacy of validity is far from 
unambiguous. Suffice it to refer here to the uncertainty experienced in respect 
to the duration of the validity of legal norms coming into and going out of 
existence by virtue of customary law in the law enforcement practice of the 
State. Further complications regarding the duration of validity, particularly the 
beinning thereof, arise from the legal norm treating time in a special way in its 
special, homogeneous context, occasionally determining the duration of validity 
differently from the objective temporal processes, real and irreversible. Like 
any process going on in time, the validity of a legal norm obviously has its 
past, present and future. The temporal commencement of validity is generally 
the date at which the norm comes into beging, and its present is the time of its 
being as it is at any one time, in relation to which the time extending back to 
its creation is deemed to be its past, whereas the time subsequent to it is its 
future. Well, but a legal norm is generally valid as from the date of its coming 
into being, which means that it is of binding force in regard to cases and 
behaviours occurring in the future as reckoned from that date. Of course, such 
futurity of validity is a mere appearance, for a legal norm is always valid in its 
concrete existence, although its validity is merely anticipated in regard to the 
real social processes and behaviours occurring at present. The fact that a legal 
norm is valid at present means its applicability not only to behaviours and 
cases occurring at present, but also to those that occur during the period 
extending from its creation to the present day and in the future as viewed in 
9 KELSEN, IL: Reine Rechtslehre. Wien, 1960. 213. 
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relafion to the present. The validity of legal norms is therefore a special one, 
for it involves more than simply a norm objectively having a past, which is the 
period from its creation to the present, and a future, which is the period 
subsequent to it; it also implies that a legal norm as it is lives not only in the 
present time, hut, by virtue of being valid, it brings influence to bear on its 
past and future as well. A legal norm is, as a rule, valid from its moment of 
creation to its date of extinction, practically meaning that during this period the 
norm applies, in its concrete form of existence at the present time, equally to 
cases and behaviours that occurred in the past and to ones that are to occur in 
the future. As can be seen, time is not irreversible in the domain of validity, 
because a legal norm that is valid today is also valid in regard to cases and 
behaviours that occurred during the period extending back to its date of 
creation, so its temporal existence today goes back to the past, too. Whereas 
in the temporality of objective processes the past is irretrievable, the time gone 
is irreversible, the duration of validity up to the present can not only be 
recalled subjectively, in the mind, but validity objectively exists in respect to 
the present and the past alike. If an act in respect to which a legal norm was 
valid at the time of its commission becomes known today, that act, which is 
virtually past when related to the present validity of the norm, is governed by 
this norm, as if by turning back the validity of the norm which is concretely 
valid at present, and this configuration stands to reason because the norm 
involved was already valid at that point of time. This possibility is always there 
to cause such variations in the validity of legal norms. The specificial feature 
of the duration of validity lies in a norm's ability to relive its past at all times 
as long as it is valid. Paradoxically, the ontological basis of this is constituted 
by the future-oriented nature of the legal norm. The fact that a legal norm is 
generally valid in respect to all future cases and behaviours from the moment 
of its coming into existence creates the basis for its application at present to 
cases and behaviours that occurred in the past, viz., during the period extending 
from its concrete present to its date of creation. One cannot change his past by 
his acts, but a legal norm is enabled by the specific duration of its validity to 
influence, shape or modify events and processes that occurred in its past. 
Thus a valid legal norm exists in objective time, but, as has been noted, the 
temporality of its validity shows specific features which act to shape the 
present, past and future of validity somewhat differently from the irreversibility 
of real temporal processes. This is evidently due to the fact that validity is 
virtually a special legal reflection of objective time, so its duration is deemed 
to be subjective time in this sense and context. As was seen, the decisive 
element in the distinction between past, present and future in the duration of 
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validity is the date at which a legal norm is created. The future of validity can 
be reckoned from the norm's creation or concrete present, while the past of 
validity accordingly extends back to that date. However specific the duration 
of validity may be, it becomes clear from the foregoing that a legal norm is 
valid only in regard to facts, behaviours, events and relations that occurred 
after its coming into existence. 
The Rétroactivité Validity of the Norm 
From all this it follows that the reversibility of a legal norm as indicated above 
can in fact be regarded as a quasi or pseudo one, which will be quite clear 
when an inquiry is also made into laws and regulations with retroactive effect 
or force. In their case the question is that both the application and, we stress, 
the validity of legal norms follow upon the occurrence of events or behaviours 
to be adjudged. The retroactivity of a legal norm means that the norm is valid 
not only in respect to events, relations and behaviours that occur after its 
enactment, that is in the future, or, in other words, it applies not only to the 
past extending from its concrete existence to its creation, but also to the past 
preceding its date of enactment. In this event the validity of the norm is really 
retroactive, the duration of its validity is really reversible, turning back to the 
past previous to its coming into existence, because it extends to acts, events 
and relations that occurred prior to the enactment of the norm. This feature of 
validity is apt to cause significant changes with respect to the past. In the first 
place it may extend legal coverage to behaviours and cases not governed by 
law before; it may remove from legal coverage situations and acts which were 
governed by valid rules of law in the past; it may render formerly lawful 
behaviours to be unlawful and prohibited; and it may render formerly unlawful 
and prohibited acts to be declared lawful and permissible and even desirable. 
In point of fact tikis means that a legal norm with retroactive of an earlier norm 
in regard to the past, to the time preceding the enactment of the norm with 
retroactive effect . The list of historical cases showing the existence as well as 
the social, political and legal role, significance and impact of such (ex post 
facto) laws and regulations is rather long, so it will suff ice to recall here the 
great boom period, immediately following World War Two, of laws and 
regulations with retroactive effect adopted worldwide.10 
10 See PESCHKA, V.: A modern jogfilozófia alapproblémái (Fundamental Problems of the 
Modem Philosophy of Law), Budapest, 1972. 238-239. 
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Consequently the validity of legal norms with retroactive effect commences, 
not with enactment, but already in the past preceding it. Such norms will 
thereby subjectively remove or terminate the irreversibility of objective time 
in the domain of validity, but not elsewhere. Their existence has the effect of 
changing the legal qualification and regulation of past behaviours, situations 
and events. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that a legal norm with 
retroactive effect cannot terminate the irreversibility of objective time, that is, 
it cannot change and undo cases, events and behaviours that occurred, took 
place or were exhibited in the past. "If all time is eternally present / All time 
is unredeemable." (T. S. Eliot) Nevertheless, it may substantially change and 
even abolish the legal qualification, value and meaning of these past cases, 
events and behaviours. "Although what happened cannot be undone, the 
normative meaning of cases long past is amenable to subsequent change by 
virtue of norms that have emerged after the events to be interpreted."11 While 
it is true that not even a legal norm with retroactive effect is able to terminate 
the irreversibility of objective time, to undo the past, such a norm tends to 
produce, by a legal requalification and reinterpretation of past situations and 
acts, momentous economic, social, political and mainly legal effects at the time 
of the emergence of its validity and its concrete present. This impact of legal 
norms with retroactive effect is manifest precisely in respect to consequences, 
to those of past acts and behaviours, entailing social and legal consequences 
which were most unlikely or had hardly any chance to ensue from past acts and 
decisions. The special temporality of legal norms with retroactive effect 
therefore brings about significant changes in respect not only to legal 
qualification and regulation, but also to concrete facts, relations and acts of 
everyday life, yet not in respect to the occurrence of cases, events and acts in 
the past, but in the period of the consequences thereof, in the present and the 
future of the validity of legal norms. 
The existence of laws and regulations with retroactive effect is a fact. The 
problem lies in the presented existence thereof, namely the question to what 
extent the adoption and existence of such laws and regulations are justified and 
substantiated in theory and practice alike. From an axiological point of view, 
the question may also be asked whether the existence of laws and regulations 
with retroactive effect is advisable. This problem is not of recent vintage, 
although, historically not by change, it comes up for discussion time to time. 
That is the force of history, particularly of legal history. It is also indicated and 
borne out, albeit with different explanations offered, by two main traditions, 
11 KELSEN: op. cit., 13. 
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otherwise diametrically opposed, of the theory and philosophy of law. Para-
doxically, the natural-law and the positivist philosophy of law hold identical 
views on the existence of laws and regulations eight retroactive effect, both 
considering it as theoretically two classical examples. The natural-law theories 
dismiss this problem with ease by claiming that practically there is no 
retroactivity, because the governing and valid natural law prevailed earlier, as 
far back as the time when the question was controlled differently by positive 
law. This is succinctly expressed hy Gustav Radhruch, who, in the critical 
period of trials in the wake of World War Two, stated that, on the one hand, 
"there may exist laws with injustice and public harm on a scale to justify the 
need to deny them validity and even a legal character"12 and that, on the other 
hand, "there are, then, legal axioms, stronger than any postulate of law, so any 
law contrary to them is devoid of validity. These axioms are called the law of 
nature or reason".13 Indeed, this law of nature or reason is always valid, and 
it overrides the validity of positive law. Consequently what we have is not 
retroactivity, but the permanent validity of natural law, one that is independent 
of positive law. As can be seen, the natural-law concept seems to deny the 
retroactivity of positive law rules on the one hand and, on the other, substantiates 
it by a vague ideology about the permanent validity of natural law. The retro-
activity of legal norms is openly and resolutely advocated by Hans Kelsen, an 
exponent par excellence of legal positivism, in arguing that since the scope of 
validity of legal norms, inclusive of temporal validity, is a substantive element 
of legal norms, it is determined by the lawmaker and that although legal norms 
generally apply to future behaviours, that is they are retroactive, because "in this 
respect the law is similar to king Midas. Just as whatever he touched turned into 
gold, anything under the control of law assumes a legal character".14 The 
theoretical basis for the advocacy by legal positivism of the retroactivity of legal 
norms is provided by Felix Somló's "incontestable truth that legal power (or, 
in other terminology, the legislator, the State, the sovereign power) may 
postulate any discretionary legal substance".15 The natural-law and legal 
positivist of legal norms are riddled with inner contradictions: the argumentation 
of the natural law tradition involves the clash between the validity of natural 
law and positive law, while legal positivism involves the clash between the 
validity and the application of laws and regulations. 
12 RADBRUCH, С..: Rechtsphilosophie, Stuttgart, 1950. 336. 
13 Ibid. 
14 KELSEN: op. cit., 282. 
15 SOMLÓ, F.: Juristische Grundlehre, Leipzig, 1927. 308. 
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The theories adopting a critical attitude toward the retroactivity of laws and 
regulations and deeming it theoretically untenable usually invoke the rule of 
law, the ideals of law, morals and the harmful effect of laws and regulations 
with retroactive force and essentially declare their opposition to the retro-
activity of legal norms. "Laws introducing amendments must not be ascribed 
retroactive force . . . , or else any guarantees by a law-governed state for the life 
of human communities stand to be abolished."16 Moreover, retroactive law "is, 
in one context, inconsistent with the very idea of law..."—writes Fuller17—, 
which is succintly expressed in New-Hampshire's Constitution (1784): "Retro-
spective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws, 
therefore, should be mode, either for the decision of civil causes, or the 
punishment of offenses." However, the problematic nature of the retroactivity 
of legal norms derives in fact from its inner inconsistency, ontological as well 
as structural. 
The question concerning the ontological inconsistency of the retroactivity 
of laws and regulation's is that, as was indicated above, legal norms are, as 
a rule, oriented to the future. Orientation to the future is determined above all 
by the alternative character of legal norms, for such norms govern situations 
of alternative nature, the actors of which are free to decide and to choose 
between behaviours and acts that are possible in a given situation. True, this 
elbowroom for decision is determined by social existence, but such determinacy 
"always implies determination 'merely' of some alternative decision, a concrete 
scope of its possibility".18 And, what is of decisive importance to legal norms 
and their validity, "not even this room for manoeuvre existing at any one time, 
however clearly described, can do away with the fact that the alternative act 
embodies the decision, the aspect of option, and that die 'place' and organ of 
such decision is the human mind".19 Therefore, the validity legal norms 
generally extends to future situations and cases alternative in nature. The 
human behaviour defined and prescribed in a legal norm is but one the options 
with respect to cases defined by law. The duration of validity of a legal norm 
and in particular its orientation to the future accordingly presuppose that, in the 
cases defined in the hypothesis of the particular norm, the behaviour prescribed 
16 BOEHMER, G.: Grundlagen der bürgerlichen Rechtsordnung. Zweites Buch, Erste 
Abteilung. Tübingen, 1951. 181. 
17 FULLER, L.: Anatomy of Law. New York-Washington-London, 1968. 63. 
18 LUKACS, Gy.: A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról (On the Ontology of Social Being), vol. 
III., Budapest, 1976. 346. 
19 Ibid., vol. II., 48. 
1 2 Vilmos Peschka 
by the norm appears as an option to translate a possibility into reality. Clearly 
and simply put, the subject at law is free to exhibit as lawful the behaviour 
postulated by the valid rule of law in question. The legal responsibility of 
persons rests precisely on this alternative nature of legal norms, on the 
possibility of decision and option within the socially determined scope of 
action, and on the effect exerted by law on such alternative situation, or on 
acceptance or disregard of the option required by law. 
By illustrating the ontological inconsistency of legal norms with retroactive 
effect we wish to point precisely to the fact that the retroactivity to the fact that 
the retroactivity of laws and regulations is contrary to this alternative nature 
and substation of legal regulation and legal responsibility. For if the validity 
of a legal norm extends also to past situations and behaviours preceding its 
enactment, the behaviour prescribed by that norm could not appear in the past 
as a legally valid alternative, legally postulated and prescribed, but it is even 
possible that a quite different legal alternative prevailed at that time. Hence the 
behaviour as postulated in the retroactive norm could not mean an alternative 
to a lawful action in the past. Although it might have been considered as an 
alternative to action or decision in a given situation, it is possible that this 
behaviour was defined as expressly unlawful by a regulation in force at the 
time, or was outside the domain of legislation altogether, was not the concern 
of the law (non iuris). Consequently the subjects of a past set of facts could not 
choose as a legal alternative the behaviour prescribed by a retroactive rule of 
law. As can be seen, retroactivity terminates the alternative character of legal 
norms in regard to the past and, with it, the alternative substantiation of legal 
responsibility. 
The ontological inconsistency of legal norms with retroactive effect is 
particularly evident in the relationship between retroactive laws and regulations 
and the ignorantia iuris. The old rule of Roman law "ignorantia iuris neminem 
excusat" is a sine qua non for the operation of legal norms, a factor which is 
indispensable for the existence and operation of legal norms in two aspects. 
First, and this is the decisive and determinant element, the alternative character 
of a legal norm would become doubtful i f i t were not possible for the subjects 
at law, the persons finding themselves in the particular situation, to make 
themselves familiar with the alternative formulated in the given norm. Second, 
the operation and enforcement of legal norms would become impossible if the 
subjects at law were free to constantly invoke ignorance of invoke the 
ignorance of law and the impossibility of getting aquainted with law. As is 
know, the principle of ignorantia iuris has given rise to widely differing 
interpretations and positions as well as to rather heated debates in literature on 
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the theory of law.20 Without elaborating on this problem we deem it necessary 
to point out that the substance and purpose of the rule of ignorancia iuris are, 
in our view, not the fiction that the provisions of law are known to everyone, 
but the unrebuttable presumption (paesumptio iuris et de iure) that it is possible 
for the subjects at law to get acquainted with the substance of legal rules. The 
prerequisite for the operation and application of a legal norm is constituted not 
by the fiction that although the norm is not known to all subjects at law, yet 
the norm deliberately considers them to be familiar with it, but by the 
probability or the chance that the subjects at law may come to know its 
substance. If we conceive of the ignorantia iuris in the first sense, we turn a 
fiction into an ontological precondition for the validity of legal norms, just as 
if we call in doubt, on the basis of absolute mechanical determinism, the 
possibility of legal alternative, of option and decision, for the subjects at law. 
Thus, we are aware that the subjects at law do not know the given legal norm, 
but we consider them to know it, or that they are entirely determined, they 
have no, being as they are entirely determined, have no possibility for 
alternative decision, yet they are to bear legal responsibility. In reality, 
however, the validity of legal norms presupposes their alternative character, the 
possibility for subjects at law to choose, within the given scope of social 
action, from several alternatives, naturally including the legal alternative, and 
thereby to be legally responsible, as well as the equally social possibility, 
which is otherwise an indispensable condition for alternative decision, for the 
subjects at law to get acquainted with the provisions of law. Since the 
possibility for familiarity with legal norms exists on a social scale, rather than 
for each individual separately, and because legal norms regulate situations at 
the social level, the condition for the application, operation and enforcement 
thereof lies only in ensuring that general, social possibility for a cquaintance 
with laws and regulations, and hence the legal presumption of this possibility 
is not rebuttable. It is in this sense that Hegel argues as follows: "to nail laws 
as high as possible in the way Dionysius the tyrant did so that not a single 
citizen was able to read them, or to bury them in the voluminous apparatus of 
scientific books, collections, decisions, customs embodying different judge-
ments, opinions and the like, and in foreign languages at that so knowledge of 
20 See SZABÓ, I.: Szocialista jogelmélet — népi demokratikus jog (Socialist Theory of 
Law—People's Democratic Law), Budapest, 1966. 156-183. 
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the prevailing law is not accessible except to persons dealing with it pro-
fessionally—add up to one and the same lawless act".21 
These two meanings of the principle of ignorantia iuris as a sine qua non 
for the validity and operation of legal norms bring influence to bear on the link 
between the ignorancia iuris and retroactive laws and regulations in either of 
two ways, as is also noted by Kelsen.22 If the ignorancia iuris as a fiction is 
construed to mean that legal norms are unknown to the subjects at law, the 
ignorancia iuris and retroactivity are reconcilable, for in this case knowledge 
of the law is a fiction just like the argument that the legal norms was in 
existence prior to its enactment, viz., it was valid. The case is different if the 
ignorantia iuris is interpreted as an unrebuttable presumption, as the norm's 
cognizability at the level of social generality. In this event, by spelling out the 
principle of ingorantia iuris, the legal norm presuposes that its substance or 
provisions are cognizable at the level of social generality for those in respect 
of whom it is valid. However, a retroactive rule of law declares its validity in 
respect to behaviours and situations which occurred prior to its date of adoption 
and the actors of which were thus obviously unable to get acquainted with its 
substance. Since the provisions of laws and regulations not yet in existence are 
impossible to know at the social level, the principle of ignoratio iuris viewed 
in this sense and the retroactivity of legal norms are irreconcilable. So Kelsen 
is mistaken in asserting that "with respect to the possibility or impossibility of 
knowing the law, there is no essential difference between a retroactive law and 
many cases in which a non-retroactive law is not, and cannot, be known by the 
individual to whom this law has to be applied".23 Consequently, and otherwise 
in opposition to his analysis in which he indirectly expounds the alternative 
substantiation of legal norms,24 Kelsen completely disregards the social 
generality of cognizability of legal norms, which is inseparable from the 
alternative character of them. By calling in doubt the cognizability of legal 
norms at the level of social generality we question their alternative character 
and substantiation as well. In this case, two socio-ontological conditions for 
legal norms, namely their application to alternative situations and the 
possibility of familiarity with them at the level of social generality, turn into 
a mere fiction, therefore, given the fictitious character of its validity, a 
21 HEGEL: A jogfilozófia alapvonalai (Elements of the Philosophy of Right), Budapest, 
1971. 215. § 233. 
22 KELSEN: General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge (Mass.), 1949. 44. 
23 Ibid. 
24 KELSEN: Reine Rechtslehre, 11. 
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retroactive rule of law is in contradiction with its ontological contitions we 
have just mentioned, namely its alternative character and its cognizability at the 
social level. 
The retroactivity of legal norms is no less in contradiction with the inner 
structure, pattern or form thereof. The point is that the categorial structure of 
legal norms is primarily determined by the teleological nature thereof. A legal 
norms involves a special teleological postulate. It is not accidentally underlined 
by Gehlen that once one looks on religion, law and morals as objective pheno-
mena of life, the question immediately arises of a teleological form of thinking 
and its performance.25 The decisive, essential aspect of the teleological 
structure is the active role of the mind, the prospective conceptual anticipation 
of the result. This is emphasized by Nicolai Hartmann in his analysis of the 
final link category, pointing out that "something that is to be a reality only in 
future cannot influence anything present unless it 'pre-exist' somehow in 
advance of its materialization, but this can only be thought of if its mode of 
existence in the pre-existent state is different from the real one which it is yet 
to grow into... This is what is possible in the mind alone".26 The prospective 
conceptual anticipation of the objective, the result, is an essential aspect of 
legal norms. In a norm, the human behaviour which the norm was created to 
induce, influence and govern conceptually exists as a result prior to the actual 
behaviour displayed on the strength of the norm. A norm conceptually designs 
human behaviour as an end which the postulator intends to induce and achieve. 
Legal norms prescribe, prohibit or permit specified behaviours or forbearance, 
namely they describe or specify the behaviours and their distinctive features 
which they seek to see realized or avoided in the daily life of people. Such 
human behaviour, postulated by a legal norm as an objective to be attained by 
the members of society, is as yet conceived of as unreal, one that will turn real 
after its expression in the norm, perhaps on the strenght of its postulation, in 
a concrete, actual human activity or behaviour. It is a structural property of the 
legal norm that it postulates something vivo, that "we think something yet 
unreal to have existence".27 Thus the teleological structure of legal norms 
means in essence that, as is stated by Hartmann in Iiis categorial analysis of the 
25 GEHLEN, A.: Az ember természete és helye a világban (Man, His Nature and Place in 
the World), Budapest, 1976. 557. 
26 HARTMANN, N.: Teleológiai gondolkodás (Teleological Thinking), Budapest, 1970. 130. 
27 HEGEL: A szellem fenomenológiája (The Phenomenology of Mind), Budapest, 1961. 309. 
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relation of finality,28 the objective set is anticipated in the mind, by jumping 
the process of time, as one existing in future. 
We see here the manifestation of an important aspect of the teleological 
relationship and the teleological nature of legal norms, namely the three-
dimensional nature of time. The fact that the result of human activity con-
ceptually exists earlier in the teleological postulation than in reality, that in the 
defined objective man projects the future before himself, while choosing the 
tools of achieving the postulated objective, the anticipated result, by going 
backwards in time in the causal interrelationship of the present and the past, 
that is the objective is based on recognition of causal interrelationships existing 
and materialized and so is founded on the present and the past, demonstrates 
the specific manifestation of the three-dimensional nature of time. The 
orientation of legal norms to the future is undoubtedly the predominant norms 
to the future is the pre-dominant aspect of their teleological structure and 
nature. 
This is made even more markedly evident by the structural feature of the 
legal norm that it is not simply teleological, but also normative, for the legal 
norms as a rule of conduct embodies two conditional relations: on the one 
hand, it provides that, with certain conditions prevailing, the specified 
behaviour must (shall) be exhibited in the future (the must refers in itself to the 
future, as not the Past Tense is used) and, on the other, this must (shall) is 
expressed in the conditional relation that should the prescribed behaviour be or 
not be exhibited, one or another legal consequence must ensue. The must 
(normative) character of the structure of legal norms is manifested in that there 
must occur specified legal consequences contingent on the realization of the 
behaviour as described in the first context. The teleological manifestation in 
legal norms of the causal relationship takes a special form: the defined 
objective is coupled by the norm with further specific results or consequences, 
precisely with the envisaged function, inter alia, to promote and ensure 
attainment of the objective (behaviour) as formulated in the given norm. In the 
legal norm itself, the specified human behaviour and its legal consequence are 
not yet real, but are only "conceived of as having existence" and as such are 
linked with the must (shall). The structural and categorial properties of legal 
norms lie in that the human behaviours defined in them and the envisaged legal 
consequences attached to them are not real except in the future. Such human 
behaviour and its legal consequence with a future reality exert an influence in 
the present by pre-existing in some form, viz., in the form of a legal norm. 
28 HARTMANN: op. cit., 134. 
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Hartmann's statement on the mode of existence of thought, intent and purpose 
holds, mutatis mutandis, for legal norms as well: "The mind has the amazing 
freedom to perceive or imagine, well in advance at discreation, a thing is not 
real as yet. What is anticipated exists, in its mode of existence, in mente only, 
but it nevertheless exists actually before becoming a reality".29 This special 
mode of existence of legal norms, their validity—that is they exist as valid—is 
borne out in life and practice by the fact that what is conceived of in the norms 
as "having existence", whether in actual human behaviours or social relations, 
will as a rule be realised in the future. 
As can be seen, the inner structure of legal norms is future-oriented in its 
pattern and normative character alike and hence its temporality, the dimension 
of time as expressed in it (the future), is in contradiction with time as 
manifested in retroactivity, since—as has been mentioned—legal norms with 
retroactive effect look to, are oriented to the past. 
29 HARTMANN: op. cit., 130. 
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Csaba VARGA Paradigms of Legal Thinking 
1. The nature of norms 
After the turn of the century, parallel to the birth of modern cognitive sciences 
and inspired by a new-Kantian renewal in the methodology of sciences, new 
realisations were formulated concerning norms. 
Language philosophy was the first to face the challenge of defining its own 
subject.1 Following the conceptualisation introduced by Ferdinand de. Saussure 
in his lectures,2 the conclusion gradually took shape—finally breaking with both 
1 On the problems of linguistic norms, see HÄNFLING, О.: Does Language Need Rules?. 
The Philosophical Quarterly, July 1980, Vol. 30, No. 120, 193-205, as well as BARTSCH, 
R.: Sprachnormen: Theorie und Praxis, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1985., especially ch. III, 
84-140, which—mainly based on H. L. A. Hart's és Joseph Raz' arguments—attempts to 
apply the lessons of legal philosophy to linguistics as well. As a pioneering venture, see 
VILLÓ, I.: A nyelvi norma meghatározásáról (On the Definition of Linguistic Norms) (in: 
Normatudat — nyelvi norma (Norm Consciousness—Linguistic Norms), ed. Gábor Kemény, 
Budapest, MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézete, 1992, 7-22), and, for a practical case-study 
KASSAI, I.: Nyelvi norma és nyelvhasználat viszonyáról az -e kérdőszó mondatbeli helye(i) 
kapcsán. (On the Relationship between Linguistic Norms and Language Use in Relation to 
the Place(s) Taken by the Interrogative Particle ' -e ') Magyar Nye.lv, 1994, Vol. 90, 42-48. 
2 Saussure's importance is analysed in a wide context by HARRIS, R.: Reading Saussure: 
A Critical Commentary on the "Course de linguistique générale", London, Duckworth, 1987; 
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the trap of naive realism and the false duality of objectivism and subjectivism-
according to which language does not have separate 'construction* and 'func-
tioning' which could be interpreted, defined or assessed in and of themselves. 
These are purely correlative concepts mutually supporting one another that can 
only be interpreted in their relative opposition within a unity. Consequently, 
both of them can only be treated analytically: presuming one of them is the 
precondition to positing the other. We might recall Gilbert Ryle's figurative 
expression, according to which things have no independent "souls" that some 
sort of external force could make the existing "body" function. On the one hand, 
the phenomenon is fully brought to life by 'construction'. The thing is thereby 
completed, since its 'functioning' is rooted in the very existence of the phe-
nomenon understood as a thing. In retrospect, it is precisely the 'construction' 
that qualifies as a randomly complementary function of something else, the 
'functioning', since it cannot be torn off what—in one way or another—actually 
'functions'. On the other hand, about the existence conceived as a process we 
cannot state that it 'functions'; it exclusively exists (happens or occurs), i.e., 
ontologically prevails. 
Thus, with the help and as the result of scholarly analysis we just give 
expression to continuous repetitions and relative consistency in the very process 
by means of notions. We have to notionalise in order to distinguish and detach 
the process in question as a phenomenon from its 'environment', in order to be 
able to describe it in its distinctive and discrete form as potential 'appearance' 
or 'state' of the same 'essence'. In other words, we may say that what we do 
is merely construe a notional structure through scientific description. And this 
we only do to for allow us to characterise the functioning we constantly observe 
as the functioning of something, broken down into the sequence of discrete 
elements. 
From the above derives the position that presuming the existence of a norm 
is nothing other than an additional aspect to the above abstractions. For we 
must presuppose the existence of a norm to be able to analyse it as a given set 
of 'functionings' and then propose further conceptual distinctions for the 
analysis of such functioning. In consequence, the hypostatisation of its existence 
is not only a precondition to being able to define the main direction(s) of its 
observable functioning and differentiate its constant features from its peripheral 
HOLDCROFT, D.: Saussure: Signs, System, and Arbitrariness, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991; HARRIS, R.: Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play 
Games with Words, London, Routledge, 1988. 
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parts and additional incidental components. It is also a precondition to being 
able to separate 'right' procedures from 'wrong' ones in the course of a 
generalising abstract operation based on the differentiation of the 'norm-
conform' uses of the hypostatised norm from what we will later label as 
'norm-breaking' . 
The same fundamental point is raised by Hans Kelsen in his Pure Theory of 
Law as wellin the form of the following question; shortly and simply, what 
construction and functioning are needed to justifiably speak of law at all? Or, 
in more professional terms: into what mentally construed order (which, once 
established, is capable of self-definition, and through its functioning also of 
incessant self-assertion and self-determination) are we expected to place the 
norm in order to be justified to speak about it as part of the law? 
Kelsen, despite the far-reaching changes of emphases in his gigantic oeuvre, 
bearing, however, a consistent basic message (notwithstanding the sometimes 
inconsistent or contradictory conclusions he drew therefrom), answered the 
question without ambiguity. Namely, validity, as the specific quality of what is 
distinctively legal, is transferred by legal functioning through a statically built 
hierarchy, advancing act by act from top to bottom, while all other forms of 
generating validity at equal levels at any given time are also conceivable when 
there is procedural action and it is actually taken. Validity becomes un-
challengeable when the chance of taking an otherwise available procedural 
action is not effectuated or is procedurally excluded, whereby the validity 
becomes final by the legal force (figure 1). 
h S ф deduct ive "statics 
l end ing /bor rowing of validity 
with procedural competence 
in case o f legal force 
Ф induct ive "dynamics 
(figure 1) 
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We still have not answered the question: do norms exist at all?3 
In law we usually think of their existence as obvious, although they are only 
paradigmatic in modern formal legal arrangements. We may recall that in 
ancient cultures (pertaining to the Old Testament, Northern Europe or even 
Albania) the task of the lag saga meant the annual recitation of the law. The 
reason for this was that law was considered to live in and through customs. The 
law's only task was to provide a framework for action and its only quality was 
to be considered "just", but only in as much as it was acknowledged and proven 
by the community as being formed along what was recognised as "tradition". 
As we may recall, Talmudic justice relied on parables, golden rules and eternal 
truths, and it strove to find the individually concrete justice when solving or 
resolving a particular case. The circumstance that the very cases were projected 
onto a mentally erected plane woven of norms and referred to within a 
normative framework served only as the rationalising justification of the given 
solution. As is known, China followed a different line of developing tradition. 
The codified, written and recorded Chinese fa only served as a framework of 
last resort, keeping in mind those rather extraordinary situations when order 
ought to be kept notwithstanding that the li living in moral teachings did not 
prove capable of fulfilling its task due to the stubbornness of the parties. 
Although in average cases and according to average moral expectations, 
consideration and careful leading should provide sufficient points of reference 
within the realm of Confucian morals. Finally, according to another tradition, 
the law built upon the ancient Greek-Roman ideal of dikaion was regarded as 
a jump-board, starting from which any judge or layman could arrive at the just 
solution of the case to be decided. 
Thus, the question arises: what kind of norm-setting and positing charac-
terises "law" in modern formal legal arrangements? Does it have a principle 
according to which everything that can be said should be said? Or, just the 
contrary, its underlying principle is everything can be said that should be said? 
The former reflects the ideal of a comprehensive regulation. It expresses the 
demand for legal homogenisation along lines of relevance, as well as for gapless 
norm-setting. On the other hand, the latter is somewhat freer. By means of 
formal norm-setting it actually tries to define normatively only the contents the 
legal status of which are questionable or contradictory, that is, those crying for 
direct and open regulation. 
3 For the most recent summary, see ULLMANN-LARG ALIT, F.: The Emergence of Norms, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977. 
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The first one is familiar from civil law traditions. The second is nonetheless 
known, although not in continental Europe. Its variants are displayed by the 
legal lives characteristic of so-called primitive societies and of English-
American common law arrangements. In early legal cultures, "the law" is 
pronounced by the high priests or magicians of the community but only at 
exceptional and festive occasions. In average situations when disputes or 
conflicts occur, the tradition consecrated by customs was most often revoked. 
Accordingly, legal reasoning is considerably loose in everyday life: it appears 
as though it were going around something. Yet, one cannot state or revoke as 
factual knowledge whether there are norms at all, and providing that there are, 
what they say. English-American law may have statutory provisions for ordinary 
situations, but the question of what they actually provide for a case to be 
decided can (and will) only he answered by the proceeding court—purely on 
grounds of a somewhat predictably consolidating judicial practice. In the 
amalgamate of precedents, accepted as guidelines for and by judicial practice, 
it is not so much the stand finally taken by any one actual decision that will 
provide genuine directions, but those reasons, considerations, principles and 
arguments [ratio decidendi] that served as the channelling framework, both 
spring-board and cogent reason alike, for the judges proceeding in the case to 
make their decisions. The ratio decidendi is formulated within the context of 
and for the facts established in the case, while the obiter dictum relates to other 
comparable (actual or imaginary) cases. Posteriorly, and basically in every 
situation, it is the reason given in the case, i.e., the ratio decidendi, that is of 
binding force for the judge at any later time, unless he proves (making use of 
Iris art of distinguishing) that despite all appearances, it is not the considerations 
in the previous precedent(s) that provide guidelines for his case due to the fact 
that there are distinctive factual differences and these are so weighty that they 
justify another principle to be followed. The selection of arguments for 
distinguishing is given free scope and is purely the pragmatism and self-
discipline (and, of course, the desire to get the approval of higher fora) that bind 
the judge in complying with the tradition of ancestors when making his own 
decision, or, as the case may be, attempting to follow new paths. After all, in 
principle, no matter whether he complies with or diverges from the past, he 
always follows his own rule of decision which he shapes inductively, unless he 
follows his own past decision by claiming it covers the case again. 
So, are there norms at all? When pondering the question again we must 
arrive at the conclusion that order is conceivable even if norms are set 
individually by and for each person apart. In consequence, ordering formal 
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norm-setting cannot be regarded as sufficiently complete in perfecting the job 
in and of itself, that is, as some sort of total everything stepping in place of 
nothing, in the literal sense of the words. Implanting norms only introduces a 
further factor into social discourses on and within the established and 
acknowledged order. It does so emphatically and with elementary force in 
cultures where the construction and preservation of order is expected to derive 
from the sole gesture of elevating some external signs into a kind of fetish (and 
we may recall the stele with Hammurabi's laws or the engraving of the Ten 
Commandments onto a table of stone) and not (yet) from the democratic culture 
of discourse. However, we thereby do not intend to suggest that norms are 
nothing more than showy clothes. It may sound paradoxical, but norms may be 
transformed into objects of adornment at most in the hands of those who expect 
them to display the magical force of being capable of solving everything—in and 
of themselves. So, in the hands of those who ignore the fact that stelae or stones 
do not have a restrictive force in and of themselves, neither do they command 
respect. The sheer fact that they stand does not prevent anyone from spitting on 
them, or from evading or going around them. When characterising the basic 
situation we may even increase the paradoxity of the expression: norms become 
genuinely valuable and purposeful instruments only in the hands of those with 
whom a formal culture is developed, requiring the norms themselves to 
transform them into actual mediators in the process of social mediation into 
which they are built—that is, into useful and at the same time merely mediating 
standards, and so much the signs, symbols and fortifiers of a by and large 
efficaciously prevailing order.4 
On final analysis, we can only state that tire source of certainties in our 
everyday life, individual and communitarian, can hardly be identified f rom 
within the "tilings" themselves. They can only be founded upon the continuity 
of human practice and the reliability of our faith in such a continuity. 
2. The nature of law 
We usually think of law in a simplifying manner, and this holds for common 
people, professionals and scholars alike. 
4 KELSEN, H.: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence. Harvard Law 
Review, November 1941. 
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According to its most common definition, law is the aggregate of rules of 
behaviour, with the coercive force of the state ultimately standing behind them. 
It is an issue of conception and further investigation to decide whether such 
definition should be confirmed unconditionally or whether objections should 
instead be emphasised concerning certain elements of this definition. All this is 
also a matter of expectations. When we regard the definition as one allowing us 
to elevate some of its presumably important elements, we can most probably 
confirm it. Whereas when we treat the definition as expressing the notions of 
genus that serves for common foundations in a strict logical sense [genus 
proximus], and as those distinguishing features within the genus that specify the 
law [differentia specifica] standing for a denotation applicable as a criterion, we 
are likely to give free reign to our doubts. For example, can it qualify as a rule 
of behaviour that has yet not been formulated, or that is only existent as a 
culturally relative normative expectation, or as the mere derivative of an 
otherwise recognised principle? Can we regard something as supported by the 
coercive power of the state if the state has no factual knowledge of it—either 
because there is no state (then and there), or because the state could exclusively 
learn about it passively, and, what is more, posteriorly (e.g., only after a certain 
procedure becomes customised and acknowledged as a custom is the state 
bound to recognise it as its own norm)? Well, inasmuch as such a definition 
is merely a sign of the way we think and of how we approach notional 
dilemmas, the above questions will become irrelevant. That is due to the fact 
that the definition itself can just as well be interpreted metaphorically, its 
contents serving as mere signs and guiding principles in the absence of anything 
better. In the reverse case, however, if we treat the definition as conceptual 
demarcation excluding any other occurrence (omnis definitio negatio est), then, 
and especially in borderline cases, we must make a choice: do we rather agree 
to approve the conceptual direction of the definition, or, instead, do we 
appreciate the consequences of its criterion-generating significance unavoidably 
excluding all different formations (e.g., pre-state or extra-state norm-systems) 
from the sphere of the notion?5 
5 "On the basis of the comparative study of legal cultures and allowing for purely social 
considerations I propose concluding: 
(1) Law is a global phenomenon embracing society as a whole. Accordingly, criminal 
gangs (mafia, Cosa Nostra), economic associations (guilds), secret societies (religious and/or 
political as early Christians, Garibaldists), as well as other club- and party-like organizations 
fall outside the domain of law in so far as society is territorially organized and those groups 
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What to regard as other formations, as pre-state or extra-state normative 
systems, is a separate issue. Twentieth century East-European history has, for 
example, generated the multitude of such potentially entagled situations in 
are closed, involving only so-called members. If social organization is still personal, the 
ground of separation between law and non-law is whether the given organization is exclusive 
and, if so, it theoretically involves all in compliance with its personal categories. The next 
consideration I propose is: 
(2) Law is a phenomenon able to settle conflicts of interests which emerge in social 
practice as fundamental. In society law is supposed to be the prime check and control 
performing this function. Law is to regulate relations sufficiently fundamental so that it can 
create society (by drawing structure and boundaries). In European urban development, some 
guilds settled conflicts of interests fundamental to society as a whole. If conflict-settlement 
is restricted to partial relations (e.g. life within the guild, order of external relationship 
relevant to guild activity), it can at the most be regarded as a set of rules integrated into the 
law or parallel with it, but in any case as one of a different kind. Or, in situations of transition 
(e.g. in times of the dissolution of state-organized power machinery) political parties can 
assume a role amounting to function as the main controlling factor of society, filling in the 
vacuum that has arisen. Lastly, in religious communities having sect-like claims of 
exclusiveness and aiming at the assertion of their own commands in all fields of common life 
it may occur that, organizing themselves as self-supporting communities, they make use of 
their own set of rules as a legal system. This was attempted, for example, by Quaker 
communities withdrawing from civilization (18—19th century British emigrants) or separating 
within civilization ( 19—20th century settlers in America). Finally: 
(3) Law is a phenomenon prevailing as the supreme controlling factor in society. Should 
several systems of norms assert themselves in society, the law's set-up is the one whose 
procedure can, in a situation of conflict, be successfully resorted to in order to implement and 
enforce ultimate solution. 
It is to be noted, however, that procedural efficacy never asserts itself in pure form. For 
instance, is the legal character of Estonian or Texas law to be derived from a further source 
when Soviet or American law has been superimposed on them, respectively? How is the 
supremacy of the own procedure to be interpreted if there is a direct recourse to international 
legal authorities in minority or human rights affairs? How to assess of criminal gangs, secret 
societies, political or religious organizations attempt to win acceptance for their claims by 
coercively preventing (through assassinations, etc.) their conflicts from being presented to 
external authorities? 
These social considerations are conceived of as mutually reinforcing each other within a 
cluster. The more completely they are manifested, the more probably one may talk about the 
presence of law in a sociological-anthropological sense." From the author: Anthropological 
Jurisprudence?: Leopold Posptsil and the Comparative Study of Legal Cultures (1985) (in his: 
Law and Philosophy: Selected Papers in Legal Theory, Budapest, ELTE "Comparative Legal 
Cultures" Project, 1994, 451-452). 
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which it could occur, for instance, that a new statehood establishing itself in the 
wake of foreign occupation would be condemned and retaliated against by the 
successor returning to the status quo ante, declaring its institutional arrangement 
and the legal effects of its administration null and void and never even to have 
existed. In addition, this successor state, acting with some fundamentalist 
Balkanese coarseness, stigmatised and punished posteriorly any past contact 
(indispensable for leading everyday life) on the part of the civilian population 
under occupation with such statehood declared never existent by the successor 
state, as if life under occupation and the bare fact of having survived were done 
for and within the framework of collaboration with the enemy. 
From the former Soviet Union, the Baltic states and the larger part of the 
Ukraine were the first to fall under German occupation. Firstly a partisan 
movement of nationalist drive was formed, wanting to be freed by any means 
from Soviet occupation, followed by a pro-Soviet movement, especially in 
the swampy areas. The prevalence of local administration controlled by the 
German occupants (undisturbed sometimes only in daylight) was soon 
challenged by the rising influence of partisans (whose wishes and demands 
grew stronger and stronger with their ability to get enforced during the 
nights). At the same time, other occupant military administrations (i.e., the 
Hungarian one), balancing between the former two, tried to impose a 
counter-balance; insuring itself, despite being in alliance with the Germans, 
by helping the local population, and concomitantly maintaining a reasonable 
relationship with the partisans. All local efforts notwithstanding, the Soviet 
power once re-imposed after the war immediately declared every "politik-
real" a treason when appraising the local survivors, and stigmatised entire 
populations of territories which had ever fallen under German occupation as 
unreliable, excluding them for this reason even from the Soviet-type of 
advancement (positions of confidence, including both foreign service and 
travel abroad). 
In the former Yugoslavia, after the dismemberment of the kingdom and 
the German occupation of the decomposing state, various partisan move-
ments with different national inclinations and networks of political 
connections were born and began to control the territories next to their base 
with varying chances and continuity. By the end of the war, one of the 
existing dozen partisan movements rose above the others. This movement 
one-sidedly announced all the others traitors and the entire law prevailing 
under the occupation non-existent as well as all cases that occurred during 
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the war between the surviving population and local administrations and 
jurisdictions legally to be non-instituted and therefore ex tunc null and void 
so far as their legal consequences were concerned, and branded personal 
relations as collaboration with the enemy. 
Confusion, unilaterality, simplification and conceptual narrowing in the 
conception of law was, however, primarily caused by the fact that legal 
ideologies determining the motility within law and the particular way of 
professional argumentation, characteristic of individual legal cultures, stepped 
beyond their own sphere, thus dominating the general (everyday and scholarly) 
approach to law as well. In the English-American legal culture, i.e., in the world 
of precedents, the above definition could be accepted since their practice 
(according to which establishing what the law is is ultimately performed by the 
judge proceeding in the name of the law and under the authorising seal of the 
state) was compatible with the conceptual sphere of the prevalent ideologies. 
This practice conceived of anything else (statutory instruments, administrative 
decrees and local governmental acts, as well as the previous jurisprudence of 
courts) as the mere antecedents of the present judicial function of decision-
making to which precedents afford a brute medium requiring actualisation. 
Although the legal cultures of continental Europe could accept the same 
definition as well, for they disposed of proper grounds to understand it as 
meeting their requirements, their underlying concept was one of tracing back the 
law to the textual manifestation of some previously established rules. From our 
methodological perspective, it is worthy of attention that such an allegedly 
concise and unambiguous definition could provide the background for these two 
almost antagonistic conceptions. 
Beyond this, legal positivism, solely prevalent (especially in Europe) from 
the end of the last century on, and particularly its most narrow off-spring, the 
so-called statutory positivism (recognising statutes as the only forms of law), did 
the most for our conception of law to have a reified and static phenomenon 
suggested for law. Actually, all cultures that recognise law exclusively in the 
form of previously enacted statutes utterly dissolve the ius into the concept of 
the lex. (A definition of this kind is one which conceives of law as of an 
aggregate of rules created through a procedure recognised and in the way 
prescribed by law.) As is known, legal positivism builds on the lexical theory 
of meaning to substantiate interpretation. Accordingly, the lex, comprising its 
meaning in a codified, immutable and exhaustive manner, is identical with the 
textual appearance of the statute. So, it is ready-made, a complete objec-
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tification, and stands in and by itself. Thus, it is not a conceptual precondition 
to, or element of, its very existence but an eventual complement at the most that 
it may come to be applied at some later time. This may prove good or bad, 
suitable or unsuitable, feasible or unfeasible, regardless of the value of the lex 
itself. The European culture of legal positivism still considers law a static and 
self-sufficient entity, completed once and for all, given and ready-to-take, the 
only thing we have to do with it is to sense its existence and use it for legal 
patterning as soon as possible. 
The theoretical experience from the previous reasoning drives us toward 
reconsideration. Science-philosophical and methodological, cognitive and 
semantic considerations encourage us to draw a more complex picture of the 
nature of law. These considerations do not refute earlier truths, although they 
still allow a more differentiated understanding of the specificity of the law's 
existence. They urge us to transcend the reified and static view of law without 
denying its ontologically significant elements which determine legal functioning 
in the respective legal cultures, i.e., the elements of legal ideology in the actual 
practice standing for the deontology of legal profession. 
In the following we will give an overview of some aspects of the existence, 
nature and ontological character of law, despite the fact that they only contribute 
marginally at best to our understanding of the nature of law. They are neither 
definitions, nor are they intended to substitute definition. Thus far we have 
attempted to provide instances of how we can interpret a usual definition 
according to usually acknowledged old paradigms that seem to stand all trials. 
Henceforth we will investigate how the same definition can be interpreted in the 
same valid and right way according to our new view to be formed on the nature 
of law and to the new paradigms underlying it. 
2.1. Law as process 
By definition and in accordance with its ontological standing, law is a process-
like phenomenon. 
Given that we must regard the textual body of the law as sheer historical 
reference, as an open potentiality within a given framework in order to be able 
to establish its meaning through a posterior operation called judicial inter-
pretation, then it will become obvious that this textual objectification itself is 
nothing more than mere chance, which can become truly law through 
actualisation. This actualisation takes place in various social processes labelled 
legal. 
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This, however, goes against all former conceptions, since it builds upon the 
recognition that law cannot be identified with any material manifestation or 
objectification of a per se dead subject. Therefore, as a more developed version 
of our previous definition we can claim: only the social mediation of the actual 
meaning of a rule of behaviour can serve for law inasmuch as it is ultimately 
backed by the coercive force of the state. Yet the social mediation of any kind 
of meaning not only presupposes the existence of an alleged sign, but the 
definition of its meanings as well. As we have seen before, there are no 
meanings in general. They are ascertainable only in concrete situations as 
defined by concrete context. And as we have also seen, the meaning in a 
concrete situation and context must be established by some forum at some time. 
In different situations and contexts the same textual body may suggest 
variations of meaning intermediate to some extent—and so far continuously 
changing in space and time. One consequence, however, is the following: since 
law is not a textual body in itself, neither is it some sort of mere referential 
practice, but precisely the juncture of these two—namely, the sequence of 
actualisations at all times of a textual body by and through a practice making 
reference to it—, so law should rather be conceived as a process-like dynamic 
continuum, instead of reducing it to a static reified entity. Law is obviously an 
aspect generated by the social processes that make use of it by referring to it. 
Thus, when the coercive force of the state stands behind such a social process, 
we ought to presume the existence of law as well. 
2.2. Multifactorality 
By definition and in accordance with its ontological standing, law is a multi-
factoral process, that is: all of its components are processes. 
The question of what components can generate law is defined through the 
history of a society and the evolvement of its culture. We may draw a conclusion 
from our known history (and from the cultural and anthropological generalisation 
of the result of sociological examinations)6 as to which law may—by eventually 
being backed by the tlrreat of coercive force of the state—result from (a) the 
6 On the specific nature of Canon Law (with regard to both the organisation of the Church 
as a special subject and the congregation as a particular circle of addressees) see, e.g., ERDÔ, 
P.: Az egyházjog teológiája intézménytörténeti megközelítésben (The Theology of Church Law: 
From an Approach of the History of Institutions), Budapest, Szent István Társulat, n.y., para. 
31-32, 53-56. 
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pressure of customary social practice, as well as from (b) 'legislation' and (c) 
'jurisdiction' differentiating this later into separate functions resulting from the 
division of labour and power as part of the institutionalisations developing along 
with the birth of the state (figure 2).7 
7 "Thus, as regards its ontological existence, law is a complex phenomenon comprising the 
interaction, interpénétration and temporary separation, i.e. the complex motion of at least tliree 
factors, namely, rule, authority's decision and actual behaviour. Anyway, law is not a pheno-
menon homogeneously or statically identical with itself. Its quality of law may be reinforced 
or weakened, rendered more or less legal by the intertwining and/or separation of its 
components, since ontologically a phenomenon supported not only by its enacted nature but 
also by a state practice of coercive measures taken in the name of the law and made accepted 
as such by society by and large is obviously »more legal«. That is, the more completely it 
comprises its three components, the more completely it will display the features of law. At 
the same time, law is a dynamic factor of reality; its components respond to external challenge 
in an ever renewing manner and this brings about internal shifts of emphasis. Here is the 
reason why law is not and cannot be identical with itself. It is in a ceaseless and endless 
motion of internal change oscillating between the qualities of more legal and less legal 
between the extreme points of becoming legal and ceasing to be legal. This approach, on the 
one hand, avoids the danger of replacing one simplification with another: the reduction to 
rules with the reduction to conflict. On the other hand, it tries to make it clear that rule is not 
simply an incidental element of law. Not so much its presence as its part played in the whole 
complex is liable to change." VARGA, Anthropological Jurisprudence?, 443—445. 
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All components of this approach have one common characteristic: They 
count with the nature of legal processes from the beginning. Most notably 
certain social processes declare themselves to be of legal character, and none of 
the other components of law deny this, on the contrary, they accept it and 
confirm it as such. Parallel to this formal, hierarchical and deductive origination 
of validity, "lending/borrowing" the validity, concomitant with "breaking down" 
the legal system from the normative top (the basic norm), a counter-running 
motion begins to consolidate itself as well. This, relying on the self-qualification 
of the actual processes declaring themselves legal, building from bottom to top 
and also along a horizontal plane, supports the legal self-assertion of all the 
levels that are connected with it. Thus, the formal origination of validity 
advancing from the top down is complemented hy an informal lending/borrow-
ing of validity advancing from bottom to top and horizontally, providing support 
by recognising this validity. So, at this point, the actual motion (strengthening 
or weakening it, or eventually running on a parallel path) joins the breaking 
down of validity according to the theory of gradation (figure 3). 
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Let us repeat that this holds for all components: the recognition and enforce-
ment as "legal" (i.e., as the realisation of "the law") of (a) the customary social 
practice, (b) the acts 'creating' norms, as well as acts 'applying' norms. These 
take place through a double justification: through origination by hierarchical 
breaking down of legal validity according to the theory of gradation, on the one 
hand, and through the self-qualification of given institutional procedures, on the 
other. During the course of this process (a) the self-assertion of customary social 
practice, (b) law-making and (c) law-application present themselves as distinc-
tively legal. Other procedures (also presenting themselves as though they pertain 
to the law) do not refute this claim. In case where the lack of counter-running 
motion (or, in case of a judicial decision gaining legal force, its unsuccess) this 
can build itself into the given legal order. According to new recognitions, the 
actual driving force of any one-way formal origination of validity as a sheer 
basis for reference is this mutually supportive circular lending/borrowing of 
validity proper, on the one hand, and the horizontal confirmation of validity, on 
the other.8 
This statement involves an important recognition concerning the nature of 
law, namely that (1) it counts the ideology characteristic of the legal profession9 
merely as the internal self-description of law. This it does independently of 
whether it sets criteria for the ways and chances of the generation of law as 
well as whether it is open all forms and possibilities of law, including the ones 
that can be enforced through long-term practices even if eventually opposed 
to already recognised ones. It is another important step to realise further that 
(2) breaking with the narrowly unifactoral and reified view of law, as well as 
with the speculative definition through normative conventionalisation of the 
acceptable ways of generating the law, it recognises that the catalogue of 
8 KRAWIETZ, W.: Die Lehre vom Stufenbau des Rechts — eine säkularisierte politische 
Theologie? (in: KRAWIETZ, Werner-SCHELSKY, Helmut (eds.), Rechtssystem und 
gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1984, 255-272). 
9 "In my opinion, in the case of communities identifying law with rules, an ideological 
concept of law can be put forward which conceives of the boundaries of law as those covered 
by legal regulation, and of the areas covered by actual behaviours and authority decisions in 
»realization« of the law as domains within itself. As it is a matter of the ideology of an 
institutional system as well as of a profession called to its functioning, in ideal is reflected in 
it. Theoretically, the realization of that ideal is not impossible but in practice, due to the 
complex definitions prevailing in life, mostly its approximations are to materialize. Thus, in 
communities identifying law with rules, norms established and fixed in a given way are the 
preponderate media and mediators of legal normativity." VARGA, 442-443. 
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acceptable ways of generating law cannot be codified by any previous definition. 
Therefore, the opportunities to follow geographically and historically varying 
paths are equally feasible and welcome to compete. Taking all of these, (3) it 
refuses to recognise exclusive, primary or distinguished ways of the formation 
of law. Instead, it leaves it up to history and the self-assertive practice of society 
to select and decide in practice which of the competing ways of generating and 
forming phenomena (and how and how much persistently) will come out as the 
exclusive, primary, distinguished, recognised or tolerated one. In consequence, 
(4) it takes cognisance of the fact that a variety of ways of generating and 
forming law may concomitantly prevail and assert themselves in society—with 
varying impact, effectiveness and persistence. It is a function of social self-
regulation and feedback whether one or more of these can become selected as 
dominant or "official" ways of the law's formation, letting the rest freely 
prevail, or maybe just tolerating or attempting to exclude or even ban them. 
Simultaneously, however, (5) independent of how we think of either of these 
ways of law formation, none of them can prevail in isolation, untouched by the 
others: they function in mutual influence of die others—strengthening or 
weakening, or parallel to one another. 
As to its fundamental nature, law is a multifactoral phenomenon. Its 
specificity is provided precisely by the fact that, in principle, its multifactorality 
can be identified in any of its components. Multifactorality is not simply a 
characteristic expressing consecutive (imaginary or actual) phases, but is a 
characteristic truly prevailing (pervasively and permeatingly) in every moment. 
For one can reveal each legal phenomenon's coming into being in the 
originally dominant way (on the one hand), somewhat coloured (strengthened, 
weakened or providing extra backing) by the parallelity or opposition of the 
dominant way to, or even the latter's independence of, other paths and ways 
of generating law. 
When defining the fundamental nature of law we ought to keep in mind the 
following considerations: (1) law is a homogeneous entity that is not 
unchangeably (and in a static and reifying manner) identical with itself, but is 
rather a changing and dynamic concept expressing the continuous process of 
social practice. Therefore, (2) we cannot think of law as though it were some 
unity, because it is composed of various motions that support or neutralise 
(extinguish) one another by their parallelity or opposite direction. Consequently, 
in this constant motion (3) we cannot from the very beginning make categorical 
statements about either of the components and whether they embody the 
'legal' or 'non-legal'. Rather we ought to formulate the following in a more 
subtle manner: it qualifies as 'legal' or 'non-legal' in this or that recognised 
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or truly prevalent sense of how law originates, and respectively, it qualifies as 
'more legal' or 'less legal' in either of the above senses. Finally, (4) as law 
is an uninterrupted process, we cannot conceive of its totality at any given time 
as uniform or complete and unchangeably identical with itself. Being a 
phenomenon issued (as woven together) from the various incessantly running 
and counter-running motions, it always displays different sides, components and 
ways of legal formation (i.e., their conflict and momentarily final outcome) at 
any moment in time. In consequence, in every such and similar sense, 
recognised or truly prevalent sense of the emergence of law, it continuously 
features up and englobes the motions and measurable states of transforming into 
and withdrawing from the law (always just in a relative sense, because it is 
measured to the aforementioned levels of 'more legal' and 'less legal'). 
2.3. Law as made up from acts 
By definition and in accordance with its ontological standing, law is a multi-
factoral process composed of the sum of actualisations made in the sequence of 
various consecutive acts. 
We may probably claim that this is some condition générale. That is, it is 
a pervasive characteristic of legal development at all times, although only in 
most recent times did it become conspicuously criterion-like in relation to the 
description of the nature of law. This shows that our social life is becoming 
more and more controlled by law and pushed to juridified channells: legal 
mediation and especially socially widespread confidence, both popular and 
professional, in relying on the power of judicial decision-making have just 
moved into the limelight and primarily in more developed countries. In more 
philosophical terms: increasing socialisation and accentuating legal mediation 
in social processes confer a stronger emphasis in selecting the established ways 
of how law is originated, upon the settlement of conflicts by means of 
authoritative decisions and upon the concrete actualisation of the latent and 
potential abstract messages of the law. 
Utilising symbolic images that might seem rather bizarre at the first sight: 
(a) legal enforcement of the customary social practice may be reminiscent of the 
roll of a stream, (b) 'legis latio' as a sequence of discrete motions may remind 
us of the advancement of a huge walking excavator, and, finally, (c) 'juris 
dictio'—with the immense number of authoritative (administrative, judicial and 
other) decisions, accumulated consecutively in time—makes us think of the juice 
uninterruptedly pouring out from the machine-line in a canning factory. The 
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demand for regulation has incredibly increased in our days. Numerous situations 
require prompt decisions and this induces an incessant flow of actualisations 
through the generation of laws. 
At the same time, today's cognitive sciences ascertain for us that—according 
to in-depth analyses—events of everyday life, minor and major alike, are 
composed of nothing but acts. Acts are performed within a conventionalised 
framework. In a changing context they undergo shifts of emphasis and changes 
of meaning—maybe unnoticeable or, moreover, unimportant in and of them-
selves—that can nevertheless add up in the longer run to changes in direction. 
Accordingly, tradition and innovation, routine and creation, fertilisedness by 
deep roots, on the one hand, and lostness in tabula rasa limitlessness, on the 
other, can intermingle in these processes into one organic evolvement. 
English-American and Scandinavian legal realism, as well as the existen-
tialist legal philosophy always put the emphasis on the judicial event as the key 
for testing law in action, and this realisation gains added meaning at this point 
in the light of what was said above. If the socialisation [Sozialisierung in 
LUKÁCS' social ontology] of societal life arrives at A stage where the actualised 
law is increasingly becoming the sole variant of law to bear genuine legal 
meaning, then—independently of how we think of our life under either the rule 
of precedent law arrangements or the traditions of legal realism or existen-
tialism—the 'judicial' event will be more likely to truly create law and carry 
its actualised (if there is any) message. (And, in turn, this may influence the 
theoretical explanations through which we attempted to reconstruct the other 
ways of generating law, that is, the specific integration, conferring legal validity, 
into the formal domain of law of the customary social practice and the law-
making significance of 'legislation'.) 
3. The nature of legal thinking 
On basis of the above survey involving some common methodological ques-
tions, as well as the attempts at answering them, related to everyday thinking, 
the scientific pattern of blinking, and questions related to the thinking 
characteristic of the legal profession that arose throughout the millennia it is 
extremely difficult, actually almost impossible to draw conclusions in the form 
of generalisable statements. The particularity and distinctive feature of law 
almost gets lost in the cavalcade of various attemptable ways of flunking since 
from induction to deduction, from the temptation by meditation resolving 
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conceptuality to rigorous axiomatism, from fiction, metaphors, symbols and 
various sorts of substitution to narrations through proverbs, precepts, allegories 
and parables, everything that human kind has developed throughout the 
millennia can also be encountered within the domain of law. What is typical of 
law among these is mainly treated within the framework of comparative law 
studies by the specialised fields of comparative legal cultures and comparative 
judicial mind.10 
Therefore, our most trivial conclusion from the present methodological 
perspective can hardly be more than that any kind of conceptual definition can 
become law (at least to some extent) and, consequently, any conceptual 
operation can become subject to legal thinking (at least to some extent). 
Accordingly, the doctrinal study of law is not necessarily more or less than the 
strict conceptual elaboration for legal purposes (at least to some extent) of any 
kind of conceptual definitions by means of definition, classification and 
systématisation. 
So, we can hardly say anything more, because the conditions of what the 
ways and means of legal reasoning are, i.e., of how to originate validity and 
draw conclusions, acknowledgeable and to be acknowledged in a given legal 
order, will be defined by the legal order itself on grounds of potentialities 
inherent in the underlying legal culture and of the legal ideology which would 
convert these into a professional practice. What was precisely revealed by the 
above survey is that neither law, nor legal thinking can stand in and by itself: 
any formal carrier of sign can only be interpreted in a meaningful way within 
its own informal context and medium. This environment provides the framework 
called legal culture, which, in turn, is rooted in the general culture of society. 
Among others, legal culture is composed of the ethos and values of the legal 
profession, its problem-sensitivity towards law and its conceptualisations, the 
conceptual and referential framework available in law, judicial and administra-
tive skills and practices, as well as the moral expectations toward the legal 
profession. Legal ideology, on the other hand, is mainly composed of the image 
to be formed in the legal order on how to 'construct* and 'operate* the law, 
that is, on the law's nature, sources and criteria of validity, and on the 
10 Cf., e.g, VARGA, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures, Aldershot— Hong Kong—Singa-
pore—Sydney, Dartmouth & New York, New York University Press, 1992 and GESSNER, 
V. -HOELAND, A.—VARGA, Cs.: European Legal Cultures, Aldershot-Brookfield-Singa-
pore-Sydney, Dartmouth, 1995, Part II, 87-166. 
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conditions of how a conclusion can be drawn in law and what consequences that 
would imply. 
So, the most general characteristic of law, present also in legal thinking, is 
that law (1) itself creates the features of its own constitution, both limits and 
criteria, (2) strictly, without dialectics or compromises, by defining a feature 
expressed in the formal facts that constitute a case. In consequence, (3) law 
must select from two possibilities existent in form of a binary code" regarding 
its construction, operation and form of manifestation: something is either inside 
or outside the law, and it either qualifies as legal or as non-legal.12 (4) The 
conditions of making this selection are also established by the law itself through 
its own "system of fulfilment".13 Therefore, (5) it is normatively closed while 
being open to new information: anything can be run through its filter to receive 
the qualification of the law (as 'compulsory', 'forbidden', 'permitted' or 
11 Niklas Luhmann's expression. 
12 "Qualification necessarily amounts to alternative exclusivity and to the declaration of 
certain duality, since the subsumption of facts under some defined notion(s) and the more or 
less automatic drawing of more or less narrowly defined legal consequences therefrom can 
only be performed unconditionally in exclusive totality, without any inclusion of the idea of 
alternativity, division, decomposition, or reservation in regard of some further potential 
qualification(s), of the qualification and the drawn legal consequences. Therefore, providing 
that given facts have been duly qualified, all provisions of the law relevant to the qualification 
of the facts in question and the consequences issuing therefrom are to be cogently and 
properly applied, while, on the other hand, the relevancy of any other provision is automati-
cally excluded by the bare fact that the given qualification in question is made—at least in the 
same respect: at the same point in time and within the same system and branch of the law." 
From the author: A joglogikai vizsgálódás lehetőségei az újabb megközelítések tükrében. 
(Prospects of Logical Investigations in Law in the Mirror of Recent Approaches) Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, 1971, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 718-719 (reprinted in his Jogi elméletek, jogi kultúrák: 
Kritikák, ismertetések a jogfilozófia és az összehasonlító jog köréből (Theories of Law, Legal 
Cultures: Critical Essays and Reviews in Legal Philosophy and Comparative Law), Budapest, 
ELTE "Comparative Legal Cultures" Project, 1994, 95-96). 
13 "Subsumption will get a particular shape owing to the fact that some teleological project 
(the law) is destined to produce another teleological project (its application), and thus the 
already mentioned dialectic, the conflict of class interests that springs from this becomes the 
ultimate determining factor, and the logical subsumption is based on this only as a 
phenomenal form."'LUKÁCS, Gy.: A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról, II (Zur Ontologie des 
gesellschaftlichen Seins: Die wichtigsten Problemkomplexe), Budapest, Magvető, 1976, 220, 
for the manuscript in German, see Lukács Archives and Library, Budapest, M/120, 124. Cf. 
from the author: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 
1985; reprint: 1998, 145, note 300. 
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'indifferent'), yet (6) this very qualification can only be gained by means of 
logical deduction as one previously codified feasible answer. 
What can still be said at this point for a generalisable conclusion? Well, 
there is at least one common characteristic of respective legal ideologies: the 
requirement that law should contribute to the resolution of social conflicts by 
transforming (through refining and stylising) real conflicts of interest firstly into 
conflicts within the law, just for those administering justice to be able to 
formulate—on basis of values, principles, considerations, references and 
perspectives recognised as referable objects in law, that is, as based on the law 
and the conclusions drawn therefrom—their own response in the name of the 
law. These in turn will be presented as the sole and exclusive response of the 
law strictly derived from the propositions of the law. This is the process of 
transformation which formal analyses have for long attempted to formulate as 
the particular (yet inexplicable) casual resolution of irresolvable contradictions 
between law and logic, on the one hand, and fact and norm, on the other.14 
This duality stretches between two poles—the own network of traditions, 
normatively recorded propositions, recognised techniques and procedures of 
argumentation, as well as referential practices within the law, on the one hand, 
and the practical nature of the issue to be decided and the demand for 
14 "As far as law-application is concerned, those conflicts require judicial decision which 
themselves are socially real together with their economic, political and moral implications. 
But in order to formulate conflicts in his reasoning, the judge first has to convert them 
into conflicts within the law. Then, in the first phase of manipulation, the selection and 
clarification of the facts of the case take place in conformity with the choice and interpretation 
of the corresponding ('relevant') norms of the legal system. The phenomenon which neo-
Kantian legal philosophy used to call the conflict between the abstract wording of the law and 
the concrete facts constituting a case, takes place in this phase. It may also be revealed at this 
time that there is a gap in the law or even a 'critical gap" (when a 'legally relevant' norm 
is available but one that would have a socially undesirable result), which the Anglo-American 
literature usually describes simply as »hard cases«. 
In the second phase of manipulation, the conflict thus converted into a conflict within the 
law is dissolved, i.e. reduced to a false conflict in legal reasoning. This is when the »facts 
constituting the case«, already qualified from a juristic point of view, and the correspondingly 
interpreted provisions of »the law« are formulated, i.e. manipulated so that they make possible 
the presentation of the desirable decision as also a logical result deriving f rom the »facts 
constituting the case« as well as from »the law« based on »legal reasoning«." VARGA, The 
Place of Law..., 146-147. 
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practicality of solutions, on the other15—, the concrete resolution of which, i.e., 
the intensification of their tension through repeated confrontation, followed by 
taking them to a point of rest, will be done in a solely hermeneutically 
constructible situation and through such a process.16 
4. Concluding thoughts 
We followed a path that led to law from the paradigms of legal thinking, and 
from the self-assertion of legal formalism to its overall cultural determination. 
Yet, our human yearnings peeked out from behind the illusory reference of our 
security and we could discover reliable solid grounds only in the elusive 
continuity of our social practice. In the meantime it proved to be a process 
which we had thought to have been present as a material entity. What we had 
believed to be fully built up proved to build continuously f rom acts in an 
uninterrupted series. 
What we have discovered about law is that it has always been inside of us, 
although we thought it to have been outside. We bear it in our culture despite 
our repeated and hasty attempts at linking it to materialities. 
We have identified ancient dilemmas as existent in our current debates as 
well. We have found long abandoned patterns again. We have discovered the 
15 It is precisely the hermeneutics of our explanation on the concept of God that provides 
such characterisation of law (considered a parallel field therefore worthy of examination): "It 
is a task of understanding that derives from the relationship between the sources of law and 
the tasks of jurisdiction, in a way that traditionalised sources of the law can set the path 
leading to present-time jurisdiction by becoming the source of understanding throwing light 
on problems of the present case in law [...]. It is expected that in encountering the present-day 
concrete case the traditionalised text can serve as enlightening, explanatory and guiding word, 
becoming the source of legal interpretation and thereby also the source of jurisdiction." 
EßELING, С.,: Wort Gottes und Hermeneutik Zeitschriftßir Theologie und Kirche, 1959, Vol. 
56, No. 2, 224-251. 
16 As we have already characterised it before, "[tjhis is Fikentscher's theory of the case 
norm, in which the hermeneutic pressure »pushes the hermeneutic process to turning point«, 
which, at a time when »with the given yardsticks of the object and the justice, neither the 
further specification of the norm nor the further breaking down of the notions of the facts that 
constitute a legal case is not possible any longer« [FIKENTSCHER, W.: Methode des Rechts, 
IV, Dogmatischer Teil, Tübingen, Mohr, 1977, 100 and 198], will be reached." Cf., from the 
author: Theory of the Judicial Process: The Establishment of Facts, Budapest, Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1995. 
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realisations of common recognitions in those potentialities and directions in law 
which we believed to have been conceptually marked off once and for all. 
However, we have found an invitation for elaboration in what has revealed 
itself as ready-to-take. Behind the mask, and in the backstage, the demand for 
our own initiation, play, role-undertaking and human responsibility has 
presented itself. We have become subjects from objects, indispensable actors 
from mere addressees. And, we can be convinced that despite having a variety 
of civilisational overcoats, the culture of law is still exclusively inherent in us 
who experience it day by day. We bear it and shape it. Everything conventional 
in it is conventionalised by us. It does not have any further existence or effect 
beyond this. And with its existence inherent in us, we cannot convey the 
responsibility to be born for it on somebody else either. It is ours in its totality 
so much that it cannot be torn out of our days or acts. It will thus turn into what 
we guard it to become. Therefore, we must take care of it at all times since we 
are, in many ways, taking care of our own.17 
17 In a wider context, cf., from the author: Measuring through Patterning in Law: 
Development of an Idea in Europe. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 1998, Vol. 39, Nos. 1-2; Norms 
through Parables in the New Testament: An Alternative Frainework for Time and Law (in: 
BOECKE, M. van-OST, F. (eds.), Time and Law, Brussels, Bruylant, 1998, 213-224); 
Patterns of Thought, Patterns of Law. Acta Juridica Hungarica 1997, Vol. 38, Nos. 3-7, 
93-105. 
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György SZÉNÁSI The Role of the International Court 
of Justice in the Development of 
International Environmental Law* 
The Charter of the United Nations which established the International Court of 
Justice gives to the Court the power to decide any legal disputes which are 
submitted to it by the parties. 
Article 36 embodies a decision to give the Court general jurisdiction over 
legal disputes of whatever character. And the Court has always taken the view 
that there are no a priori limits to the subject of international regulation. The 
jurisdiction of the Court thus includes disputes of a legal character, that is to 
say, disputes between states as to their respective rights and obligations on 
questions related to the environment as well. And the potential breadth of this 
jurisdiction has been reaffirmed by influential agencies. For example, Agenda 21, 
drafted by the UN Conference on Environment and Development, encouraged the 
recourse of States to the ICJ in environmental matters (Chapter 39.10). 
International treaties aiming at the protection of the environment or including 
provisions which concern environmental protection often explicitly state that 
disputes arising from the application or the interpretation of their clauses should 
* Paper prepared to the 1CJ/UNITAR Colloqium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the 
International Court of Justice (The Hague, April 16-18, 1996). A shorter version of this text 
has been delivered by the author at the colloquium. 
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be referred to the ICJ.1 Practically all the major treaties concerning environ-
mental protection adopted later than the mid-1980's include such provisions. The 
Court itself has formed a standing special Chamber, on the basis of Article 26(1) 
of its Statute, in order to be prepared to the fullest possible extent to deal with 
any environmental case falling within its jurisdiction. 
In a statement at the UN Conference on Environment and Development held 
in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, Sir Robert Jennings, then President of the 
Court, declared that «the function of the established 'principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations' must include not only the settlement of disputes but 
also the scientific development of general international law». He also indicated 
that principles and rules of law can be gradually developed and elaborated by 
the very process of interpreting and applying them to the specific and often 
unforeseen factual situations that arise in actual disputes brought before them. 
1 Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean 
Sea, Rome, 24 September 1949, Art. 13; International Convention for the Prevention of the 
Pollution by Ships, London, 12 May 1954, Art. 13; Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1 December 
1959, Art. XI(2); Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 21 May, 1963, 
Optional Protocol, Art. 1; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, New 
York, 3 March, 1980, Art. 17(2); International Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 20 May 1980, Art; XXV(2); Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March, 1985, Art.ll(3)(b); Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 26 September 1986, Art. 11(2); Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Vienna, 26 
September 1986, Art. 13(2); Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Basle, 22 March 1989, Art. 20(2); Convention on the 
Ban of the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of their Transboundary 
Movements within Africa, Bamako, 31 January 1991, Art.20(2); Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 1991, Art. 15(2)(a); 
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Madrid, 4 October 1991, Art. 
19(1); Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Art. 22(2)(a); Convention on Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Art. 21(2)(a); Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, June, 1992, Art. 14(2)(a); Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992, Art. 27(3)(b); Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, 
Paris, 13 January 1993, Art.XIV(2); FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 
24 November 1993, Art. IX(3); Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution on further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, Oslo, 13 June 1994; UN Convention 
to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, Art. 28(2)(b). 
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International environmental law—and environmental law in general—consti-
tute a new field of law and, as Judge Jennings stated: «That new international 
law for the protection of the environment needs urgently to be developed 
cannot be a matter of doubt». 
Perhaps the Court 's decision to establish the Chamber for Environmental 
Matters also reflects the need to develop this new field of international law. 
How can the Court contribute to the elaboration and the development of inter-
national environmental law? The list of the sources of law which the Court shall 
apply, as defined in Article 38 of the Statute gives the elements of the answer. 
a) The first of such sources are «international conventions, whether general 
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contracting states». 
This rule naturally includes the treaties which contain provisions concerning 
environmental protection. 
It also means that the application of treaty provisions is not restricted to 
those of the particular treaty whose interpretation and application is at stake. 
Other treaties binding upon the parties to the dispute, including conventions 
which contain general rules and principles concerning environmental protection, 
can be utilised, «whether general or particular», in order to determine the 
interpretation or the scope of application of a given treaty. In this regard it 
should be noted that Article 22(1) of the Rio de Janeiro Convention on 
Biological Diversity, now binding upon more than 130 states, foresees that: 
«The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international 
agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would 
cause serious damage or a threat to biological diversity.» 
This provision should certainly be applied when appropriate in disputes 
between parties to the Convention, even if the Court is asked to pronounce on 
the application or the interpretation of another treaty. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity is very significant in respect to the 
question of whether rules and principles which emerged after the conclusion of 
a treaty should be taken into account. The Court itself has stated that: «...an 
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework 
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation...».2 
A further step in the present investigation is to ask whether rules of 
conventions can be utilised in disputes between states which are not parties, or 
2 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(Southwest Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1971, 16 ff, at 31. 
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all of which are not parties to such conventions. This raises on the one hand 
the problem of «erga omnes» obligations created by treaties, and on the other 
hand the question of the extent to which treaties on environmental matters can 
contribute to the development of general international law, binding on all those 
states who have not expressly disagreed with the particular development. 
A fundamental element of the answer can be found in the Advisory Opinion 
related to the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. This Opinion of the Court admits that principles 
underlying a convention can be recognised as binding on states, even without 
any treaty obligation. The Court also noted the unilateral nature of the 
humanitarian purposes and obligations of the Convention, rejecting the concept 
that all international treaty matters arc directly inspired by the notion of 
contract: 
«In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of 
their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely the 
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the 
convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of 
individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a 
perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which 
inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, 
the foundation and measure of all its provisions.»3 
In the case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Company, Limited, 
the Court referred to its former opinion, further developing this distinction: 
«...an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-
vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes». 
The examples given by the Court of such obligations are significant: the 
outlawing of acts of aggression, genocide, principles and rules concerning the 
basic rights of the human person. As die judgment states: «Some ofthe corre-
sponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international 
law ... others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-
universal character».4 
3 Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports, 1951. 21 and 23. 
4 Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports, 1970. 32. 
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By these dicta the Court has clearly designated the way in which inter-
national law can be developed, and its approach can equally be applied to 
international environment protection as to other areas. Indeed this has been 
expressly recognised by the International Law Commission in its work on state 
responsibility; I refer particularly to the definition of state crimes in Article 19 
of Part I, but also to the more generally applicable definition of "injured State" 
in Article 5 of Part II. The Court should not only interpret and apply treaties 
which are submitted to it, taking into account other conventional provisions 
existing between the parties to the dispute, which aim at the protection of the 
environment. It also should use rules and principles included in treaties having 
a general scope and tending to the same objective, independently of the fact of 
whether the parties to the dispute are contracting parties or not to such treaties. 
Indeed, many multilateral conventions related to environmental protection fall 
into categories comparable to those designated above, as the contracting states 
do not have any interest of their own and act for a common interest. 
Such treaties, but also other instruments respected by all the states in the 
World, such as the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Declaration of Rio 
de Janeiro of 1992, demonstrate that the protection of the environment 
constitutes a common interest. The fundamental importance of environmental 
concern is also shown, as it were in extremis, by its incorporation into 
international humanitarian law. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, bans employing methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause wide-spread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.5 The Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission 
includes a provision punishing an individual who wilfully causes or orders the 
causing of widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment.6 One may thus conclude that environmental protection is a major interest 
of mankind and that rules and principles which tend to ensure it must be 
considered as having a general relevance.7 The Court could be inspired by 
5 Protocol I, Geneva, 8 June 1977, Articles XXV.l, XXXV.3, LIV.2, LV.l and LVI.l . Cf.: 
Protocol II, Art; XIV and XV. 
6 Article 26, Wilful and Severe Damage to the Environment, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1991, vol. II, Part Two, 107. 
7 See also DAILLET, P. and PELLET, A., who recognise the importance of the «édiction 
de nonnes à vocation universelle »which creates situations where treaties can be applied to non-
party states without their consent. Droit international public, 5th ed., Paris, 1994, 244-248. 
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such conclusions and consequently develop international law in environmental 
matters. 
b) Rules and principles concerning environmental protection can also fall 
into the category of «international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law» (Statute of the ICJ, Art. 38(1 )(b)). 
The core problem of this very classic definition of custom is to determine, 
especially in matters concerning environmental protection, what is «practice». 
General awareness of environmental problems is little older than a quarter of 
a century. Can a general practice be established in such a relatively short time? 
On the other hand, what type of behaviour should be considered as contributing 
to the emergence of international customary rules? 
It has been suggested that repeated expressions of the consensus of states 
on certain rules can make customary law rules emerge. Indeed, such 
expressions can be considered a practice and at the same time as the acceptance 
of their legal nature, the «opinio iuris». Such expressions of a consensus can 
figure in legally binding instruments or in «soft law» instruments, that is to 
say, in non-binding declarations, resolutions or recommendations. The two 
hypotheses should be examined separately, although quite often the same rules 
and principles are formulated successively in both types of instruments. 
1. Rules and principles which repeatedly appear in different treaties can be 
considered to reflect a growing consensus on their content. On the contrary, it 
can be argued that the very fact that the authors of more recent treaties 
believed it necessary to repeat them shows their uncertainty concerning the 
existence of such rules and principles. In some cases the uncertainty has been 
eliminated by a more or less formal recognition of the customary nature of 
such rules and principles. This was the case of Part XII of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, related to the protection of and preservation of the 
marine environment. Even before the entry into force of the Convention the 
preamble of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (Paris, 22 September 1992) explicitly stated: 
«Recalling the relevant provisions of customary international law reflected 
in Part XII of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and, in particular, 
Article 197 on global and regional cooperation for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment...». 
In reality, Part XII of the Convention includes many provisions which did 
not exist as international law rules before the opening of the Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, but the extensive processes of that Conference, and related 
activities in the law of the sea, have had a catalytic effect. 
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2. Rules and principles formulated in non-binding instruments can also be 
recognised and thus acquire the status of customary law rules. In this regard a 
paragraph of the preamble of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution (Geneva, 13 November 1979) is significant: 
«Considering the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and in particular principle 21, 
which expresses the common conviction that states have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction...». 
It may be added that the rule for the respect of the environment outside the 
limits of the jurisdiction of states, formulated by Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration, was later included in several international conventions.8 
By acknowledging the emergence of customary law rules related to the 
protection of the environment, the World Court can contribute to the 
development of international law in this field. 
c) The problem of identifying «the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations» (Statute, Art. 38(1 )(c)> has been a much debated one since 
the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Concerning 
environmental law, it is clear that a set of rules and principles appears both in 
international law and in domestic legal systems. 
The Rio de Janeiro Declaration proclaims several of these principles. Some 
of them originated in domestic law systems, such as the principle of public 
participation9 or the prior assessment of the environmental impact of 
8 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, Art. 194(2); 
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 9 
July 1985, Art 20; Convention of Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992, Art; 3; UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992, Preamble. 
9 According to principle 10 «Environmental issues are best handled with the participation 
of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, 
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. 
Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, 
shall be provided.» Public participation also is emphasised in Agenda 21 (Section III). See, 
on public participation in the European Union and in domestic law systems: KISS, 
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projects.10 Others were first formulated in international instruments, such as 
the precautionary principle," the requirement of notification to concerned 
A.—SHELTON, D.: Manual of European Environmental Law, Cambridge, 1993, 443-501. In 
recent international treaties public participation appears more and more often: ASEAN 
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, 
Art. 16; Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
Espoo, 25 February 1991, Art. 2(6); Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Art. 16; Convention on 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Art. 9; Convention 
on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, 9 April 1992, 
Art. 17; Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992, Art; 4(l)(i); 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris, 
22 September 1992, Art. 9; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Lugano, 21 June 1993, Art. 13-16; North American 
Agreement on Environmental Co-operation, 13 September 1993, Art. 2(l)(a); Convention on 
Co-operation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, Sofia, 29 June 
1994, Art. 14; Protocol to the 1976 Barcelona Convention Concerning Specially Protected 
Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, Barcelona, 10 June 1995, Art. 19, etc. 
10 According to Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration «Environmental impact assessment, as 
a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a 
significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent 
national authority.» Cf.: KISS—SHELTON: Manual of European Environmental Law, op. cit., 
58-61. In the international field see: Kuwait Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution, 24 April 1978, Art. 11; Convention on the Protection of Nature 
in the South Pacific, Apia, Art. 5(4); UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 
10 December 1982, Art. 206; ASEAN Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, Art. 14; Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 April 1991; passim; Protocol to the 
Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Madrid, 4 April 1991, Art. 8; Convention on 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Annex IV and V; 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, 9 
April 1992, Art. 7; Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992, Art. 14; 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris, 
22 September 1992, Art. 6; North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation, 13 
September 1993, Art. 2(l)(e); etc. Many non-mandatory international instruments also 
advocate the prior assessment of potential environmental impact: see KISS, A.—SHELTON, 
D.: International Environmental IMW, Transnational Publishers, 1991, 147-148. 
11 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides: «In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary principle shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion.» See: Convention on the Ban of the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the 
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governments of emergencies12 and of projects which can affect their environ-
ment, and the duty to consult with such states.13 It seems that in given 
Control of their Transboundary Movements within Africa, Bamako, 31 January 1991, Art. 
4(3)(f); Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Art. 130R(2); Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 
17 March 1992, Art. 2; Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea, Helsinki, 9 April 1992, Art. 3(2); Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de 
Janeiro, June 1992, Art. 4(1 )(f); Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 
1992, preamble; Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast 
Atlantic, Paris, 22 September 1992, Art. 2(2)(a); Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution on further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, Oslo, 13 June 1994, 
Preamble; Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube 
River, Sofia, 29 June 1994, Art. 2(4); Protocol to the 1976 Barcelona Convention Concerning 
Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, Barcelona, 10 June 
1995, Preamble; Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, 
The Hague, 16 September 1995, Art. 2(2); Agreement for the Implementation of the UNCLOS 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, New York, 4 December 1995, Art. 5(c) and 6; etc. 
12 Principle 18 of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration provides that: «States shall immediately 
notify other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce 
sudden harmful effects on the environment of those States. Every effort shall be made by the 
international community to help States so afflicted.» See: UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, Art. 198, preceded and followed by comparable 
provisions of a series of 8 conventional systems concerning regional seas and their protocols 
(KISS—S H ELTON: International Environmental Law, op. cit., 194—196), as well as 
Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, Bonn, 3 December 
1976, Art. 11; ASEAN Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, Art. 20(d); Convention on Early Notification in the Case of 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Vienna, 26 September 1986 passim; Convention 
on the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe, Magdeburg, 8 Oct. 1990, Art. 
2(l)(h); Agreement on Co-operation for Combating Pollution in the North-East Atlantic, 
Lisbon, 17 October 1990, Art. 9(2); Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation, London, 30 November 1990, Art. 3-5; Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on 
Environmental Protection, Madrid, 4 October 1991, Art. 15(2); Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki 17 March 1992, 
Art. 14; Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17 March 
1992, Art. 10; Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area, Helsinki, 9 April 1992, Art. 13; Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 
June 1992, Art. 14 l)(d); Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and Sustainable Use 
of the Danube River, Sofia, 29 June 1994, Art. 16, etc. Cf. International Court of Justice, 
Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), Merits, 3 April 1949, ICJ Reports, 1949, 22. 
13 According to Principle 19 of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration «States shall provide prior 
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circumstances the Court could apply such rules and principles as falling within 
the scope of rules envisaged in Art. 38(1 )(c). 
d) Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations can be used as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law (Statute, Art. 38(1 )(d)). 
The decision of an international tribunal which is most often quoted on 
matters relating to the environment is the 1941 arbitral award in the Trail 
Smelter case. The Tribunal proclaimed that 
«...no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence».14 
Although it was concerned with a very different problem, the International 
Court of Justice later confirmed the basic rule that no state may utilise its 
territory contrary to the rights of other states.15 An obiter dictum of the 
arbitrators in the Lake Lanoux Case16 can also be considered as reinforcing 
the rule that no state should cause significant injury to the environment of other 
states. One may presume that the International Court of Justice would consider 
these decisions in a given case submitted to it. 
The last type of potential source of law which the Court can apply, the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. 
and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that 
may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with 
(hose States at an early stage and in good faith». See: Nordic Environmental Protection 
Convention, Stockholm, 19 February 1974, Art. 4-7; Kuwait Convention on the Protection 
of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 24 April 1974, Art. 11; ASEAN Agreement on 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, Art. 20; 
Agreement between Germany, the EEC and Austria on Cooperation in Managing Water 
Resources of the Danube Basin, Regensburg, 1 December 1987; Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 1991, particularly Art. 
3(2) and (3); Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Articles 9(2)(h), 10, 13 and 16; Convention on Co-operation 
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, Sofia, 29 June 1994, Art. 10 and 
11, etc.; See also for non-binding international instruments: KISS—SHELTON: International 
Environmental Law, op. cit., 138-141. 
14 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 3, 1938 at 1963. 
15 Corfu Channel Case UK v. Albania, Merits, ICJ Reports, 1949, 4. 
16 Affaire du Lac Lanoux, France c. Espagne, 19 November, 1956, United Nations Reports 
of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 12, 281. 
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naturally raises the problem of the identification of such teachings. What can 
be stated at this point is that since the beginning of the 1970s a huge number 
of books and articles has been published concerning international environ-
mental legal problems. It can be estimated that the number of monographs is 
above 50 and there are at least 20 law reviews which focus on this field. All 
international law reviews and treatises also publish articles and developments 
on international law problems concerning environmental matters. Naturally, 
such a quantitative approach is not sufficient to reveal sources of law, but its 
significance cannot be denied. The Court itself does not, of course, refer by 
name to any legal writers at all; it focuses, and rightly focuses, on the specific 
case and refers to doctrine only in general terms. Nonetheless, as separate 
opinions reveal and other evidence suggest, the Court collectively is fully 
aware of the trends of doctrinal development, and is careful to take those broad 
trends into account, without being unduly influenced by any specific "school" 
or approach. 
* * * 
In conclusion, it may be submitted that the values which will constitute the 
foundation of international law in the coming decades or even in the latter part 
of the 21st century are human rights in the broadest meaning of this concept, 
including the right to a healthy environment, both for present and future 
generations. Jurisdiction in respect to the protection of human rights was 
conferred upon special tribunals and structures outside of the International 
Court of Justice both for historic and political reasons. It is highly desirable 
that, as emphasised by Sir Robert Jennings, the Court play a role, which will 
be of crucial importance, in the implementation and the development of 
international law in this new area. The tasks of the Court are, however, far 
from being easy in this respect. As one of the cases currently listed by the 
Court demonstrates, issues of international environmental law may relate to a 
whole range of other important questions, the Court is therefore expected, 
while dealing with the former, to contribute also to the doctrine of material 
breach of a treaty, clausula rebus sic stantibus, repudiation of a treaty by the 
violation of its provisions, as well as to the doctrine of state succession, all 
closely connected to the "basic" dispute. May I express my conviction that the 
International Court of Justice will perfectly master this extremely difficult task 
by delivering specific answers to specific questions. But—and this is the special 
feature and strength of law—it can thereby contribute to the development and 
better understanding of international law in a field of profound human interest, 
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whilst at the same time help to restore the mild climate necessary to further 
develop the friendly relations between the two States concerned. It is a 
formidable task, calling for deep study and reflection, but above all for judicial 
wisdom, which is undoubtedly characteristic to this august body. 
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1. Introduction 
Reshaping their health care systems towards a more market-driven model, most 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) face serious legal problems. 
This article analyses therefore the shift from a severely regulated health care 
system towards a more flexible health care scheme from a legal perspective. 
To increase understanding in the legal consequences of reforming CEE 
health care system schemes, author has developed a tentative theoretical model 
of health care law-making (section 2). This model can be characterised by its 
interactive and circular concept of legal decision-making. As such, the model 
considers the legislative process as a circular systematic activity. Its 
progressively introduced legislative changes enable to review (un)intended 
consequences of opted measures and to modify if necessary. Whereas the 
underlying health care legal principles of the normative frame function as the 
raison d'être of legal measures, the derived normative approach conceptualises 
the optional pace of change (section 3). 
To review the feasibility of the theoretical model, the model has been 
compared to the actual legislative reform process in Hungary. This article 
outlines some of the results, which prima facie confirm the validity of the 
model given the experienced parallels (section 4). It is, however, concluded that 
further comparative research is necessary to verify the feasibility in a different 
legal setting (section 5). 
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2. An analytical framework of health care law-making 
Due to the rather inconsistent legal reform strategy, legislative changes of 
the health care structure in Central and Eastern Europe have been frequently 
characterised as 'crisis management'. Too often, rapidly changing circumstances 
have resulted in less developed, temporary and ad hoc legislative measures. 
These experiences give rise to reconsider the current unsatisfactory approach 
of law-making. In order to develop a more structural and systematic approach 
of health care law-making a tentative model that is founded on correlating 
legal-formal understanding with substantive parameters may provide a useful 
instrument. Consequently, it is questionable in what respect the application of 
such an analytical model may improve the contemporary practise of law-
making in Central and Eastern Europe. The answer refers to the relation health 
care law-making and health policy since health policy objectives to certain 
extent shape the legislative agenda and reverse. Fundamental legal principles 
determine the policy-objectives of the legislature including values as equal 
access to health care and respect for human rights. The balance between both 
perspectives reflects a compromise that corresponds to a minimum level of 
services and facilities available to the entire population. 
2.1 The underlying strategy of incremental changes 
The underlying idea of the suggested model is one of incremental changes of 
the current health care structure. Since the disappointing experiences in the 
early 1990s with mainly duplicating an existent model, a gradual system 
change has been suggested as more appropriate.1 The proposed circular 
concept of law-making translates this notion into law-making by maintaining 
certain elements of the 'ancient ' legal system combined with additional 
changes. These reforms can be structured according a frame of universal legal 
norms irrespective the uniqueness of each country's present status of the health 
care system. From a legal-analytical perspective, the progressive approach of 
constantly monitored effects may reveal possible ramifications and pitfalls in 
reforming the legislative structure. As such, the circular idea of law-making 
buttresses the legislative reform process by timely intervention and geared to 
underpinning objectives and principles. Here it is assumed to provide a 
scientific basis for developing health care legislation. 
1 SALTMAN, R. G.-FIGUERAS, J.: European Health Care Reform: Analysis of Current 
Strategies. World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, 1997. 264. 
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2.2 A legal-theoretical model of law-making 
Derived from both legal as organisational sciences,2 the idea of law-making 
can be considered as a methodological concept that consists of various 
successive elements.3 Graphically, the method can be reflected according to a 
(simplified) model. 
Figure 1. Elements of law-making 
2 Cf., for example NOLL, P.: Gesetzgebungslehre, Hamburg, 1973; CAROLL, S. J.-TOSI, 
H. L.: Management by Objectives: Applications and Research, New York, 1973.; KREMS, 
В.: Grundfragen der Gesetzgebungslehre, Berlin, 1979.; WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: Einführung in 
die Gesetzgebungstheorie. Wien, 1984, Contemporary Models of the Legal Sciences. Wroclaw, 
1989.; Van der VELDEN, W. G.: The. development of the science of Legislation. A legal 
theoretical inquiry, (dissertation), Utrecht, 1988.; WINTER, H. В.: Evaluation of law-making, 
Groningen, 1996.; ÖHLINGER, T.: Methodik der Gesetzgebung: Legistische Richtlinien in 
Theorie und Praxis. Wien, 1982, 21-22.; SARNECKI, P. Gesetzgebungsqualität und 
Gesetzgebungsverfahren in Polen, in SCHÄFFER, H.: Gesetzgebungsverfahren und 
Gesetzgebungsqualität, Manz, Vienna, 1992. 37-40.; SZURGACZ, H.: Entwicklungen im 
Polnischen Sozialrecht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Krankenversicherung und der 
Sozialhilfe, 174-175., in: Rechtsberatung und Verwaltingsjorderung in Mittel- und Osteuropa: 
Vorträge und Diskussionen im Zweiten Werkstattsgespräch zur Verwaltungs forderung der 
Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer, München, 1994. 174-175. 
3 Method defined as: 'a collection of well-ordered and specified activities and possibly 
other instruments, in order to achieve a particular aim or aims, in a particular field and under 
particular conditions'. In the legislative setting, the aim or objective of the method is to 
rationalise the law making process. Van der VELDEN W. G.: op. cit. 192. 
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The first element is identified as 'objectives of law-making' and refers to the 
law-jobs or functions of law. The objective-approach imposes the legislature 
to legislative intervention. Whereas the magnitude, complexity and urgency of 
occurring problems necessitate to prioritise legislative issues, based on a first 
problem-analysis. An extensive descriptive analysis of the specified issue(s) 
will ultimately result in initiating a range of legislative measures that need to 
be implemented and monitored by its effects. To review the extent of 
realisation by its underpinning objectives, and to analyse possible (side-)effects 
of intervention mechanism, evaluation is an effective element that could 
ultimately result in adjustment or modification of the opted instrument. 
Consequently, a motivated consideration of chosen objectives, priorities, means, 
content of the legal document, evaluation-criteria may contribute in a more 
systematic and rational approach of the law-making activity.4 
2.3 Relevance to health care law-making 
Health care legislation as part and parcel of health care law functions as an 
inherent means to perform the main objectives of intended legal reforms. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) has propagated such a systematical approach 
of law-making several years ago.5 Despite its (theoretical) attractiveness, 
deficits in the implementation and evaluation of legislative mechanisms and 
insufficient considered measures complicate a successful realisation of the law-
making reform strategy in most Eastern European countries. Integration of the 
universal functions of health care law into a general concept of law-making 
could improve that activity. A theoretical concept that reflects both normative 
and instrumental qualities may support the legislature in redefining health care 
legislation. Particularly in a state of flux with rapid and profound changes, the 
discerned functions of health care law provide a useful tool for a further to be 
elaborated conceptual frame of legislation. 
4 The rationality concept of law-making has been critised by its rather theoretical approach, 
both in legal as well as in political sciences (KREMS and GÖRLITZ: op. cit.). Rational law-
making is more a legal fiction, than a political reality. Nevertheless, the endeavour to achieve 
a certain degree of rationalisation and controllability in the law making process is legitimate, 
although it has its restrictions. 
5 World Health Organization. Strengthening Ministeries of Health for Primary Health Care, 
1988. Technical Report Series No. 766 WHO, Geneva, 1988, 92. This classification has been 
adopted from Roemer, (ROEMER, R - MCKRAY, G.: Legal Aspects of Health Policy Issues 
and Trends. Westport, 1980. 439) and corresponds largely with the categories of fundamental 
legislative tasks in health care. MONTEGOMERY, J.: Health Care Law. New York, 1997, 53. 
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The functions (or law-jobs6) were successively grouped according to 
clusters such as public health, organisation of health resources, financing and 
tariffs, quality control, and patients' rights. The law-jobs symbolise basic legal 
principles formulated by the WHO as:7 
— to prohibit conduct, and ban or regulate the use of products injurious to 
health; 
— authorise programs and services that promote the health of individuals 
and the community; 
— regulate the production of resources and the production, deployment, and 
the management of the health manpower required for the delivery of health 
care to individuals and of the environmental health services; 
— provide the social financing of health care; 
— exercise surveillance over the quality of health care; 
— to ensure the rights of individuals. 
Combining these functions with the previous model of law-making concentrates 
its application to the field of health care. As a result of the circular approach, 
the law-making activity can be reflected according to the successively discerned 
elements. 
Figure 2. Model of health care law-making 
6 LLEWELLYN, K.: The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs. 1940. Yale Law Journal 
49, quoted by: Longley, D. Health Care Constitutions. Cavendish Publishing, 1996, 12. 
7 WHO 1988, op. cit., 92. 
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The conceptual framework of health care law-making is defined as a coherent 
model of concepts, definitions, assumptions and other analytical instruments 
intended to develop and assess a normative frame of legislation by its 
underpinning ideas. It is assumed to provide a scientific basis for health care 
legislation. Since it is an intellectual construction it does not have to represent 
the actual situation. Such a model is always a simplification, though not a 
blueprint of reality. Accordingly, any description must include certain elements 
of reality while excluding others. Its qualities mainly concern formulating and 
verifying theoretical concepts of health care law-making, which might have 
consequences to the actual legislative activity. 
Obviously, the chronology of the suggested sequence of law-jobs does not 
include a hard and fast rule but it offers a tool to redefine health care legis-
lation in a more systematical manner. It 'colours' the theoretical perspective 
of health care reforms; it enables to correlate the multitude of changes in the 
interactive law-making process. 
Differences in implementation and stages of development of the reform-
process do not a prima facie alter the methodology as well influence the time-
table of intended reforms. In general, the primacy of public health has been 
considered as a fundamental condition for society to enjoy its health.8 It 
requires measures that protect, prevent and promote the health of society. As 
a consequence, such a definition places explicit obligations on the state to 
ensure the conditions for a climate that guarantees a certain level of physical 
and mental health (including healthy environment, decent sanitation, hygiene, 
vaccination programs, medical care, health education and promotion). Besides 
basic public health facilities, other health care resources that concern individual 
aspects of health care necessitate to plan and allocate such provisions according 
to the needs and available resources (organisational aspects). Whereas to 
guarantee and maintain a financially affordable health care system, regulation 
of the finance, including tariffs, is a legislative affair par excellence. These 
three elements, public health, regulating the organisational aspects of health 
care resources and the sources of finance initiate the need for additional 
regulative mechanisms related to quality and professions (audit and control 
systems as well as regulation of professions), and patients' rights. Graphically, 
these law-jobs corresponds with the mid circle of interventive clusters 
according to the suggested sequence. 
8 DONALDSON, R. J.-DONALDSON, L. J.: Essential Public Health Medicine, Dordrecht, 
1993. IX. 
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It will be clear that the complexity of (re)delining health care legislation 
needs a long-term strategy that cannot be realised in a singular process. 
Reforming health care legislation therefore requires a continuous approach 
carried out progressively by selected cluster(s). The review element in the 
legislative process suggested this already, more or less. In this respect, besides 
review based on legislative evaluation, case law review also reveals possible 
shortcomings of legislative deficits and changes. Assessment of legislation to 
its objectives by means of case law uncovers incidental and/or structural 
deficiencies that may initiate a reconsideration of the original rule. Whereas the 
systematical sequential approach of reforming health care legislation strengthens 
the idea of a circular and gradual process. 
Finally, the nucleus of the model reflects fundamental principles of health 
care law in the process of (re)defining law-making. Both the right to health care 
and patients' autonomy function as central benchmarks, which represent under-
pinning principles of this frame of law-making.91011 Changes in interpreting 
9 Leenen, H. J. J—Pinet, G— Prims, A. V. (eds.): "Trends in Health Legislation in Europe". 
Masson/World Health Organisation, Paris, 1986. vii.; LEENEN, H. J. J . -GEVERS, J. K. 
M—PINET, G.: The Rights of Patients in Europe. World Health Organization, Regional Office 
for Europe, Deventer, 1993, VII. 
10 Health as defined by the Preamble of the WHO Constitution, 1948: 'a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.' 
This view of health goes well beyond the absence of disease or physical and mental 
infirmities. In fact it proposes so broad and inclusive a conception that it turns health into a 
norm virtually synonymous with human well-being. Although the WHO definition offers an 
attractive aspirational standard, it is a problematic grounding for a human right. As such, it 
would imply that governments have the duty to guarantee or provide complete physical, 
mental, and social well-being for citizens. This is an impossible goal. CHAPMAN, A.: 
Violation of the Right to Health, in: "The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights", (eds.: Van Boven, Til. C— Flinterman, С,—Westerdorp, I.) Nether-
lands, Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht, SIM Special No. 20, 1998. 87-88. It is more 
feasible to speak of the Right to Health Care, interpreted as access to benefit f rom (a 
minimum of necessary) health care services and facilities. For example, the interpretation of 
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations (Ecosul 
Committee) discussed in: The Right to Health Care in Several European Countries, (eds.: Den 
Exter, A. P.—Hermans H. E. G. M.), Studies in Social Policy. The Hague, 1999. 
11 The central idea that underlies the concept of autonomy is indicated by the etymology of 
the term: autos (self) and nomos (rule, governance or law). The term was first applied to the 
Greek city state. A city had autonomia when citizens made their own laws, as opposed to 
being under the control of some conquering power. DWORKIN, G.: The theory and practice 
of autonomy. 1991 (1988), 12-13. Such a perception of autonomy refers to independent 
actions or decisions without external interference; when they are self determined. Liberty or 
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these principles may affect the function of law and the legislature in health 
care, and therefore influence the content of health care legislation. Hence, such 
an integrated circular model correlates principles, law and law-making. More-
over the systematic approach by means of stages of law-making and discerned 
law-jobs in health care may contribute to review legislative decision-making. 
It may reduce the level of 'trail and error' by rationalising the process of law-
making in health care. 
freedoms are however, not equivalent to autonomy (The Oxford Dictionary (1991) defines 
autonomy as 'freedom of the will ' , equivalent to self-determination: the free determination 
of one's own actions, Webster's Dictionary, 1992) but may be a necessary condition for 
individuals to develop their own aims and interests. In order to clarify the difference, 
Dworkin refers to an example from John Locke (105). "Consider a person who is put into 
a prison cell and told that all the doors are locked. The guards go through the motion of 
locking the doors but in fact one of the locks is defective and the prisoner could simply open 
the door and leave the cell. Because he is not aware of this he, quite reasonably, remains in 
his cell." The prisoner is, in fact, free to leave the cell. His liberty has not, although he does 
not know this, been limited. His autonomy has been limited. His view of the alternatives 
open to him have been manipulated by the guards in such a fashion that he will not choose 
to leave. This example shows that self determination can be limited without limited liberty. 
Dworkin characterised autonomy as the capacity of a person to reflect critically upon, and 
then attempt to accept or change his or her preferences, desires, values or ideals (20). Thus 
autonomy is not simply a reflective capacity but also includes some ability to alter one's 
preferences and to make them effective Derived of the ancient autonomy principle, in the 
contemporary legal doctrine patients' rights are generally considered as part and parcel of 
human rights. Like other individual rights and freedoms, patients' rights are aimed at 
protecting the individual sphere and individual liberty. This new category of rights include, 
for example, informed consent, confidentiality, and access to (medical) records. These rights 
in turn generate several new rights including disclosure, correction and the removal of data 
recorded by various kinds of information systems, as well as the right to a second opinion 
and not to be informed (LEENEN: op. cit. 1993. 28-29, 60-61, 81-82). in action (108). 
Generally, autonomy and self determination can be considered as exchangeable. The 
underlying idea of individual self determination, reflected by concepts such as respect for 
human dignity and the integrity of the human body, functions as the cornerstone of 
international human rights law. In health care the right to self determination created a new 
category of rights, so-called patients' rights. Derived of the ancient autonomy principle, in 
the contemporary legal doctrine patients' rights are generally considered as part and parcel 
of human rights. Like other individual rights and freedoms, patients' rights are aimed at 
protecting the individual sphere and individual liberty. 
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2.4 Correlation law-making activity and health policy 
Until now (the start of) the legislative process has been considered as a rather 
autonomous and mechanical activity, without external influence. Nothing is 
further from the truth. For instance, the initiated transition from a strong centrally 
planned tax-based health care system, towards a decentralised health insurance 
scheme is the result of a political decision-making process. Subsequently based 
on primarily socio-economic motives. Thus, changing the health care legislative 
framework cannot be placed within a vacuum but must be commensurate with 
legal, political and social principles, transformed in a strategic plan of further 
defined and elaborated health policy-objectives. In other words, health care 
legislation and health policy are interrelated: health care legislation both 
expresses autonomous axiological norms (i.e. guarantee the rights of individuals, 
equal access, non-discrimination.) but it also reflects instrumental policy-
objectives (cost-efficiency, efficient allocation health resources, etc.).12 Health 
care legislation balances between fundamental normative principles and 
legitimising instrumental policy-objectives. Integrated into the previous model, 
health policy objectives embrace the categories as the discerned law-jobs of 
health care legislation. Moreover, the circular approach reflects the continuing 
interaction between law-making and policy-making. Whereas policy-objectives 
initiate legislative intervention, otherwise, diverging judicial interpretation may 
require legislative correction and/or adjustment of existing policy-objec-
tives/programmes. Indeed, here law-making has a legitimising function besides 
its traditional guarantee-function. The presumed hierarchy between guarantee 
and instrumental qualities manifests itself particularly in health care: the 
dilemma between reflecting primarily economic effectiveness and efficiency vs. 
expressing universal access to health care (equality). 
Differentiating the equality-principle could solve this dilemma. What 
matters is the motivation to differentiate. In health care that motivation can be 
found in the impossibility to guarantee full access to universal health care. 
Here, the collapse of previous Eastern European health care ideals is 
exemplary. Curtailment of a previously unrestricted right to access is inevitable 
and even necessary to guarantee a sustainable health care system accessible for 
the entire population. To legitimise such limitations the legislature, since that 
is pre-eminently a social consideration, has to guarantee a certain level of basic 
health care. This can be justified since certain categories do not have the ability 
12 ROEMER-McKRAY: op. cit., 437^38. ; LEENEN: Trends in Health Legislation in 
Europe, op. cit., VII. 
6 4 André P. den Exter 
to choose in a rational manner and opt for a certain level of facilities. Whereas 
above a certain basic level of facilities citizens can be expected to take out 
additional health insurance against for instance, supplementary, luxury 
facilities, and co-payments.13 Thus, a certain degree of legal equality should 
be aimed at, whereas above that level differences could be accepted. Although 
initiated by economic reasons, from a legal point of view such a perspective 
can also be justified by criteria open to objectification. 
To find the equilibrium between traditional legal and instrumental policy 
objectives is one of the most difficult aspects in the current health care 
legislative debate. Particularly in countries on their way to health care system 
reforms, changing the legal structure will emerge a debate about underpinning 
concepts of the role of the legislature and therefore the government in health 
care. On the one hand, the newly developed legislative strategy intends to 
introduce (market-based) efficiency measures, otherwise they have to express 
fundamental values. The centre of the model expresses such principles, which 
may correct a too instrumental approach of law-making initiated by instru-
mental objectives. Reverse, legal principles are bound by instrumental values 
that attempt to develop and maintain sustainable access to health care. Both 
perspectives interact and are reflected in figure 3. To indicate interactivity 
between the law-making activity and correlative health policy, the outermost 
circle of health policy has been drawn directly around the legislative concept. 
By singling out tire review element, the model indicates the continuous mutual 
interaction between legislation and policy making. 
However, the suggested rational approach of the legal decision-making 
process does not have to correspond to the actual process. Real legal or 
policy decision-making process has rather been characterised as "muddling 
through", instead of the more mechanical rational approach. Whether or not 
reflecting the actual process, and given its limitations, the rational concept of 
transforming policy-targets into legislative objectives and the suggested 
sequence of continuously passing stages may help to clarify problems, struc-
ture the diffuse process of making choices or selecting objectives. In this 
respect it may function as a instrument in attempting to increase the trans-
parency and accountability of the decision-making process, without having the 
illusion to alter, in the long run, how policy-makers or law-makers reach 
decisions.14 
13 Based on: RAWLS, J.: A Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1971, 12th ed. 1992. 
14 FOLTZ, A. M.: The policy process, in: Health policy and systems development. An 
agenda for research, ed.: Janovsky, J., WHO Geneva, 1996. 211. 
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Figure 3. The synthesis of health care law-making and policy-making 
3. Relevance to Central and Eastern European health care reforms 
3.1 The pace of change 
Clearly, the model ' s objective determined approach in law-making can not be 
considered as a panacea to rationalise law-making. Nonetheless, it has certain 
advantages; in particular in the Eastern European context where priorities and 
the extent of far-reaching reforms require a clear strategy of law-making 
policy to structure the reform process. Operationalising both the traditional 
guarantee function as well as instrumental conceptions in the health care 
setting may contribute to ameliorate the (re-)definition of the legal structure. 
It provides the legislature with a conceptual f rame capable of modifying the 
legal structure in a more coherent manner. In effect, the model indicates the 
method and direction in reforming the health care legal system; based on an 
ongoing, evaluative approach instead of a radical transformation. Changing the 
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legal infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe results in incremental 
legislative changes based on the objective determined approach (law jobs). 
Analysing previous experiences and optional reform scenario may clarify this 
idea. 
3.2 Previous experiences in health care system reforms 
From a legal point of view, health care system reforms have been frequently 
insufficient underpinned.15 Exemplary is the abrupt (re-) introduction of a 
statutory health insurance system and large-scale decentralisation and privati-
sation developments in several CEE-countries. Legal reforms that fail to 
ensure a more efficient and effective allocation of resources undermine access 
to and the quality of health services and public health measures available to 
the public. This undesirable effect may have a direct negative impact on the 
general health status of the population, which will increase the need for health 
care. Demographic developments and the introduction of new medical techno-
logies will strengthen those needs. Thus, deficiencies in legal reforms also 
affect the health situation of the population, besides a country's economic 
strength.16 
The disappointing outcomes of massive deregulation and funding 
experiences resulted in a reconsideration or postponement of sudden and 
substantial legislative changes. At the moment, CEE-countries seem more 
carefully with duplicating (elements of) any existing model which transfer 
western problems in these countries. A more progressively introduced system 
change may seem to be more advisable. Such a concept includes several stages 
of reform. 
15 Den Exter, A. P.—Hermans H. E. G. M. eds.: The Right to Health Care in several 
European Countries. The Hague, 1999. 170-172. 
16 Whereas upward trends in unemployment and consumer prices have a direct negative 
effect on the health service expenditures in Eastern European countries since health service 
expenditures per head primarily depend on the economic strength of a country. MAJNONI 
DTNTIGNANO, В.: Health Care Financing in Europe, Health Care Reforms in Europe. 
Proceedings of the first meeting of the working party on health care reforms in Europe, 1992 
Madrid. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Doc. ICP/PHC 
210(C)BD, quoted by ZARKOVIC, G.-MIELCK, A.-JOHN, J.-BECKMANN, M.: Reforms 
of the Health Care Systems in Former Socialist Countries: Problems, Option, Scenarios. 
Oberschleissheim: Medis Institut für Medizinische Informatik und Systemforschung, 1994. 31. 
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3.3 Themes in the reform stages 
An extensive analysis of the content of the reform stages would be too far 
beyond the scope of this article. Here, several discerned elements will be 
roughly discussed since they affect all aspects of health care. What is important 
is the idea of gradually introducing legal modifications. Instead of losing the 
good parts as well as the bad parts, changing the legal structure should be 
aimed at combining the successes of a universal accessible health care system 
with western understanding to make a system more responsive to individuals' 
needs and economic incentives that encourage cost-efficiency. This concept 
implies a critical reflection on both former experiences and future legal 
changes. Instead of enforcing massive breakthroughs, a series of correlated 
incremental changes of the legislative framework seem to be more appropriate 
to cope with the unavoidable adjustments. In view of the overall trend towards 
a more market related health care system, legislative reforms may start with 
(relatively) minor adaptations strengthening the public health sphere which 
include organisational, allocative changes in health care services (e.g., 
redistribution of collective and individual health tasks, establishing health 
promotive and disease preventive activities at county and local level). Such 
regulatory reforms may function as precondition for a gradual shift towards a 
public/private funded health insurance system since many CEE governments 
have given preference to this method of finance above the chronic deficiencies 
in the contemporary health care funding.17 Combined with allowing private 
physicians to act as independent contractors to health financing agencies, more 
and more the government will withdrawal from the organisation, provision and 
finance of health care. Combining different methods of funding could raise 
additional financial resources, as well as cost-effectiveness of their utilisation. 
After all, the introduction of new finance methods does not a priori conflict 
with the previous national health care system. 
17 GOLDSTEIN, E . -PREKER, A. S . -ADEYI, O.: Trends in Health Status. Services, and 
Finance. The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Washington DC: World Bank 1996 
Tecnolcal Paper No. 341 Vol I. 24. Also BECKMAN, M.-ZARKOVIC, G.: Transition to 
Health Insurance in Former Socialist Countries in: The Process and Management of Change. 
Transition to a Health Insurance System in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Proceedings of the second meeting of the working party on health care reforms in Europe. 
Essen, 8. 1993 October 19-21. 
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Initial reforms 
Restructuring the health care organisation is a main issue in the contemporary 
reforms. Interesting experiences have occurred in countries characterised by a 
'classical' NHS-model. Governments are making or have intended to make the 
health care system more competitive by retaining public funding.18 The purpose 
of these reforms is to make the resource allocation in health care more 
efficient, more innovative and more responsive to the consumers' preferences. 
Here, the separation between the purchaser and provider of health care was an 
essentia] element in the reform strategy. As concerns the split of primary care 
services, many CEE-countries are already familiar with this idea. Primary care 
providers function, to certain extent, as a gatekeeper to secondary care such as 
specialist care, prescribing drugs and hospital care. Strengthening their position 
can improve efficient care. A further step is to give primary care providers 
financial responsibilities for (part of) the costs of the follow-up care provided 
by others to their patients.19 In this respect, several European forms with 
"budget holding primary care centres" already experience with financial respon-
sibility for purchasing part of the second-line care (e.g., Russia, Leningrad, 
Sweden, Bohus). 
The provider-purchaser split can be rather easily realised by introducing a 
kind of contract-model. In such a scheme (groups of) general practitioners, 
dentists, pharmacists are independent and contracted by the third-party 
purchaser (e.g., health authority or insurer) who acts as a prudent buyer of care 
on behalf of its members. Whether representatives of the profession negotiate 
its terms. Part of contracting providers concern the negotiations about the 
quality, volume and price of care. It is supposed that selective contracting by 
third-party purchasers will initiate competition among providers. 
In a latter stage contracts with other providers (specialist care and 
institutional care) could then be a natural complement to these contracts and 
in fact could then be supportive to the conditions agreed upon in the contracts 
between purchaser and the primary care physicians.20 Where agreement is not 
forthcoming, the government can use its legislative power to impose a contract. 
18 FATTORE, G.: Cost containment and health care reforms in the British NHS, in: Health 
Care and Cost Containment in the European Union. Mossialos, E.—Le Grand, J. eds., Ashgate 
Aldershot, 1999. 733 e.a. 
19 VEN VAN DE, W. P. M. M.: Market-Oriented Health Care Reforms: Trends, and Future 
Options. Soc. Sc. Med. 1996. 43. 5., 656-657. 
20 VEN VAN DE: op. cit., 658. 
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Reverse to the enforcement of health authorities, the contract give rise to 
private law rights, and providers can bring actions for breach of contract if 
payment is wrongly withheld.21 
The gradual development of a public financed model (e.g., general taxes, 
earmarked taxes, compulsory insurance) combined with a system of contracts 
between (quasi) autonomous providers and third-party purchaser(s) of care 
reflects a shift away from a vertically integrated system towards a contractual 
model in which purchaser and provider of care have to conclude contracts with 
each other. The increased competition that will arise among providers is one 
of the elements of "managed or regulated competition" and is intended to 
allocate resources more efficiently.22 
But despite the presumed attractiveness of managed competition, a major 
legal dilemma concern the package and scope of health care benefits to which 
patients are entitled to. The entitlements may conflict with the objectives of the 
managed competition reforms encouraging cost-effective substitution of care 
and increasing consumer choice.23 Encountering an appropriate definition of 
health care (and thus the package of benefits) combined with sufficient room 
for managed care and attractive for alternative methods health care delivery 
creates another dilemma. 
To deal with such dilemmas will be one of the main issues that might occur 
in the suggested strategy. In the short term, legislative incentives, which initiate 
the provider-purchaser split, should anticipate to the described problems. 
For this moment, it can be concluded that current Western reform strategies 
with for instance separate (financial) resources for separate service packages 
offer interesting opportunities to CEE health care reforms.24 Introducing 
comparable experiences require however a basis in the legal systems as they 
stand now. This means that the contemporary legal structures are not auto-
matically incompatible with suggested new initiatives. But the legal conditions 
21 MONTGOMERY: op. cit., 106-107. 
22 The prototype model of managed competition was developed by Enthoven as an 
alternative to the fragmented, inefficient inequitable U.S. health care system, in which 
unmanaged competition had resulted in an expensive and uncontrollable medical arms race. 
ENTHOVEN, A. C.: Consumer Choice Health Plan, New England Journal of Medicine, 1978. 
298., 650, 709. 
23 SCHUT, F. H. -HERMANS H. E. G. M.: Managed Competition Reforms in the 
Netherlands and Its Lessons for Canada. Dalhousie Law Journal, 1998. Vol. 20, no. 2., 2. 
24 Cf, for instance, HERMANS, H — NOOREN, J.: Contracting and the Purchaser-Provider 
split in Western Europe: A Legal-Organizational Analysis. Medicine and Law, 17, 1998. 
167-188. 
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among which the transformation of the current regulative structure should occur, 
require a critical analysis concerning underpinning health care legal concepts. 
Towards a pluriform health insurance system? 
In a later stage, the hybrid finance scheme will more and more substitute 
elements of the national health care scheme into a mandatory health insurance 
system. This includes also generating additional finance mechanisms to provide 
in extra funding since the often unbalanced compulsory insurance scheme can-
not guarantee (near) universal health care by itself. In CEE countries, voluntary 
insurance has been considered as a promising mean to provide in additional 
revenues such as nonessential care excluded from statutory insurance.25 
Besides, conditionally, a restricted private scheme offers the better off the 
possibility to opt out of the statutory insurance scheme and to insure themselves 
additionally and/or exclusively with a private insurer. Were voluntary insurance 
is available in the CEE [...], it currently provides only a small proportion of the 
total health care financing. It is, however, a source of financing that may grow 
significantly as institutional and regulatory frameworks are developed and the 
transition to new funding mechanism progresses.26 
Besides voluntary insurance, other modalities of cost-sharing mechanisms 
such as co-payments and external sources will be or have already been 
introduced.27 A comparable shift from a declining share of public to private 
funding has been noticed in EU countries. Patients in many countries have 
experienced substantial cost-sharing increases as a result of higher charges; 
indeed, this seems to be an important component in the shift of the public-
private mix in these countries.28 
The increasing necessity to contain costs and improve efficiency will 
further pressurise patients' rights. Protecting these rights is a legal affair par 
excellence. Therefore, changed circumstances impel the legislature to develop 
25 Such arrangements (although in an embrionic stage) can already be found in several CEE 
countries: e.g., Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
26 SALTMAN—FIGUERAS: op. cit., 133. 
27 Cost-sharing defined as a form of splitting the costs of health care services in order to 
make users economically responsible for their behaviour. However, in the CEE setting its 
primary aim is to raise the revenues. SHEIMAN, I. in: Den Exter—Hermans: The Right to 
Health Care in several European Countries, op cit., 110-111. 
28 HUBER, M.: Health Care Financing in European Union Member Stales. An Initial 
Perspective Based on Recent OECD Work on Overall Social Trends, in: Health Care and its 
Financing in the Single European Market. Ed.: Leidl, R., Amsterdam, 1998. 63. 
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or modify the contemporary codes in a more sophisticated frame of (new) 
patients' rights including the inviolability of the human body, informed 
consent, disclosure, correction, and removal of data recorded by different types 
of information systems. Needless to say that the codification of patients' rights 
must be considered in a broader perspective. To effectuate these rights requires, 
inter alia, an easy accessible system to complain. 
4. Validity of the law-making model: Interim results 
4.1 Methodology and objective of research 
To verify the feasibility of the optional scenario as outcomes of the theoretical 
model, an explorative study has started with describing the main features of the 
Hungarian legislative framework. The selection of Hungary was inspired by 
future enlargement of the European Union, which necessitates revision of the 
national legal framework according to EU standards. Furthermore, the 
Hungarian health care system reforms have already experienced considerable 
changes with related legal questions. 
Outcomes of research enable to examine the state of the law-making practise. 
Comparing the actual legal decision-making process with the analytical method 
of law-making may contribute to verify the validity of the hypothesis: a rational 
model of health care law-making. 
In view of the scope and complexity of research, limiting the field of 
research is inevitable. Selected clusters of health care legislation include public 
health, organisation and planning of health care resources, health financing and 
patients' rights) and type of regulation (parliamentary acts). Besides Hungary, 
comparative research will mutatis mutandis include the Czech Republic and 
Poland as eligible EU candidates. Hereafter, temporary outcomes are focussed 
on a first analysis of the model in Hungary. 
4.2 Initial outcomes: Patterns in legislative reforms and (lacking) 
correspondence with the analytical concept 
Besides the Constitution,29 the health care right in Hungary is embedded in 
its legal framework. A system which is still under construction. It appeared that 
29 According to article 70 D, access to health care is still defined as a citizens right, contrary 
to recent legislation (Compulsory Health Insurance Act 1997) which formulated such a right 
as a social insurance entitlement based on compulsory individual contributions. 
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legislative reforms were primarily concentrated on clusters such as, public 
health, organisation and planning of resources, health financing and patients' 
rights. Furthermore, the described features of the legal structure and sequence 
of legislative reforms since 1989 largely endorse the notion of a step by step 
approach, starting with reorganising public health legislation. 
Sequence clusters of health care law 
In general, the sequence and regulated subjects of the enacted laws corresponded 
with the previously discerned clusters of health care law. Nonetheless, a separate 
legal cluster on controlling quality of care is largely absent. This could be 
explained by the legislative system itself, which considers quality control as 
subordinated to public health given the referrals in the Public Health Act, 
Health Care Act and Hungarian Medical Chamber Act (1994). The indirectness 
of references, however, does not seem to support this notion. Otherwise, it is 
more likely that the Hungarian legislature did not prioritise quality control in 
the legislative reforms at all. In that case, omissions and latent problems on 
quality control call for adequate legal measures. In view of future enlargement, 
conformity towards Community legislation is a precondition for entering the 
market. Incorporating European directives concerning equivalent professional 
qualifications and skills (as part of quality control) are particularly important 
when the common market will be opened for Hungarian health professionals. The 
Community already adopted specific directives concerning the mutual recognition 
of diplomas of doctors, dentists, pharmacists, midwives and nurses.30 However, 
up until now, the implementation of those European qualification standards, 
which enable free movement of persons with regard to health, have hardly been 
taken into consideration since the Hungarian Minister of Health does not expect 
a mass outflow of health personnel even with the present major differences in 
wage levels between Hungary and that of the EU Member States.31 Given the 
structural overcapacity of medical doctors and the intended drastic measures to 
reduce the number of hospital beds, nevertheless, such an outflow of physicians 
is quite likely. Reverse, the recognition of foreign diplomas and licensing of 
health personnel who intend to start a (specialised) practice in Hungary has not 
30 E.g. Directive 93/61/EEC to facilitate the free movement of medical doctors, and the 
mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications. 
Official Journal of the EC no. С 323, 1992. 
31 Health and Enlargement of the EU: Views of a candidate Country. Dr Árpad Gógl, 
Minister of Health of the Republic of Hungary. Eurohealth Vol. 4, No 4, Autumn 1998. 18. 
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been addressed either, although that might interfere with planning and allocation 
policy. 
Problem analysis: Health financing example 
Introducing a compulsory health insurance system was a second major reform 
issue, initiated in 1993 and modernised with the introduction of a new 
Compulsory Health Insurance Act 1997.32 According to the act, the Health 
Insurance Fund (Országos Egészségbistositási Pénztár — OEP) contracts with 
health care providers to guarantee the insured adequate care without reasonable 
time. The insured are entitled to a universal package of services, including 
preventive care, primary, secondary and tertiary care, and child care 'provided 
in kind' and free of charge. 
With the introduction of the package of health insurance legislation, several 
problems remained. For instance, the act failed to define the benefit package 
covered by the National Health Insurance Fund. Due to the lack of an explicit 
catalogue of defined services, all services are practically included although 
some types of health care services are not covered by the fund. In the near 
future, limiting the scope of services covered by the Fund will be inevitable 
given its structural distorted funding.33 Such a debate introduces a new 
impetus into the public/private insurance discussion. After all, restricting the 
number or scope of entitlements creates a potential market for both non-profit 
as for-profit insurance companies to reinsure the generated deficit by means of 
additional or supplementary insurance. Up to now, politicians has avoided such 
a discussion. But it will be clear that priority setting by means of limiting 
individual entitlements will to a large extent determine the future discussion. 
The discussion on priority setting and creating legal conditions for private 
health insurance cannot solve the problem of shortage of funds on its own. 
32 Act LXXX 1997, Act LXXXI 1997, Act LXXXII 1997, Act LXXXIII 1997 and Act 
LXXXIV, 1997. This package of laws encompasses further regulative reforms of the social 
insurance right, formalising the split of the health care and pension financing. In January 
1998, these acts came into force (with the exception of Act LXXXII that came into force in 
September 1998). 
33 Each year, since 1991, the deficits of the OEP have increased. Up to now, both the 
Ministry of Health and the OEP have been unable to contain expenditures. Limiting the scope 
of the compulsory benefit package has been considered as an option to bridge the financing 
gap since such a measure would strengthen the role of private insurance. National Economic 
Research Associates (NERA). October 1998 Financing Health Care. The Health Care System 
in Hungary. 172. 
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Imperfections in the methods for levying health care funds and revenues, which 
do not reach, anticipated levels are mentioned as other major reasons of the 
distorted funding.34 
Pathology of law-making practice: failing implementation and absence of 
systematic evaluation 
Vaguely formulated policy objectives may be accompanied by only limited 
program design at legislative stage. Thus at implementation stage all the 
battles about conflicting objectives or values which were ignored or circum-
vented at the earlier stage will emerge.35 This is exactly what happened with 
the programmatic declaration of a Health Insurance Act (1993). Drafting the 
Compulsory Health Insurance Act was not accompanied with a debate on limiting 
entitlements. Since it was, and still is such a highly controversial issue, govern-
ment could do nothing else than preserving a comprehensive benefit package 
ignoring the financial consequences. After enactment, the changing position and 
function of OEP from a 'passive' purchaser into a more proactive contractor 
has caused various conflicts both on reimbursement of entitlements and types 
of contracted services. These disputes reflect the underlying dilemma between 
insufficient finances and practically unrestricted claims. 
Furthermore, an extensive legislative production in a rather short period of 
time hinders an effective realisation. Besides guidelines for those operationa-
lising the rules, administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms are 
indispensable to effectuate legal standards. Generally, this aspect of the law-
making circle has been neglected. Too often, enactment of a legal norm was 
considered as final stage in the legislative process while self-implementing 
norms do not exist. Administrative enforcement, if present, frequently faces 
serious problems. Judicial enforcement however, was not considered a serious 
option and happened sporadically. Mobilising public opinion is still more 
effective than starting a court procedure to enforce individual rights.36 
However, it is expected that recently introduced complaint procedures may 
change this situation. 
34 NERA, op. cit., 55. 
35 Hogwood, B. W.—Peters, B. G. (eds.): The Pathology of Public Policy. Oxford, Claridon 
Press, 1985. 25. 
36 Interview Data Protection Parliamentary Commissioner Office, Dr. Székely, I. Budapest, 
October 1998. 
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Besides individual (quasi) judicial procedures, in Hungary, systematic 
monitoring and reviewing legislation is absent. Since the first parliament 
(1990-1994), no scientific evaluation of (key elements of) formal acts has so 
far undertaken. Indeed, yearly parliamentary budget debates include some 
monitoring and evaluation aspects but has its limitations. A systematic scien-
tific assessment, however, about effectiveness on legislative experiences is 
unknown. Consequently, review and correction of legislation and legislative 
policy based on evaluation studies do not take place. 
5. Conclusions 
The Hungarian example illustrates that the described method of systematising 
the legislative structure can identify existing and potential obstacles. By means 
of analysing the steps of the theoretical model, it has been attempted to 
diagnose pathological features and suggest treatment for law-making. Drawn 
from described disorders and consequences of invalid legal rules and its 
legislative strategy, the diagnosis of legislative 'malnutrition' concerns both 
the method of lawmaking as the substantive legal concept of health care law. 
Proposed treatment starts with strengthening the legislative role in the reform 
discussion specifying objectives, legal preconditions, and selection criteria of 
needed legal rules. Besides emphasising a more rational decision making on 
substantive norms, quality of law-making would improve with structural assess-
ment of legislative results. Review to meta standards as legality, legitimacy, 
effectiveness and efficiency enable to evaluate outcomes with underlying targets 
that subsequently may entail alteration of the reform plan. 
More concrete, initial analysis of the Hungarian legal framework has 
revealed several lacunas, regulatory imperfections in different fields such as 
health care financing and quality control. While poor enforcement mechanisms 
and its consequences exposes a more methodological deficit. Promoting a 
circular approach of law-making provide a cocktail of remedies presenting a 
combined cure with a methodological conception of health care law. Intended 
to treat the disease, suppressing symptoms and alleviation of suffering are 
considered as supportive objectives. A second and third opinion in different 
CEE settings enable to verify the acceptability of suggested therapy.' 
* Acknowledgement — The author would like to thank Umberto Hermans and Ernesto Hülst 
for their stimulating comments on an earlier draft. 
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Gábor TÖRÖK The Classical Model 
of Bankruptcy Law 
The common legal policy basis of the Bankruptcy Acts of Europe in the 19th 
century was clearly the liberal capitalist economic concept. Whereas in terms 
of legal policy those Acts sought the. fullest possible satisfaction of creditors' 
claims on the one hand and, on the other, displacement of bankrupt persons 
and firms from the economic life, especially those who engaged in trade. 
In the French1 and Italian2 law and within the ambit thereof no one but 
traders or merchant companies were allowed to be subjects of bankruptcy. In 
addition to the historical roots, this approach was justified by claiming that 
trade was the area where failure of a commercial firm was able to start, almost 
always and within a very short period of time, a chain-reaction that was liable 
to undermine the economic stability of the particular region. Therefore it was 
held necessary to intervene as quickly as possible, isolating and then liquidating 
a ruined firm, thereby preventing the occurrence of a chainreaction and turning 
bankruptcy into an "isolated phenomenon"3 of the economy. This purpose was 
1 Code de Commerce (Book III, 22 September 1807). 
2 Italian Commercial Act of 1865. 
3 KISS Gy.: A csőd közgazdasági és jogi megközelítése. (Vázlat a polgári magyar és a mai 
francia csődjogról.) A "szocialista vállalat" kutatási főirány keretében készült tanulmány. 
Kézirat [An Economic and a Legal Approach to Bankruptcy. (Outlines on the bourgeois 
Hungarian and the modern French Law of Bankruptcy.) Study prepared in line with the Main 
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served by the relative speediness and the informality of bankruptcy proceedings. 
The failure of other than traders and firms did not pose such direct dangers in 
respect of the economy, rather their elimination had a much more indirect effect, 
with creditors seeing their claims satisfied under the rules of ordinary execution. 
The solutions of the German-Austrian type4 of legislation extended bank-
ruptcy both to traders and non-traders. The reason, along with the less 
determinant role of trade, was to seek in the German thought of legal dogmatics: 
the precise and exhaustive "search for truth" obviously could not allow the 
parties as large elbow-room as it was left by the French approach. Of course, 
the consequences of this were also manifested in the proceedings themselves: 
as everything or almost everything was done or supervised by the court, the 
proceedings became time-consuming, with creditors often waiting for years to 
get their money. The preference to trade, however, made its effect felt in this 
field as well, since even these codes applied different rules to traders for the 
purpose of relatively simplifying and expediting proceedings, with no great 
success after all. 
1. Procedural bankruptcy law (bankruptcy proceedings) 
The device adopted by the French Code of Commercial Law5 represented one 
of the early prototypes of the bankruptcy law system during the period of liberal 
capitalism. The procedure devised by this Code can be summed up as follows. 
When a trader stops making payments he goes bankrupt, and the Commercial 
Court orders a declaration of bankruptcy against him if it learns the fact of 
failure, whether from the debtor or any creditor or otherwise. In its decree of 
bankruptcy the Court appoints a trustee among its own members and assigns 
one or more proxies (agents) to attend to the affairs of the bankrupt's estate 
temporarily. Thereupon the Court recedes into the background since most of 
the judicial tasks, mainly operative measures, are handled by the trustee in 
bankruptcy, who conducts the proceedings and controls the activity of the 
administrator of the estate, while his consent is required to the performance of 
legal acts by administrators in specific cases. 
The proceedings can be divided into three phases. 
Trend of Research on the "Socialist enterprise", Manuscript], Pécs, 1982, 1. 
4 The German Reich Bankruptcy Act was promulgated on 10 February 1877. 
5 Seefn . 1. 
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In the first phase the chief duty of proxies, or agents is to take preliminary 
security measures (attachment of the bankrupt's estate, arrest of the bankrupt 
where appropriate, sale of perishable goods and drawing up of a balance-sheet). 
As the first step in the second phase, the trustee summons the creditors to 
meet and to elect provisional representatives from their own ranks, the elected 
representatives to be confirmed by the court in their post. (Thus, in the last 
analysis, the right of appointment is vested in the court.) Their function is to 
administer the bankrupt's estate, but their decision concerning the collection of 
claims or the sale of movables is subject to the trustee's approval. Furthermore, 
they have to find the creditors yet unknown, with as little as 40 days allowed 
for this task. 
An important right of provisional representatives is to ascertain the total 
value of "passive estate", or the aggregate sum of claims. The representatives 
may propose acceptance of a particular claim or may even dismiss claims. In 
the latter case it is for the court to decide on the validity of a creditor's claim 
after the prior hearing of the trustee. The closing step in this phase consists in 
calling together the creditors, who are invited by the trustee to reach a 
condordat in the first place, the validity of the condordat requires the votes in 
favour of the majority of creditors present if the total number of voters in 
favour covers three-fourths of all claims. 
Where no concordat is reached, the proceedings reach the third phase: at the 
same meeting the trustee proposes conclusion of a so called "union" contract, 
the substance of which consists in creditors deciding, by a majority of votes, 
to sell the bankrupt's estate, with permanent representatives elected from 
among their own ranks for the performance of this task. The permanent 
representatives submit monthly reports on their work to the trustee, who orders, 
on the basis of reports, satisfaction of privileged claims or, if funds are 
available, that of the rest of creditors. They rely on this order of the trustee for 
drawing up the plan of division and effecting payments. The proceedings are 
terminated upon the court 's acceptance of the representatives' final account. 
This procedure as set out in the Code de commerce was further simplified 
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1838, which abolished the status of "proxy", or agent 
and provided that the court must appoint, already in its decree of bankruptcy, 
the provisional representatives, who were either confirmed or simply replaced 
by the creditors summoned to meet later. The Code set shorter time-limits to 
expedite proceedings and prescribed other measures of substantive law in an 
effort to promote early conclusion thereof. 
In Germany the uniform Reich Bankruptcy Act was promulgated on 10 
February 1877, shortly after the proclamation of imperial rule. The promul-
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gátion of the Act was preceded by seven years of preparatory work. The Act 
was based on the Prussian Bankruptcy Act,6 but it went far to take into 
account the results of legal development in Europe, especially in France. 
The Code covers substantive law, procedural law and penal sanctions in 
three parts. In an effort to regulate the economic processes at work as accurately 
as possible it determined the rights and duties of the subjects of bankruptcy 
extensively and minutely. As under the Prussian Act, the main actor was the 
court. 
Under the Code, the institution of proceedings can be requested by the 
debtor or the creditor, and in exceptional cases it may also be ordered ex 
officio. If the positive law basis for adjudication in bankruptcy exists, bank-
ruptcy is declared by the court. Then the bankrupt's assets are attached and the 
creditors file their claims. Appointed in the decree of bankruptcy, the admi-
nistrator of the bankrupt's estate (receiver) tabulates claims and makes a 
proposal for the extent of satisfying them. 
It is at the so-called liquidation hearing that the court decides on the 
satisfaction of creditors' claims or, to be more precise, on the rate of satis-
faction (this is called "sorting"). Thereupon the administrator's role is 
terminated and replaced by the so-called committee of bankruptcy elected by 
creditors from among themselves. Acting under supervision by the court and 
the trustee in bankruptcy, the committee disposes of the assets and divides the 
proceeds according to strictly defined principles and the ranking of creaditors 
for dividend. After distribution of the estate the court declares the bankruptcy 
closed, but if unknown bankruptcy assets happen to be disclosed later, the same 
proceedings are continued. 
At any time during the proceedings (naturally before the deadline) the bank-
rupt may reach settlement with his creditors. The legal form of such settlement 
is called compulsory settlement, or concordat. 
In Hungary the system of the liberal capitalist bankruptcy law was established 
by the Act XVII of 1881. 
Under it, proceedings generally commence on petition; ex officio institution 
thereof is only exceptional. The Act regulated two cases of proceedings instituted 
on petition: either immediate proceedings (without preliminary evidence) or 
proceedings after court hearing: 
Immediate declaration of bankruptcy, if 
— a petition in bankruptcy is filed by the debtor; 
— a petition in bankruptcy is filed by an heir against the decedent's estate; 
6 Prussian Bankruptcy Act of 1863. 
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— the creditor files a petition in commercial bankruptcy and shows beyond 
question that the debtor has stopped making payment. 
Declaration of bankruptcy after court hearing, if 
— on the basis of claims duly evidenced by documents the creditors show 
the probability of their claims exceeding the debtor's assets. If at the hearing 
the debtor is unable to prove his solvency or fails to give other assurance for 
satisfaction of claims or is absent from the hearing, the proceedings are 
commenced by the court. 
Like the other systems of law, the Hungarian law of bankruptcy leaves it 
to judicial practice to actually establish the existence of bankruptcy or to define 
the criteria for adjudication in bankruptcy. It follows as a matter of course that 
the statements of policy issued by courts have focused mainly on what is 
insufficient to prove a debtor's bankruptcy. 
According to judicial practice, 
— bankruptcy may not be declared if the petitioner specifies only such assets as 
were, prior to bankruptcy, attached7 to cover claims exceeding the value thereof; 
— the fact that the bankrupt's movables were partly sold at auction by order 
of the court and are partly administered by the sequestrator is insufficient to 
establish the probability that the debts will exceed the bankrupt's assets.8 
In Art. 849 the Act made it a duty of the creditor to duly verify the legal 
title to his claim. Judicial practice defined the range of claims that could not 
be deemed to be "duly verified", namely 
— claims depending on the occurrence of a subsequent event;10 
7 Curia, 1404/1885. 8. 
8 Curia, 1044/1913. 
9 "Art. 84. Where one or several creditors file a bankruptcy petition on the basis of duly 
verified but unexpired claims and show the probability that the debtor's liabilities exceed his 
assets, the court shall appoint a date of hearing on not later than the third day and shall, 
under the rules of procedure relative to the service of the first bankruptcy order, summon the 
debtor with an in junction to give security to the creditors filing the petition or to prove his 
solvency by presenting a statement of his assets and liabilities. 
If the debtor fails to comply with the said injunction and the creditors do not withdraw 
thèir petition, bankruptcy shall be ordered forthwith. 
Postponement of the hearing shall be subject to the assent of the creditors who have 
presented the petition of bankruptcy. For an important reason the court may postpone the 
hearing without the creditors' assent. 
If the court finds the bankruptcy petition unfounded, it shall reject it without ordering a 
hearing." 
10 Curia, 596/1884. 
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— doubtful claims at issue;11 
— claims based on a statement of account12 annexed by the creditor to the 
bankruptcy petition, but challenged by the debtor. 
Claims are also deemed not to be "duly verified" if 
— a petition in bankruptcy is not filed by all the heirs; 
— by relying in the documents enclosed, the court is unable to establish 
beyond question the existence of preconditions for adjudication in commercial 
bankruptcy. 
Proceedings are instituted ex officio 
— in respect of property situate in Hungary and owned by a corporation with 
foreign interests; 
— in cases where the procedure for concordat without bankruptcy 
proceedings against a trader was terminated because the trader 
— had failed to pay in advance the costs of proceedings; 
— had failed to submit a list of his creditors and debtors; 
— had failed to submit his inventory and balancesheet of assets and 
liabilities within the set time-limit; 
— had kept delaying, with intent or by gross negligence, the notification 
of his insolvency, thereby reducing funds accessible to creditors; 
— because Iiis offer to reach settlement had been refused by the 
majority of creditors; 
— because the court had denied approval of the concordat accepted by 
creditors. 
No bankruptcy proceedings are instituted if the debtor has a single creditor, 
if the bankrupt's estate is insufficient to cover even the costs of proceedings, 
11 During the bankruptcy proceedings no evidence is admitted of the justice of the claim of 
the creditor filing the bankruptcy petition, but, in accordance with Art. 84. of Act XVII of 
1881, the creditor must, already in his petition, certify by document that his petition would 
have been impossible to grant if only for the reason that he has no duly verified claim, 
because for the purpose of establishing whether the complainant became the defendant's 
creditor by virtue of the business transaction mentioned in the petition it should necessarily 
have been considered whether the transaction contested by the defendant had actually been 
effected and performed in such a manner and under such conditions as are claimed by the 
complainant, but, since this question could not be decided by the court within the frameworks 
of the present bankruptcy proceedings, the complainant's status as creditor is not established 
(Curia, 1699/1890, 7 January 1891; 1155/86 in similar terms). 
12 The statement of account annexed by the creditor to his bankruptcy petition and 
challenged by the debtor is inept for proving in itself the existence of the claim (Curia, 
233/910, IV, 15 March 1910). 
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or if proceedings not involving bankruptcy have commenced (these circum-
stances act to bar bankruptcy). 
The Act provides specific facilities for creditors to file a bankruptcy petition 
against traders and commercial firms. While the facilities are undoubtedly 
enjoyed by creditors, the primary goal contemporary legal policy was to sort 
out bankrupt traders as soon as possible. 
The court decides by order on each bankruptcy petition, such order to state 
the reason for the decision and to be sent to the parties involved. 
The court's decision is appealable, but the appeal has only partial delaying 
force, as the declaration of bankruptcy takes effect under substantive law 
irrespective of appeal, with the appointment of trustee and administrator and 
with the order of attachment becoming valid. On the other hand, the delaying 
force of appeal is manifested in that the so-called bankruptcy notice may not 
be issued before the final decision, meaning also that the procedures for 
liquidation and property administration will not commence. 
The court issues the bankruptcy notice after its order becomes final. 
The notice must show 
— the name of the court; 
— the name, occupation and address of the bankrupt; 
— the names and addresses of the trustee and the administrator; 
— the time-limit set for the filing of claims; 
— the day of the liquidation hearing, and it must contain; 
— summons to those wishing to act as creditors in order to file their claims 
with a view to judging their legal ground and classifying them, even if a 
separate action has been brought in respect thereof; 
— summons to lienors and persons entitled to retention to notify their acquired 
rights or the show the pledged property itself to the trustee in bankruptcy; 
— a warning to persons entitled to failure to assert their rights will be no bar 
to realisation and distribution of the bankrupt's estate; 
— summons to bankruptcy creditors to attend the hearing. 
The court orders attachment of the estate immediately after the declaration 
of bankruptcy. The bankrupt's business documents will be transmitted to the 
administrator, while his securities and cash not absolutely necessary for his 
daily activity will be deposited in court. Acting under the trustee's supervision, 
the administrator takes an inventory of the bankrupt's assets. Concurrently with 
stock-taking and attachment, the trustee may instruct the bankrupt to draw up 
a balance-sheet of assets and liabilities. 
The time-limit for the establishment of claims against the bankrupt's estate 
must be set between 30 and 90 days. The administrator must carefully examine 
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the claims filed and their enclosures, the bankrupt's accounts and other business 
records, and he must hear the bankrupt on the claims in order to enable him to 
state his view during the hearing about the justice and classification of claims. 
The committee of bankruptcy is elected during this same period, at the first 
hearing, which is to be presided over by the trustee. 
The liquidation hearing must be held within 30 days from the expiry of the 
time-limit for the filing of claims. During the intervening period the 
administrator must tabulate creditors' claims, such tabular statement to contain 
the personal data of creditors, the amounts of claims and incidental charges, 
and the legal titles to claims. 
The liquidation hearing is conducted by the trustee and must be attended by 
the interested creditors, the administrator and the bankrupt, but absence of the 
bankrupt and creditors is in itself no bar to holding the hearing. 
The first to speak during the hearing about claims not included for some 
reason in the tabular statement and then about the claims contained in the 
statement are the administrator, the creditors and the bankrupt. Anyone may 
contest any claim in respect of its classification and justice (right of challenge). 
If no one exercises his right of challenge in respect of a particular claims, 
the record of the hearing itself becomes an executory deed. In cases where the 
parties uphold their objections and the trustee did not succeed in his attempt 
to reach a settlement, the creditors are to enforce their claims in legal pro-
ceedings (this is called separate litigation). 
The so-called deadline for liquidation is decisive to the sale and 
administration of the bankrupt's estate, for, prior to its expiry, the bankruptcy 
assets are manager by the administrator under the supervision of the trustee, the 
bankruptcy court and the provisional committee of creditors. The administrator 
may not sell movables except when an obvious advantage to the estate is 
obtained or their retention would incur extra costs par excellence, whereas 
immovables may be sold only and exclusively with the aim of preventing 
damage. Accordingly the only positive task to be accomplished during the 
period indicated is recovery of outstanding debts. 
The situation is completely changed after the deadline for liquidation, which 
is fixed by the trustee at the liquidation hearing. From that day onwards, after 
the election of the permanent committee of bankruptcy, the estate is administered 
by creditors independently, and the process of actual realization is started. 
The proceedings concerning the distribution of the estate are conducted by 
the administrator on the basis of a plan he drew up previously. The order of 
payments to be made is stated in the plan, so the creditors gain full or pro-
portional satisfaction from the fund of distribution, according to the classifi-
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cation and ranking of their claims, after deduction of the costs and debts 
chargeable to the estate. 
Distribution proceedings must take place as many times as enough funds 
have accumulated f rom the proceed of realization. The last procedure of this 
kind is referred to in the Act as ultimate distribution, which is followed by 
the court 's final decree closing the bankruptcy on the basis of the trustee's 
report. 
The bankrupt may nevertheless achieve completion of the bankruptcy 
proceedings by concluding a concordat, since during the period between the 
liquidation hearing and the ultimate distribution he may at any time make an 
offer of concordat with his creditors. The substance of the offer lies in the 
bankrupt's willingness to pay part of the claims in return for termination of 
the proceedings. How great can that part be? Obviously, it is ultimately 
determined by agreement between debtor and creditors, but the law, precisely 
by reason of preventing any act calculated to deceive creditors, who are not 
in an advantageous position, determines the minimum rate, below which the 
concordat may not be approved. 
The bankrupt may initiate the procedure for concordat only if he undertakes, 
in respect of his creditors not enjoying an advantageous position (Class II of 
bankruptcy creditors), to pay at least 50% of their claims during a period of 8 
months or by equal instalments over 10 months (or if the offers 60% or more, 
he evidently must pay only 50% during 8 months, with the facility of an 
additional 10 months for payment of the rest by instalments). 
If the bankrupt's offer is below 50%, the concordat may not be approved 
except when the bankrupt is able to effect prompt payment of 25 to 50% of 
claims and to enclose with his bankruptcy petition a written declaration of 
approval by creditors representing 50% of all claims. In this connection, 
however, it should be pointed out that the creditors are not bound at all by this 
declaration of approval, which may be revoked without comments at any time. 
2. Legal effect of the declaration of bankruptcy 
2.1. An overall view 
The classical law is completely clear and unambiguous in that the primary 
purpose of this legal institution is to ensure satisfaction of creditors' claims. 
This had been the starting point, which ultimately led to the bankruptcy law 
being conceived of as universal execution, but it also called for a well 
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definable range of property (bankrupt's estate) that was in principle accessible 
to creditors, and it required an exact enumeration of the participants' rights and 
duties in the different phases of proceedings. 
The court's decree of bankruptcy starts the bankruptcy proceedings on the 
one hand and, what is now more important to our subject, basically changes the 
previous, normal pattern of contract-law relations on the other, altering the 
legal position of the bankrupt and the persons maintaining relations with him 
and, chiefly in respect of the bankrupt, essentially influencing the debtor's 
status in social life. This impact results from the general and the special legal 
effect of the declaration of bankruptcy. 
2.1.1. General legal effect 
— The bankrupt person loses his rights of administration and disposal 
relative to the property constituting the estate. 
— Any inheritance or legacy legally due to the bankrupt forms part of the 
estate. 
— The bankrupt may not demand maintenance out of the property 
constituting the estate. 
— The bankrupt's legal declarations regarding the property constituting the 
estate are invalid in respect to creditors. 
— Any performance in the bankrupt's favour is valid only if he consigns the 
object(s) of performance to the estate. 
— No legal proceedings may be started or continued against the bankrupt in 
respect of the property constituting the estate. 
— No property, lien or retention right may be acquired, and no security or 
attachment or execution ordered, on the basis of the bankrupt's debts in respect 
to things or rights forming part of the estate. 
— Claims against the bankrupt become due. 
— Prescription does not commence or, if running, is interrupted 
immediately. 
2.1.2. Special legal effect 
The bankrupt's transactions preceding bankruptcy are judged differently in 
respect of whether or not the party effecting them acted in good faith. If the 
party acted in good faith, the contracts are valid and will have the status of 
creditors in the particular class, but if he did not, the invalidity or nullity of the 
contract may be established. 
As can be seen, the consequences of the declaration of bankruptcy 
thoroughly change the existing pattern of relations and therefore a particular 
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measure of care should be devoted to the precise definition of the property 
constituting the estate and to the date of declaration, which is nothing else than 
that of the occurrence of the general and special legal effect. 
2.1.3. Property constituting the bankrupt's estate 
The classical law takes three different approaches to his question 
— Under the French, Belgian, Italian, Austria, Hungarian and other laws,13 
the total assets admissible to execution, or any property accruing to the estate 
during the proceedings following the declaration of bankruptcy forms part of 
the bankrupt's estate. 
— Under the Prussian Code,14 the bankrupt's estate includes his total assets 
existing and expected. 
— Under the German Reich Bankruptcy Act,15 the bankrupt's estate 
includes only and exclusively the property existing and admissible to execution 
at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy. 
As it appears clearly from this enumeration as well, the majority solutions 
of the 19th century focused on admissibility to execution, but regarded any 
increment of property during the proceedings as also forming part of the 
bankrupt's estate. 
Accordingly, the legal effect of declaration 
— extends only to the bankrupt's property, meaning also that the bankrupt 
must have the right of ownership under this general rule. Hence a thing 
possessed but not owned by the bankrupt forms no part of his estate. The 
bankrupt's total assets are constituted solely by liquid assets rather than by the 
sum of things, rights and liabilities, and they include any financial claims of 
the bankrupt, whether in rem or personal under the law of property, which he 
can validly raise on things of another, as well as all things not held but owned 
by him. 
— Nor is it disputable than the overwhelming majority of codes considers 
any increment of property during the proceedings to form part of the 
bankrupt's estate. Such increment includes that part of property acquired by the 
bankrupt as a reward for his own activity, since no legislation prohibits him 
from engaging in gainful activity during the period of bankruptcy proceedings. 
13 French Bankruptcy Act (Art. 443), Belgian Bankruptcy Act of 18 April 1851 (Art. 444), 
Italian Commercial Act (Art. 669), Austrian Bankruptcy Act (Art. 1), Austrian Bankruptcy Act 
of 28 December 1868. 
14 Prussian Bankruptcy Act (Art. 1). 
15 German Reich Bankruptcy Act (Art. 1). 
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The bankrupt may carry on such activity anywhere, and it is even possible for 
him to be employed at his own firm against which a bankruptcy order has been 
issued. Although this remuneration, or the reward for his work is, in theory, 
part of his estate, it should be stressed that it is this sum that was primarily 
destined for his maintenance and that of his family. All codes (except the 
Prussian, of course) agree in that the bankrupt's earnings serve above all for 
his maintenance and that of his family and that he must bring into the estate 
only that part thereof which is not required to cover the cost of living. This 
was taken so seriously that the law provided in principle that the bankrupt's 
income did not ipso jure form part of the estate and also left it to the court to 
determine any deductible part of income. The criterion of admissibility to 
execution is an essential element in respect of the bankrupt's estate. At this 
juncture we do not venture to give even an exemplificative enumeration of 
what can be and cannot be an object of execution as the list differs by country. 
On the whole, classical literature concurred with the approach set out above, 
but, again, what followed from it was the concept of bankruptcy as execution. 
As Apáthy wittily wrote, "Both theory and practice have always concurred in 
that the legal effect of declaration of bankruptcy extends to all assets of a 
bankrupt. Still, nor can it be questioned, at least at present, that the property 
which cannot be an object of execution is to be exempted from the legal effect 
of declaration. Both views are in accord with the substance and nature of 
bankruptcy, both cases are natural concomitants of bankruptcy, which cannot 
be considered other than general execution (my emphasis — G. T.). The only 
difference between ordinary execution and bankruptcy consists in that the 
former is limited to a certain part of property, perhaps to some chattels, while 
the latter affects the totality of a bankrupt's assets. This approach entails the 
need for the definition of assets that can be surrendered to bankruptcy to be 
governed by the general principles of execution".16 
2.1.4. Commencement of the legal effect of declaration 
Under the Hungarian and Austrian laws, the date of commencement of 
declaration is the day on which the court's decree of bankruptcy is nailed up 
to the court's notice-board. The same solution was adopted by the French, 
Italian and Belgian bankruptcy acts, but the Prussian and German Reich 
16 APÁTHY, I.: A magyar csődjog rendszere. I. kötet, Anyagi csődjog (System of the 
Hungarian Law of Bankruptcy. Volume I, Substantive Law of Bankruptcy), Budapest, 1887, 
68-69. 
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bankruptcy acts17 define the date of commencement of legal effect as the hour 
at which the court decree is issued. From this it directly follows that these Acts 
required the court decree to indicate its exact hour of issue. 
As against the general concurrence of literature in respect to assets 
constituting a bankrupt's estate, Hungarian literature was also deeply divided 
on this question. For instance, Lajos Králik, another prominent jurist in 
bankruptcy of his time along with Apáthy, clearly links the date of declaration 
to the hour of issue of the court's decree of bankruptcy, considering it ipso jure 
1 К 
in nature. 
2.2. The bankrupt's rights of administration and disposal 
In terms of property law it is beyond doubt that the most serious consequence 
of the legal effect of declaration results in the bankrupt losing Iiis rights of 
administration and disposal in respect of assets constituting his estate, exercise 
of these rights passing to the administrator of the bankrupt's estate. On the 
other hand, the administrator's rights are relatively limited since they showed 
a much stronger goal orientation of bankruptcy assets than they do today, 
namely the prevalence of the requirement for the property to be used for 
satisfaction of creditors' claims, mainly those who had a valid legal title 
already at the time of declaration. At the same time, however, loss of the rights 
of administration and disposal does not affect the bankrupt's right of 
ownership. The bankrupt remains the owner of the entire estate and loses only 
some partial, though undoubtedly significant, components of his ownership 
right. Contemporary literature19 can be said to be completely unanimous on 
this aspect, and it also resulted from this approach that no separate provision 
on the right of ownership was necessary in respect to the assets possibly 
remaining after conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, since the bankrupt 
did not lose hid ownership right and hence there was no need to produce any 
legal ground for devolution of ownership in order for him to be again the 
actual owner of the remaining assets, that is, what terminated in respect to this 
part of property was the exercise by another of the rights of administration and 
17 Prussian Bankruptcy Act (Art. 121), German Reich Bankruptcy Act (Art. 100). 
18 KRÁLIK, L.: Magyar csődjog (Hungarian Bankruptcy Law), Budapest, 1881, 18. 
19 See, e.g., HERCZEGH, M.: A csődtörvénykezés Magyarországban és Erdélyben 
(Bankruptcy Legislation in Hungary and Transsylvania), Pest, 1872, 22; KRÁLIK: op. cit., 
13; WENGLER: Der Concurs der Gläubiger, Leipzig, 1871, 940; SCHUSTER: Darstellung 
der Concursordnung, Wien, 1857, 13. 
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disposal heretofore restricting the bankrupt's right of ownership. From his point 
of view this meant no more than that he was free again to exercise his 
ownership right without restrictions. 
Considering that the bankrupt loses his rights of administration and 
disposal only and exclusively in respect to his estate, the fact of declaration of 
bankruptcy affects neither his personal rights concerning other property, nor his 
right of disposal otherwise existing. So there is no bar to the bankrupt 
establishing legal relations with third persons or even with bankruptcy 
creditors, the only limitation being that such relations may not affect the 
bankrupt's estate itself. 
It follows from the oft-mentioned approach of the classical law that while 
the bankrupt's rights of administration and disposal actually pertained to the 
administrator of the estate, the latter's strongly limited role gave rise to a 
serious dispute in literature about the creditors' status. The substance of the 
dispute can be summed up in that, according to some authors,20 the tights of 
administration and disposal devolve only apparently upon the administrator, 
but, considering that he acts in the interest of creditors and ultimately carries 
out their "instructions", they are actually exercise by creditors after all. If such 
is the case, the question arises whether the legal effect of declaration of 
bankruptcy brings about ipso jure any community of creditors and whether 
such community takes on the character of legal entity. 
The advocates of the opposite view21 maintain that what we have here 
in respect of creditors is but a quasi joinder of parties, for the creditors 
themselves may not directly exercise the rights of administration and disposal. 
Some authors point out that, within the limitations imposed by national laws, 
these rights pertain only and exclusively to the administrator of the bankrupt's 
estate, who, acting in this capacity, may do everything the bankrupt might have 
done in the absence of declaration, notably both his right to decide on 
substantive matters and his right of representation are essentially unrestricted, 
with allowance naturally made for judicial control, but, on the other hand, the 
administrator may not exercise the rights which pertain by their nature to the 
bankrupt's person. 
20 According to Apathy, the rights of administration and disposal pass to creditors, but the 
latter may not exercise them. Creditors form a "causal joinder", which, however, does not 
qualify as a legal entity. APÁTHY: op. cit., 78-80. 
21 HERCZEGH: A magyar csődtörvény (The Hungarian Bankruptcy Act), Budapest, 1882, 
21 et seq.; WENGLER: op. cit., 70. 
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While the loss of the bankrupt's rights of administration and disposal or 
the nullity thereof when exercised can be said to be of full scope, that fullness 
is nevertheless limited for, as is clearly stated by several jurists in classical 
law,22 the bankrupt's declaration at law is null and void only in respect to his 
creditors and to the extent that it goes to property forming part of the estate. 
Thus this nullity is by all means relative. Hence it directly follows that the 
bankrupt is free to dispose of any property and to assert any economic rights 
that do not form part of the estate either because they are inadmissible to 
execution or pertain to his person, and he may demand a valuable consideration 
for personal service and may even satisfy any of his bankruptcy creditors "from 
his own separate property". In this respect he is not tied to the ranking of 
priorities among claims as established by the bankruptcy act. In point of fact, 
he is deemed by law to be a third person, so in principle the possibility cannot 
be ruled out of his becoming, as it were, his own creditor by purchasing 
(satisfying) the claims of his creditors. (In that period, factoring did not 
naturally exist in its present form, and therefore practice was not influenced by 
any eventual precedence thereof, as research has found no trace of such cases 
causing any problem, or else legislation or at least judicial practice should 
necessarily have settled this question, since this "liberalism" as we see it today 
can be a rather serious source of abuse, let alone the fact that it is apt to easily 
upset the otherwise strict rank-order of creditors' claims.) 
The relative nullity of the bankrupt's declarations at law has, among other 
things, entailed the need for law to cover the type of payments made to the 
bankrupt by third persons. The legal status of performance differs according to 
whether performance preceded or followed the publication of the decree of 
bankruptcy. If performance preceded publication, it was for the administrator 
to prove that the third person rendering performance knew of the fact of 
declaration, or else it was the duty of the third party to prove that he was 
ignorant of the fact of declaration. 
Where the bankrupt brought the value of performance into the estate, the 
legal transaction was deemed to be absolutely valid, but if, as against the 
present-day solution, he did not do so, his failure did not by itself render the 
transaction invalid, it merely reversed the burden of proof in the manner 
indicated above. Thus, if the third person was able to produce reliable evidence 
that he had been ignorant (because of e.g., staying abroad) of the decree of 
bankruptcy despite its publication, he did not, in principle, face the danger of 
22 HERCZEGH: A magyar csődtörvény (The Hungarian Bankruptcy Act), 30; KRÁLIK: 
op. cit., 27; WENGLER: op. cit., 104. 
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double performance. So good faith had a decisive role to play, but it naturally 
did not release the bankrupt from his obligation to add the countervalue of 
performance to the estate. The same rule applied when performance was 
effected by the representative of the contracting party. 
Relative nullity continues to give rise to legal actibn in which the 
bankrupt may be represented by himself or the bankrupt himself is made the 
defending party on account of some personal service. 
Since these aspects bear on the bankrupt's personal capacity to sue or to 
be sued, which is not subject to restrictions, they do not affect the estate, but 
the situation is different if such legal actions (Whether active or passive) were 
brought prior to the declaration of bankruptcy and their subject-matter concerns 
even the estate itself wholly or in part. In these cases the administrator has the 
right of free option, deciding to act or not to act with full powers for the 
bankrupt in the legal proceedings. It is an interesting solution of these laws23 
that if the administrator discontinues an active legal action, while promptly 
recognizing the claim in an action against the bankrupt, the legal costs may not 
be charged as a debt to the estate. The materially "losing" party may, in the way 
of ordinary bankruptcy creditor, enforce his claim merely as a personal one. 
This is of immense disadvantage to him because at the ultimate distribution of 
the estate both accounts receivable and debts due enjoyed absolute priority. 
Practically there was no case in which such debts or costs were not paid off. 
For that matter, the proceedings could not even have been instituted in the face 
of such danger (cases in which the value of property is insufficient to cover 
even the costs of proceedings are deemed to be circumstances acting as a bar 
to bankruptcy). 
2.3. Due-date of claims 
An important element of the general effect of die declaration of bankruptcy is 
that creditors' claims against the bankrupt fall due with the fact of declaration. 
The reason for this provision of law is clear, as the administrator is thereby 
brought into a position to confront all claims against the bankrupt with the 
latter's accessible property. On the other hand, however, it is only the claims 
against the estate that fall due, in accordance with the general principle that it 
is exclusively the estate that serves as security for creditors' satisfaction. A 
23 Hungarian Bankruptcy Act (Art. 9), German Reich Bankruptcy Act (Art. 10), Austrian 
Bankruptcy Act (Art. 10). 
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contract of the type which, e.g., aims at payment of some allowance or 
involves an obligation for periodic payments does not expire. 
The classical laws were not completely uniform on the types of claims 
falling due. Under the Prussian, Austrian and Hungarian bankruptcy acts, for 
instance, only claims against the estate become due,24 whereas under the 
French and Italian acts25 the bankrupt's total debts can be regarded as falling 
due ipso jure with the fact of declaration of bankruptcy. 
Another important question concerning this subject is whether the 
declaration affects and to what extent those persons who have, under some 
legal title, given security with regard to the bankrupt. The classical law referred 
to the totality of such persons as co-debtors and took the approach that the 
declaration was not to change their position, notably claims did not fall due 
against them. Králik justified that view along the following lines. 
"It makes sense that a claim against a bankrupt should become due, 
because the bankrupt's right of disposal expired with the declaration of 
bankruptcy, so it is a commensurable incident that claims against him should 
also expire. However, this does not allow the conclusion that claims should 
expire against the bankrupt's co-debtors as well, that those who are to blame 
for nothing should be compelled to pay a debt which has not yet become due 
in respect of them. In the economic and business world of a trader and a 
manufacturer it is a matter of capital importance that calculated receipts and 
outlays should follow in line; payments cannot be undertaken and effected 
except in proportion to and by the date of receipts. Advancing expiry dates 
under such circumstance is equal to turning the most reasonable and most 
probable combinations upside down. It would ruin many traders or would at 
least compel them to establish a fund for that purpose, merely by reason of their 
going surety to meet such kind of unforeseeable contingencies, and it would 
divert much capital from productive operations, while causing innumerable 
failures in the case of banks and savings-banks going bankrupt."26 
24 Prussian Bankruptcy Act (Art. 249), Austrian Bankruptcy Act (Art. 25). 
25 French Bankruptcy Act (Art. 444), Italian Commercial Act (Art. 201). 
26 KRÁLIK: op. cit., 47. 
9 4 Gábor Török 
3. Status of persons participating in bankruptcy proceedings, with 
particular emphasis on their liability 
3.1. Debtor 
A debtor may be a physical or a legal person. If the debtor is a physical person 
and he dies either before the institution of proceedings or during the period 
thereof, he is "replaced" by the estate, the net value of which — namely the part 
reduced by liabilities in accordance with what has been stated about the 
concept of the bankrupt 's estate — will constitute the bankrupt's estate. 
The deptor's having lost his rights of administration and disposal in 
respect to his estate did not naturally release him from certain obligations he 
could not behave like an outsider, playing the role of an illustrous stranger, 
because the Act imposed on him duties to be performed within an appointed 
date chiefly in the initial phase of bankruptcy proceedings. First and foremost 
among his duties was immediate provision of information for the court about 
the position of his estate. This duty to inform should be understood in a broad 
sense to include showing actually available assets, together with accounts 
receivable affecting the estate, as well as claims against the estate (liabilities). 
If the bankrupt failed to inform the court or informed it reluctantly, the trustee 
had the right and the duty to make him comply with his duty even by 
threatening penalty. The bankrupt had to submit the related statement himself, 
to sign it and to add a clause with a declaration of readiness to swear at any 
time that he had concealed no part of property and had not included "fictitious 
debts" in Iris statement. The act of swearing was not automatic, but if the 
administrator or any creditor submitted a request to the trustee to that effect, 
the bankrupt was under obligation to swear the oath. Swearing an oath was 
important for die added reason that any deficiencies that might come out 
afterwards were within the ambit of penal law and therefore the bankrupt was 
allowed to correct his statement before the act of swearing. In that case the law 
presumed good faith, basing itself on the assumption of a simple error. 
Eventual arrest of the bankrupt is a most interesting provision of the 
classical law. There are two cases to be distinguished. In the first case the court 
orders arrest almost automatically, but it may do so only if there is good reason 
for thinking that the bankrupt would abscond. The court has discretion to 
decide on this issue, to hear anyone as a witness, but is not under obligation 
to hear anyone. 
In the other case, however, the court was under obligation to order the 
bankrupt 's arrest if during the bankruptcy proceedings there had emerged 
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evidence of the bankrupt's oath-breaking or the bankrupt had refused to comply 
with any court order in spite of repeated warnings. 
The maximum term of detention was 2 months in both cases, the bankrupt 
was allowed to charge his cost of provision against the estate and had to give 
account thereof as a debt burdening the estate. Interestingly, this latter 
provision was incorporated in the text of the act only, whereas the bill had 
contained the diametrically opposed view which did not allow the bankrupt to 
demand maintenance out of the estate. 
The relevant acts precisely determined the place and conditions of 
detention of this type. Practice was completely uniform in that confinement was 
executed in the least severe grade of punishment everywhere. 
During the period of detention the bankrupt was free to request the court 
at any time to release him, and the court was to decide after a compulsory 
hearing of the trustee. In addition to his role in detention as outlined above, the 
trustee had another right in respect to the bankrupt's personal freedom, namely 
the bankrupt was not allowed to leave his place of residence after the 
institution of bankruptcy proceedings. The reason was obviously to ensure that 
the bankrupt was physically available to the trustee and the court. If he wanted 
to leave, he had to ask the trustee for "leave of absence", and if his request 
was declined, he had the right to apply to the court for a legal remedy, but no 
further appeal lay against die court's decision. 
3.2. Creditors 
Anyone having some material claim, pertaining to property rights, against the 
debtor—regardless of whether the debtor's entire property or a specified part 
thereof serves as security for the satisfaction of claimsy—is to be deemed 
creditor in the widest sense of the word. In this context, therefore, we can 
speak of creditors "per se" and "not per se". Bankruptcy creditors per se are 
those who at the time of declaration of bankruptcy have a claim based on a 
contract-law relationship. A person whose claim results from the law of filings 
rather than the law of contracts, whose claim is on personal service by the 
debtor and, finally, who had no claim at the time of declaration was not 
included in this group and hence not deemed to be a bankruptcy creditor. 
Defined as bankruptcy creditors not per se are persons whose claims arise 
from a legal transaction, not with the debtor, but with the bankrupt's estate, 
creditors entitled to claim back property and taking action for delivery from the 
estate of a thing forming no part thereof (e.g. the thing is not owned by the 
bankrupt) and, finally, creditors entitled to separate satisfaction, whose claims 
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are based on the law of things and who may seek satisfaction only from a 
certain part of the property, they are basically persons entitled to claims 
secured by a right of pledge or lien. 
At a later stage we shall revert to the status of creditors in respect of their 
claims and of the committee of bankruptcy during the proceedings. Here we 
shall dwell on a very special aspect of liability. 
Under the heading "Criminal Decisions" in Chapter 2 of Title III the 
Hungarian Bankruptcy Act defines practically two criminal-law facts, which 
can also be accomplished by creditors. The legislator proceeds from the 
assumption that creditors" interests may be prejudiced not only by the debtor's 
acts, but also by co-creditors, either directly or indirectly, in the latter case 
evidently by inducing a third person to commit a particular act. 
In the first place, a case in point is that a person files a false claim or 
instigates another to do so in order to obtain an advantage for the debtor, for 
himself or perhaps for someone else. The offence can only be committed within 
a specified time, namely during the period of bankruptcy proceedings between 
the date of declaration of bankruptcy and the conclusion of proceedings. The 
perpetrator is punishable even if the bankruptcy proceedings are instituted on 
account of his filing a false claim, because the proceedings have commenced 
at his petition, that is to say that the offence was committed between the two 
dates indicated above, from this it logically follows that if the creditor 
withdraws Iiis filing of the false claim — naturally this avenue in not open to 
every false claim, but only to the one which is to serve as a basis for the 
institution of proceedings —, withdrawal excludes punishability. 
A claim is defined as false not only when the legal ground is untrue, but 
also when the person filing the claim changes the legal title to his claim in 
order to secure a more favourable ranking thereof, or when he raises the 
amount of claim in order to gain a higher rate of satisfaction at the ultimate 
division of the estate. 
The perpetrator of the offence of filing a false claim is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of up to 3 years, to a fine of not more than 1.000 
forints or to deprivation of office. 
Similarly, a penal-law fact is deemed to be accomplished by a person who 
gives or promises money or other advantage to any of the creditors or, with the 
creditor's consent, to his relative in order for him to support adoption of a 
certain decision, his punishment being imprisonment for a term of up to 2 years 
and a fine of not more than 200 forints. The person accepting such money or 
advantage is liable to the same punishment. Contemporary literature definitely 
considers this buying of vote to be one of the most serious acts, since it will 
Tlie Classical Model of Bankruptcy Law 9 7 
cause the creditor "to vote, as a result of bribery, against his conviction as well 
as the desiderata of law and justice at the adoption of a decision within his 
province".27 Whether or not the decision supported by the bribed creditor 
eventually obtained the votes of the majority is indifferent to the 
accomplishment of the statutorily defined fact, but, on the other hand, a 
creditor accepting a reward after the voting is not punishable unless the reward 
can be proved to have also implied his taking a certain position at the 
forthcoming vote. 
3.3. Administrator of the bankrupt's estate 
After the declaration of bankruptcy the administrator of the bankrupt's estate 
takes over the rights of administration and disposal lost by the bankrupt and 
exercises them until the deadline for the ultimate distribution of the estate. 
The administrator is appointed by the court declaring the bankruptcy generally, 
under Hungarian practice, from among lawyers practising and residing in the 
court's venue. The court's independence in appointment is practically limited 
by a single rule, namely the bankrupt may not be appointed administrator 
even if the said lawyer and the bankrupt's relatives are subject to a similar 
rule of incompatibility. Under the old Hungarian law, cousins were also 
included in the category of relatives. Appointment in violation of the rule of 
incompatibility was ipso jure invalid. 
The most important prerogative of the administrator is to exercise the 
rights of representation, administration and disposal in respect of the bankrupt's 
estate. 
In exercise of these right the administrator must identify and supervise the 
assets and liabilities, secure the active assets and ensure the collection of 
outstanding debts. In addition, it is mainly for him to judge creditors' claims 
filed against the estate, either contesting or recognizing them as just, and to 
decide whether to participate as representative in the legal proceedings under 
way or to terminate them. 
His prerogatives rest basically on the court decision, as part of which a 
separate letter of appointment is issued for him in lieu of any separate 
authorization, entitling him to draw sums of money, to make out money-orders, 
etc. It is interesting, however, that while the administrator is vested with 
general powers of representation, this prerogative in nevertheless restricted in 
27 APÁTHY, I.: A magyar csődjog rendszere. Második Rész. Alaki csődjog (System of the 
Hungarian Law of Bankruptcy. Part Two. Procedural Bankruptcy Law), Budapest, 1888, 199. 
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one aspect, notably the administrator is not authorized to receive securities, 
jewels or sums of money deposited with authorities, and should he want to 
receive them, he must apply to the bankruptcy court for a separate 
authorization issued for that purpose. 
The administrator must exercise due diligence in carrying out his activity 
and is responsible for any damage resulting from his failure to observe this 
rule. According to the general view, he is also responsible for culpa levis,2* 
as he has voluntarily accepted the post of administrator and receives a 
remuneration for his services. 
Besides die administrator's liability for damages, the bankruptcy court 
may impose on him a fine of up to 200 forints for omission. If the imposition 
of a fine was of no avail, the court may relieve him of his duties, either ex 
officio or on motion of the trustee or the committee of bankruptcy. It is an 
interesting provision that in case of motion the court does not hear the 
bankrupt, but in case of release from office ex officio both the trustee and the 
committee of bankruptcy and even the administrator himself must be allowed 
to be heard. The court decision relieving the administrator of his duties may be 
appealed against in each case. 
As in accordance with his legal status the administrator is interesting in 
an early conclusion of proceedings, he is given priority over everyone else in 
demanding reimbursement of his expenses and payment of his remuneration, 
so much so that the bankruptcy proceedings may not be terminated without 
satisfaction of his claims. In the question of remuneration, however, the 
committee of bankruptcy, too, has an import role to play inasmuch as it is 
essentially for it to approve the amount of remuneration in the first place. The 
agreement between the committee and the administrator on remuneration is 
subject to approval by the court, which, however, has a discretion to reduce the 
amount if it finds it unreasonably high. 
3.4. Committee of bankruptcy 
The setting up of a committee of bankruptcy—although, interestingly, it was not 
mandatory in all national legislations—came to assume extremely great 
importance during the proceedings. Its fundamental conceptual criterion 
consists in that its members, 3 to 5 on average, are elected by creditors from 
28 APÁTHY: II, op. cit., 47. A similar provision is contained in Art. 74 of the German 
Reich Bankruptcy Act, which ordains application of the maxim of "bonus et diligens 
paterfamilias" to the activity of the administrator of bankrupt's estate. 
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among themselves to defend and represent their own interests. Its function is 
to represent the creditors' interests before the court and the trustee vis-à-vis the 
bankrupt, namely to act in and on behalf of creditors. In the laws which do not 
prescribe the setting up of a committee the matters within the committee's 
province are dealt with either by the court itself or by a meeting of creditors 
convened from time to time. (This also naturally means that the proceedings 
are likely to lose considerable impetus.) 
With a view to election of the committee, the trustee appoints a day in his 
notice, and the creditors present must elect their representatives by a simple 
majority of votes. The committee thus elected is not subject to approval by the 
court; its members are issued with letters of appointment by the trustee. 
The committee's basic task is to support and control the administrator's 
activity. In exercising its right of control the committee may at any time 
request information from the administrator on any matter, inspect any official 
document and inquire into the status of property, the only limitation being that 
an inquiry may not be held at an inconvenient date, i.e., it may not disturb the 
normal course of property management. 
The committee may, on its authority, terminate any irregularity disclosed 
by control (which obviously means that it invites the administrator to take the 
necessary measure within an appointed date) or turn to the trustee. 
The committee adopts its own rules of procedure, the substantive aspects 
of which are not governed by law, but a chairman must be elected in any case. 
Like the trustee, the committee must use due diligence in performing its 
functions and bears liability for any damage caused by omission. However, 
such liability exists only and exclusively in respect to creditors, since its 
members and the rest of creditors are bound by a relationship of agency. Any 
member of the committee may happen to detect a circumstance which, in his 
judgement, calls for immediate action, in that case he may act on behalf of the 
committee, but must bear responsibility alone, it is not shared by his co-
creditors in the committee. 
The right of proposal to call the committee or an individual member 
thereof to account is vested first of all in the administrator, since he must, as 
has been seen, represent the interests not only of the bankrupt, but also of all 
creditors. At the same time, however, any other creditor may take action 
against the committee if he believes that his own rights have been prejudice by 
the committee's measures. 
The committee members may not demand any remuneration, but may 
demand reimbursement from the estate of their expenses incurred and certified. 
Such claims must be charged against the costs account of the estate. 
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In view of the fact that membership in the committee is in the nature of 
agency, committee members may be recalled at any time, but in actual practice 
recall is effected after the deadline for liquidation, when the right to dispose 
of the estate no longer pertains to the administrator, but to the whole body of 
creditors.29 
3.5. Trustee in bankruptcy 
The institution of trustee in bankruptcy was introduce by the French 
Commercial Code and the French Bankruptcy Act of 1838 related thereto. The 
creation of this post was clearly justified by the need to expedite proceedings 
through relieving pressure on the court. The trustee himself is appointed by the 
court, from among its own members of a lower grade, to conduct proceedings 
and to control both the administrator of the bankrupt's estate and the committee 
of bankruptcy. Owing precisely to his mobility, the trustee has lived up to the 
expectations in full. The court itself does not visit premises and confines itself 
to deciding on matters of fundamental importance or in cases where a complain 
against the trustee's measures is admissible. 
Recall of the trustee may be ordered by the court in every case; its 
decision is not to be justified and is non-appealable. 
4. Creditors' claims 
4.1. Right of recovery 
Considering that the bankrupt's estate includes but tilings owned by the debtor, 
the owners have the right to recover tilings that are held but not owned by the 
bankrupt. 
Exercise of the right of recovery is essentially an act outside the ambit of 
bankruptcy in every case. 
The legal ground for the right of recovery is created by the unjust 
enrichment of the bankrupt's estate. As a general rule, if another's tiling in 
kind can be found in the estate, the administrator is under obligation to deliver 
it without any formal proceedings. However, in cases where a thing of another 
was sold, exchanged or otherwise alienated by the debtor before the declaration 
of bankruptcy or by the administrator after the declaration, the party entitled 
29 KRÁLIK: op. cit., 222-223. 
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to recovery may demand delivery of the receipts or, if no sun has yet been 
received, assignment of the claim. 
4.2. Right to separate satisfaction 
This right is vested in co-owners who act, together with the debtor, as owners 
at a company. Starting from the general principle of the law of bankruptcy that 
the bankrupt's estate may be constituted by nothing but things owned by the 
debtor, things pertaining to co-owners rather than to the debtor at the company 
form no part of the bankrupt's estate. Consequently the debtor's fellow-owners 
may demand that their share of property be separated from the estate and be 
delivered to them. Nevertheless, this general principle does not apply to certain 
forms of company. Thus, for instance, if bankruptcy has been declared against 
the senior partner in a limited partnership, the silent partner may enforce his 
claim only as a bankruptcy creditor and is not entitled to separate satisfaction. 
The most important category of those enjoying the right to separate 
satisfaction is undoubtedly constituted by mortgagees. Since the contemporary 
private law practically allowed mortgage on real property only, such mortgage 
was one on the debtor's immovables and included eventual receipts therefrom. 
As a general rule, the debtor's real property constitutes a fund of separate 
satisfaction in case of bankruptcy, the only exception being that when it is not 
mortgaged, it serves as a fund of separate satisfaction to the extent required by 
the liabilities and costs of the estate, taxes connected with bankruptcy 
proceedings, and the costs of maintenance of the real property. Another 
general rule is that the real property constitutes a fund of separate satisfaction 
in the state in which it was at the time of declaration of bankruptcy. The yields 
of pre-declaration real property do not belong to the fund of separate 
satisfaction, but the post-declaration gain does. 
In cases where several creditors have a mortgage on the particular real 
property, they are subject to the principle of general ranking, practically 
meaning that after deduction of the expenses incurred (cost of auction, direct 
state and municipal taxes on real property, etc.) the administrator must satisfy 
them from the purchase pries of the real property. 
Similarly, lienors of movables could enforce their claims by exercising the 
right to separate satisfaction. The Hungarian Bankruptcy Act did not cover the 
conditions for acquiring a right of pledge, but laid down the principle that 
lienors of movables must be satisfied from the value of movables forming part 
of the bankrupt's estate and burdened with lien or after payment of any debts 
and costs of that property. 
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It applies to all creditors entitled to separate satisfaction that they may 
enforce their claims in precedence of bankruptcy creditors, in the manner that 
the estate will be constituted by the part of property burdened with a right in 
rem and remaining after their satisfaction. 
4.3. Estate creditors 
Here belong expenditures necessarily incurred in connection with the 
proceedings and the administrator's measures. The classical laws drew a sharp 
distinction between the two legal grounds, referring to the former as costs of 
the estate and to the latter as liabilities of the estate. The costs included the 
administrator's remuneration, without payment of which the proceedings could 
not even be concluded, as has been seen above, but it can be stated in general 
that payment of the costs and liabilities took perforce precedence of satisfaction 
of other creditors and the extent of satisfaction was 100% in any case. 
4.4. Bankruptcy creditors 
The so-called general estate of a bankrupt is constituted by the debtor's 
property remaining after separate satisfaction and payment of the costs and 
liabilities of the estate. 
Although each bankruptcy creditor is a personal creditor—therefore the 
legal title of his claim is based on contract law (for if it were based on the law 
of things he would be placed in another category of creditors) and even an 
equal mark might be put between such creditors—each of the classical laws 
classified creditors by different criteria, the result being a strict rank-order 
among them. This practically meant that until full satisfaction of creditors in 
the preceding class creditors in the subsequent class could not be satisfied, and 
where the remaining property was insufficient for full satisfaction of claims in 
the given class, creditors had to be satisfied in proportion to their claims. The 
national laws grouped bankrupt creditors in different classes, of which there 
were 5 in, e.g., the German Reich Bankruptcy Act and 3 in the Hungarian Act. 
A detailed description of the latter follows below. 
Class I included creditors of the following claims: 
— the debtor's employees who worked on a regular basis in the deptor's 
household or business were entitled to back-pay due to them for one year 
immediately preceding the declaration of bankruptcy or to their pay for the 
statutory period of notice even if their employment relations no longer existed 
at the time of declaration or were not maintained by the administrator of the 
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estate. If the administrator maintained employment, their pay and their wages 
for the period of notice were deemed to be liabilities of the estate; 
— if the debtor died before the declaration of bankruptcy, his eventual 
medical and burial expenses belonged in this class insofar as payment there of 
had been made within one year preceding declaration; 
— unpaid portions of arrears of rates and taxes within 3 years preceding 
declaration; 
— satisfaction of claims of minors and persons under curatorship in 
general. 
Class II, practically always the largest, was that of creditors whose claims 
did not belong in Class I; these were the general creditors, the only exception 
being Class III, which did not essentially constitute a separate legal ground. 
The difference between Classes II and III lay fundamentally in that interest and 
allowance-like liabilities which had existed earlier than 3 years prior to 
declaration were rated by the Act as the last item in the order of payments, 
representing the so-called Class III. 
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Mónika WELLER Application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
in the Hungarian Legal System 
As a result of the political transformation in 1989-1990, Hungary became a 
member state of the Council of Europe and signed the European Convention on 
Human Rights and its additional protocols in 1990. Following a careful 
screening process (a compatibility exercise as it has become known in the 
Council of Europe1) the Convention was ratified on 5 November 1992. 
At the time of ratification, the following statements were made concerning 
the competence of the supervisory organs: 
"The Republic of Hungary declares that for a period of five years, 
which will be tacitly renewed for further periods of five years, unless the 
Republic of Hungary withdraws its declaration before the expiration of the 
appropriate term: 
1 See: Compatibility of Hungarian law with the European Convention on Human Rights: 
preparatory work prior to ratification. Council of Europe, Directorate of Human Rights, Doc.: 
H (95) 2. The „Hungarian Model" is set as an example for the new Member States of the 
Council of Europe, and Hungarian experts are often invited to take part in those compatibility 
exercises. 
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a. it recognises in accordance with Article 25 of the Convention, Article 
6 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 7 of Protocol No. 7 the competence of the 
European Commission of Human Rights to receive petitions from any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to 
be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention and its 
Protocols, where the facts of the alleged violation of these rights occur after 
the Convention and its Protocols have come into force in respect of the 
Republic of Hungary; 
b. it recognises in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, Article 6 
of the Protocol No. 4 and Article 7 of Protocol No. 7 as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, on condition of reciprocity, the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in all matters concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Convention and its Protocols and 
relating to facts occurring after the Convention and its Protocols have come 
into force in respect of the Republic of Hungary." 
"The above declaration is interpreted by the Government of the 
Republic of Hungary, that measures taken by the Hungarian Republic for the 
reparation of the violation of the aforesaid rights which had taken place prior 
to the entry into force of the Convention and its Protocols shall not be 
considered as facts of the alleged violation of these rights." 
In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention, the Republic of Hungary made 
the following reservation in respect of the right to access to courts guaranteed 
by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: 
"For the time being in proceedings for regulatory offences before the 
administrative authorities, Hungary cannot guarantee the right to access to 
courts, because the current Hungarian laws do not provide such right, the 
decision of the administrative authorities being final. 
The relevant provisions of the Hungarian law referred to above are: 
— Section 4 of Act No. IV of 1972 on courts, modified several times, 
which provides that the courts, unless an Act stipulates otherwise, may 
review the legality of the decisions taken by the administrative authorities; 
— An exception is contained in Section 71/A of Act No. I of 1968 on 
proceedings for regulatory offences, modified several times, which allows 
for the offender to request judicial review solely against the measures taken 
by the administrative authority to commute to confinements the fine the 
offender had been sentenced to pay; no other access to court against final 
decisions taken in proceedings for regulatory offences is permitted". 
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Prior to and following ratification, a number of new acts were adopted in 
order to bring Hungarian legislation in line with the requirements of the 
Convention, and also the text of the Convention, in accordance with Article 7 
(2) of the Hungarian Constitution, was incorporated into Hungarian law by Act 
No. XXXI of 1993 whereby the Convention became applicable before domestic 
courts. 
The incorporation of the Convention into domestic law is a very important 
factor for its efficiency and it enables the Convention supervisory mechanism 
to play a truly subsidiary role as it was intended to.2 In those countries where 
the Convention is not part of domestic law, as it was the case with the United 
kingdom until 1998, domestic courts are not in a position to establish violation 
of the Convention rights and to provide an effective remedy, therefore all those 
cases where otherwise domestic courts could effectively protect human rights 
have to be brought before and decided by the international court. 
In order to avoid a flow of cases to the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights,3 therefore it is very important that not only legislation be 
constantly brought in line with new developments in the Strasbourg case-law but 
also domestic courts be ready to apply the Convention. From this perspective, 
Part A below explores how Hungarian courts apply the Convention, Part В 
examines the role of the Constitutional Court in bringing Hungarian legislation 
in line with the Convention standards, and Part С presents the applications 
introduced against Hungary before the European Commission on Human Rights. 
A. Application of the Convention by the Hungarian courts 
The Hungarian legal system is not a case-law system and not all judgments of 
(higher) courts are published (and therefore it is impossible to give a complete 
picture on the subject) but only a selection of judgments intended to provide 
guidance as to the most important questions of interpretation of laws. These 
judgments are not of binding force but of persuasive authority. A compilation 
is published monthly by the Supreme Court as "Decisions of Courts" (Bírósági 
2 Herbert PETZOLD: The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity. In: Macdonald, R. 
St. J.—Matscher, F.—Petzold, H. (Elds.): The European System for the Protection of Human 
Rights. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. 41-62. 
3 Following the entry into force of the 11th Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights on 1 November 1998, the Commission and the Court is replaced by a new single 
Court. 
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Határozatok; ВН.) which also contains summaries of judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
Many of these judgments of higher courts (County Courts and the Supreme 
Court) contain references to the Convention with a view to give weight to 
arguments based on corresponding national legislation. It is very rare that 
provisions of the Convention (that is the Act promulgating the text of the 
Convention and its protocols) are referred to as an independent basis for 
decision, and the courts very rarely refer to the case-law of the Strasbourg 
organs. It is interesting to note that when there is such a reference made in the 
judgment, the "source" is specified as it has been published in the above 
mentioned compilation (ВН.) and not with reference to the original English or 
French sources (e.g. Series A). 
In this context, two cases are interesting to mention. The first judgment 
(published as BH1996.189.) concerned the right to defence in case of two 
juvenile offenders where legal assistance was compulsory. Each of the 
defendants had a legal representative assigned to them by the court but one of 
the lawyers was substituted by the other at the first hearing, and both of them 
were substituted by a third one at the second hearing without authorisation by 
the court or the defendants. The appellate court held, with reference to Article 
6(3) b of the Convention, that compulsory legal representation must not be 
interpreted formally: the mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient, he must 
have enough time to prepare for the defence of his client. When the legal 
representative assigned by the court in respect of one of the defendants is 
substituted by the lawyer of the other defendant (which is possible only when 
there is no conflict of interest between them) the court must satisfy itself that 
the latter is well-prepared in the cases of both defendants. 
The other case (BH 1998.132.) concerned parental rights and the placement 
of children after the divorce of the parents. In the divorce proceedings, upon the 
agreement of the parents, the two children were placed in the custody of the 
mother. But very soon, the father filed a legal action for changing the placement 
of the children on the ground that the mother regularly attended meetings of 
Jehovah's Witnesses and by so doing she neglected her children and even put 
their life and health at risk. At the hearing, she failed to give a definite answer 
whether she would allow the children to undergo blood-transfusion in case of 
medical need. Evidence showed, however, that she did take care properly of her 
children. On the other hand, expert opinion stated that the elder boy was more 
attached to his father than to his mother, and that he had suffered some 
psychological damage (e.g. strong fear of death) on account of his mother's 
religious influence on him. Therefore the court decided that the older boy 
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should be placed with the father while the younger remained with the mother. 
The Supreme Court, however, held that, besides that the separation of the 
siblings was not in their interest, the judgment was unlawful because it was 
based primarily on the mother's religious conviction and failed to take into 
account other relevant factors favourable to her. With reference to Article 8 and 
14 of the Convention, as well as the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Hoffmann v Austria, the Supreme Court stated that the religious 
conviction of a parent cannot be a decisive factor in custody cases neither in 
favour, nor to the disadvantage of the parent concerned. With reference to 
Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the Supreme Court held that the 
equality of the spouses required that when there was a conflict between the 
religious or philosophical convictions of the parents each of them should equally 
be responsible to resolve this conflict in the interest of their children, and one 
of them (the parent belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses denomination) could 
not be held exclusively responsible for the harmful effects resulting from this 
conflict. 
B. The Convention in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court 
The primary role of the Constitutional Court is not deciding individual cases, 
individual human rights violations although it may do so in constitutional 
complaint procedures. Its primary and very important role is to control the 
constitutionality of legislation. As human rights are guaranteed by the 
Constitution and Article 7 of the Constitution provides for the observance of 
international obligations, the concept of constitutionality includes the observance 
of human rights and the standards of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Therefore a survey of the practice of the Constitutional Court is very 
important for assessing the impact of the Convention on Hungarian law. 
One of the most important and most debated decisions of the Constitutional 
Court was the one declaring the unconstitutionality of death penalty (Consti-
tutional Court decision No. 23 of 31 October 1990). The judgment had been 
delivered a few days before the Convention was actually signed by Hungary. In 
item V/4 of the comments to this decision, reference is made, among other 
documents of international law relating to death penalty, to Protocol No. 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights as a demonstration of European 
legal development towards the abolition of death penalty, but the decision was, 
of course, based on arguments stemming from the text of the Constitution itself. 
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The Constitution prohibited arbitrary deprivation of life and a subsequent 
amendment to an other provision declared that substantive content of fundamental 
rights must not be restricted by law. The Court held that the right to life and 
human dignity was a source of and a precondition for many other fundamental 
rights and the execution of death penalty lead to a total and irreversible 
destruction of these rights, and therefore it was in contravention with the 
Constitution. 
Constitutional Court decision No. 22 of 10 April 1992, in the period between 
signature and ratification, concerned the right to marry which, as opposed to the 
Convention, is not expressly provided for by the Constitution but it can be 
derived from the constitutional protection of marriage, as well as from the right 
to human dignity which includes the right to personal self-determination. The 
Court referred to Article 12 of the Convention in connection with Article 7 of 
the Hungarian Constitution providing that the Hungarian legal order accepts the 
generally recognised principles of international law. The Court stated that any 
restriction on the right to marry (e.g. a requirement of marriage licence for the 
members of the different armed forces and services) can only be justified when 
it is unavoidable, absolutely necessary and proportional. 
Constitutional Court decision No. 30 of 26 May 1992 concerned the 
balancing between freedom of expression and the rights of others (the right to 
human dignity). Among Hungary's international obligations, the Court referred 
to the Convention (still before ratification) stating that it did not contain an 
obligation for the State to punish acts of incitement to hatred (as opposed to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), it rather provided for the 
limits of restricting the freedom of expression. The Court also referred to the 
practice of the European Commission on Human Rights that prohibition of 
communications of racial hatred constituted a justified restriction under the 
Convention. The Constitutional Court held that freedom of expression was 
particularly important in a democratic society and it could be restricted only 
when it was proportional to the aim pursued and only by the lightest possible 
means of protecting the rights of others: e.g., subject to the circumstances of the 
case, civil law action for immaterial damages was preferable to measures of 
criminal law. Therefore the Court decided that freedom of expression was 
constitutionally restricted by criminal sanctions with regard to incitement to 
hatred but not with regard to the use of degrading expressions in general. 
Constitutional Court decision No. 4 of 12 February 1993, in deciding on a 
series of issues raised by Act No. XXXII of 1991 providing for the restitution 
of formerly Church-owned real estate property, including buildings operated as 
State schools, the Constitutional Court relied on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to 
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the Convention in order to determine the scope of the State's obligations. It held 
that the freedom of religion and the right to education must be balanced. 
Referring to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Kjeldsen, 
Busk Madsen and Pedersen, it stated that State schools were prohibited from 
providing any kind of education which could be considered as disregarding the 
convictions of parents (and the child). Parents have a right to choose religious 
education for their children but they also have the right not to be obliged to send 
their children to schools that provide education contrary to their convictions. The 
State is not obliged to establish religious (philosophically committed) schools, 
and "neutral" State schools are proper alternatives to committed schools in 
accordance with the right to freedom of conscience. The attendance of neutral 
State schools, however, must not impose disproportionate burden on those who 
do not want to attend religious schools. But it is only in the circumstances of 
each case that proportionality can be determined, and the Act was found to 
contain sufficient guarantees, therefore it was not declared unconstitutional. 
Constitutional Court decision No. 60 of 29 November 1993 referred to two 
decisions of the European Commission on Human Rights (Appl. No. 8707/79 
and Appl. No. 7992/77) in upholding the constitutionality of compulsory use of 
safety belts in cars. 
In Constitutional Court decision No. 64 of 22 December 1993, the Court 
declared that its conception of protection of the right to property is the same as 
that of the European Convention on Human Rights as reflected in the case-law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, with special reference to the judgment 
in James and Others (Series A No. 98); and in Constitutional Court decision No. 
35 of 24 June 1994 concerning the restrictions on acquiring agricultural land 
property, the President of the Constitutional Court, in his concurring opinion, 
referred to the case-law of the Convention (including the decision of the Com-
mission in Széchényi v Hungary, see below) to the effect that the Convention 
does not guarantee a right to acquiring property, only protects the Deaceful 
enjoyment of property against unreasonable or disproportionate intervention or 
restrictions. 
Constitutional Court decision No. 22 of 16 April 1994, referring to the 
judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Van Leuven and de 
Meiere, declared that compulsory membership in a professional organisation 
established under public law (Bar Association) did not infringe the right to 
freedom of association. 
The Constitutional Court referred to Article 10 of the Convention in many 
cases emphasising its fundamental importance in a democratic society (e.g. in 
decision No. 34 of 24 June 1994). In Constitutional Court decision No. 36 of 
1 1 2 Mónika Weller 
24 June 1994, the Court held that according higher protection to officials of 
State (including politicians, members of the Government) in terms of more severe 
punishment for "insult of an authority or of an official person" than for libel or 
slander was unconstitutional, since the European Court of Human Rights had 
held that the limits of acceptable expression were broader in case of politicians 
and public figures than that of private persons. This kind of restriction on 
expressing value judgments is not "necessary" and is disproportionate. 
In Constitutional Court decision No. 14 of 13 March 1995, the Court stated 
that the right to marriage was reserved for a man and a woman (as confirmed 
by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment in Rees) but relations 
of cohabitation (life-partnership) of couples of the same sex merit, without 
discrimination, the same legal recognition and protection than life-partnership 
of a man and a woman. So the Civil Code was changed accordingly. 
Constitutional Court decision No. 58 of 15 September 1995 concerned the 
contradiction between the right to privacy of an accused person in relation to 
information on his mental conditions and the publicity of criminal trials. The 
Constitutional Court observed that according to the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Organs, the publicity of trials is an important guarantee both for the 
individual and the public, and the person concerned do not have a right to 
exclusion of publicity. Although the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure is 
less detailed than Article 6 (1) of the Convention setting forth the grounds for 
exclusion of publicity, "moral grounds" mentioned in the Hungarian provision 
may be interpreted extensively, and the Constitutional Court added that there 
was nothing to prevent trial courts from bearing in mind the provisions of 
international conventions (such as the European Convention on Human Rights) 
in determining whether there was a need of excluding publicity from the whole 
or a part of the trial in order to protect the privacy of the accused. Thereby, in 
fact, the Constitutional Court ruled that ordinary courts may (or even should) 
apply the provisions of the Convention directly. 
In Constitutional Court decision No. 67 of 7 December 1995, the Court held 
that in case of an objection by the defendant to the sentencing without trial 
(penal order) when a hearing must be held, the provision that this hearing is 
held by the same judge who previously imposed a sentence without trial was 
not, in general, contrary to the impartiality of judges. The Court referred to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the approaches to be 
applied in determining the impartiality of judges, as well as to Recommendation 
No. R (87) 18 of the Committee of Ministers encouraging the application of 
penal order as a means of expediting criminal procedures. The Constitutional 
Court laid emphasis on the fact that besides there being sufficient guarantees 
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for the defendant in case of a sentencing without trial, there was another funda-
mental right at stake, that is the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time. 
Finally, a decision of great importance for the application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights was Constitutional Court decision No. 63 of 12 
December 1997. The Court found that the lack of judicial review in cases of 
regulatory offences before the administrative authorities — a field covered by 
Hungary's reservation to the Convention — was in contravention with various 
provisions of the Hungarian Constitution and set this provision (Section 71/A 
of Act No. I of 1968 on proceedings for regulatory offences referred to in the 
reservation) aside pro futuro, as from 31 December 1998. This provision was also 
found to be unconstitutional on the ground that the possibility of access to court 
in cases of commuting to confinement the fine the offender had been sentenced 
to did not constitute sufficient guarantee in terms of protection against 
deprivation of liberty, since the court was only entitled to revise the decision 
of commutation on grounds of lawfulness but not in terms of facts. Thereby 
decisions of administrative authorities imposing fines were in fact decisions on 
conditional deprivation of liberty. So the provision restricting access to courts, 
covered by Hungary's reservation, shall cease to be in force by 1 January 1999, 
and it is for the legislature to adopt the necessary measures before this date. 
After the entry into force of the new provisions in conformity with the 
requirements of the Constitution, the Hungarian reservation to Article 6 (1) of 
the Convention has to be revoked. (It shall, anyway, lose its effect , the 
provision referred to in it having been emptied.) 
C. Cases brought before the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights 
The instrument of ratification of the Convention and its nine protocols was 
deposited by Hungary on 5 November 1992 and this was the date of the entry 
into force of the Convention with respect to Hungary. In the period between 
1993 and 1997, 823 provisional files were opened (there was a peak in 1995) and 
about 47% of them have been registered (387 applications in 5 years). The rate 
of registration has increased from 40% to 55% which shows, to some extent, that 
potential applicants (natural or juridical persons under Hungarian jurisdiction) are 
increasingly aware of the requirements and possibilities of this mechanism or that 
they more often avail themselves of the assistance of legal counsel. 
During the period of 1993-1998, 26 applications were referred to the 
Hungarian Government for their comments. 13 of these applications were 
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declared inadmissible and 7 are pending admissibility decision. Of 8 applications 
that have been declared admissible, 3 cases have been ended by friendly 
settlement (both concerning protracted civil procedures) and 4 applications have 
been concluded by Article 31 reports of the Commission, one of which has been 
referred to the Court. 
There are two cases which are interesting to note although they have been 
declared inadmissible by the Commission without having been communicated 
to the Government. Application No. 21344/93 by August Széchényi concerned 
compensation for expropriation effected in or about 1945. As it has been 
mentioned, the Hungarian Government made a declaration upon ratification that 
"measures taken by the Hungarian Republic for the reparation of the violation 
of the [rights set forth in the Convention] which had taken place prior to the 
entry into force of the Convention and its Protocols shall not be considered as 
facts of the alleged violation of these rights." According to its content, this 
declaration could be considered as a reservation. The Commission, however, 
examined Szechenyi's application without even taking note of this declaration. 
The Commission held that expropriations in 1945 were instantaneous acts and 
did therefore not constitute continuous violations, and that the Convention did 
not guarantee a right to restitution or other reparation of injuries which were not 
in themselves violations of the Convention. Therefore we may conclude that this 
"interpretative declaration" had no relevance to the interpretation of the 
Convention. 
The Commission has also examined the Hungarian reservation to Article 6 
§ 1 concerning limitation of access to courts with regard to regulatory offences 
before administrative authorities (application No. 31506/96 by Istvánné Rékási). 
The Commission found that the reservation complied with the requirements of 
Article 64 § 2 of the Convention and declared the application inadmissible. 
Of the 26 applications referred to the Government, about 10 complained of 
the length of civil procedures: 4 of them have been declared inadmissible, 1 is 
pending admissibility decision, 3 have been concluded by friendly settlement, 
and in one case, the Commission has drawn up a report on the merits under 
Article 31 finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. There have 
been other applications under Article 6 concerning access to court and various 
aspects of fairness of criminal proceedings but they were declared inadmissible 
or are still pending admissibility decision, except for application No. 29082/95 
(by Z. Dallos) concerning requalification of the criminal charge by the court of 
second instance which has been declared admissible. 
An application (No. 22172/93 by Georgi Lukov Romanov) by a Bulgarian 
national complained under Article 5 of the length of his detention on remand 
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and the lack of any reasonable suspicion against him. He was suspected of 
having been involved in committing a currency offence and also the offence of 
receiving stolen goods. He was detained on remand for about one year and five 
months, then the criminal proceedings were "offered" to the General Prosecutor 
of the Republic of Bulgaria under a bilateral treaty on mutual assistance. The 
applicant was transferred to Bulgaria but no criminal proceedings have been 
instituted against him by the Bulgarian authorities. The Commission examined 
whether there was a reasonable suspicion against him to be arrested, whether 
there were sufficient reasons justifying his continued detention on remand and 
found the application manifestly ill-founded. 
Other applications submitted by persons of foreign nationality concerned 
complaints under Article 3 of the applicants' proposed expulsion to their country 
of origin. The first application of this kind (No. 30471/96) was filed by four 
Somalian citizens who applied for refugee status with the UNHCR Branch 
Office in Budapest but their application was refused at first. Finally, upon 
intervention by Amnesty International, the UNHCR requested the Hungarian 
Government to grant provisional residence permits to the applicants. The 
Government did so, and the applicants were placed in the Red Cross Refugee 
Home in Budapest and were granted free movement in Hungary. In a few 
month, however, the applicants have illegally left Hungary and ceased to keep 
contact with the Commission. Therefore the Commission has struck the 
application off its list of cases. A similar application (No. 34772/97) introduced 
by 15 Syrian nationals is pending admissibility decision. An application (No. 
43887/98) under Article 3 concerning extradition to Turkey was struck out of 
the list of cases because it was settled by a decision of the Minister of Justice 
refusing the applicant's extradition. 
Further issues raised under Article 3 include the conditions of detention of 
a convicted disabled person in a prison hospital (application No. 23636/94 by 
RM.) the Commission found a violation on account of the applicant's hygienic 
care in the prison hospital. There have been two applications introduced against 
Hungary concerning treatment by the police. One of them (application No. 
26692/95 by Gábor Bethlen) has been declared inadmissible because of non-
observance of the six month time-limit while the other (No. 31561/96) is 
pending admissibility decision. 
Two applications raise issues under Article 11 concerning freedom of 
association. One of them (application No. 32367/96) is pending admissibility 
decision. It concerns the denial of registration of an association under a name 
containing reference to a public authority. In the other case (application No. 
25390/94 by László Rekvényi), the applicant complained that participation in 
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certain political activities and membership in political parties were prohibited for 
him as a police officer. The prohibition of political activities of police officers, 
provided for by the Hungarian Constitution, also raised issues under Article 10. 
The Commission found that the prohibition concerning membership in political 
parties was not in contravention with Article 11 of the Convention, whereas the 
notion of political activity is so sweeping that its general prohibition by the 
Constitution without there being further legislation or practice providing 
guidance as to its precise meaning (which was found to be the case in a certain 
period of 1994) does not conform to the requirement of foreseeability, therefore 
the restriction at that time could not be considered as prescribed by law and it 
constituted a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. This case has been 
referred to the European Court of Human Rights and it remains to be seen 
whether the Court shall pronounce on the most delicate issue (avoided by the 
Commission) of the necessity of this prohibition in a democratic society in 
terms of the Convention. 
Finally, three applications concerned issues primarily under Article 8. 
Application No. 21647/93 was introduced by Géza Szegő, a father who 
complained about the absence of enforcement of his right to access to his son. 
The Commission confirmed that besides an obligation to refrain from arbitrary 
interference by public authorities, there may be positive obligations on the part 
of the State inherent in an effective "respect" for family life. The obligation 
to take such measures, however, is not absolute, the co-operation of all 
concerned will always be an important ingredient which, in this case, was 
totally lacking. The Commission found that in the circumstances of the case the 
authorities made reasonable efforts to enforce the applicant's right of access to 
his son and, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the 
competent Hungarian authorities, found the application manifestly ill-founded. 
Application No. 23198/94 by László Beck complained about the control of 
correspondence of prisoners under Article 8. The Commission found that the 
Hungarian practice was in conformity with the Convention, the occasional 
opening of a prisoner's letters, chosen at random, did not exceed the scope of 
control measures warranted by the ordinary and reasonable requirements of 
imprisonment. Therefore this application was declared inadmissible on grounds 
of being manifestly ill-founded. 
Similar complaints were introduced in application No. 21967/93 by Sándor 
Sárközi. He complained about the conditions of Iiis detention under Article 3, 
the interference with his correspondence with his family under Article 8 and 
the lack of effective remedy under Article 13. None of these complaints were 
found to disclose any violation of the Convention. In the process of exami-
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nation of the case, however, a letter addressed to the applicant by the 
Commission had been opened by the prison authorities before it was handed 
over to the applicant. The Hungarian legislation then in force prohibited any 
interference with letters addressed to international organisations but checking of 
mail coming from those organs (with a view of verifying that the sender is 
indeed the organisation indicated on the envelop) was permitted. So the measure 
in question was effected in accordance with the law but the Commission, having 
noted that under Section 36 para. 5 of the Law on the Execution of Sentences 
prisoners' correspondence may be controlled by the prison authorities for 
reasons of security, except for letters sent to international organisations (§ 94 
of the Report of 6 March 1997), declared in its report that the opening of the 
letter sent by the Commission was not in accordance with the law (§ 95). This 
little confusion might have been created by the fact that Hungarian legislation 
had been changed to exclude the control of letters coming from international 
organisations well before the Commission's report has been drawn up. 
Fortunately, the Commission went on to examine "for reasons of completeness" 
whether other conditions under paragraph 2 of Article 8 had been satisfied and 
held that the opening of the Commission's letter could not be regarded as 
necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 
8 and found a violation of the Convention. 
Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the Convention has already had a considerable impact 
on the Hungarian legal order and, as human rights awareness increases and 
lawyers get more and more acquainted with the Strasbourg case law and 
procedure, an increasing number of individual applications against Hungary can 
be expected. It is very likely that some of them will point to problems in the 
legal system which should be remedied by modifications of laws or enactment 
of new legislation, so they will bring about an even greater impact of the 
Convention in the Hungarian legal system. 
Other applications point at structural problems in the administration of 
justice. In many cases of protracted civil proceedings, by way of friendly 
settlement or as just satisfaction, the Government had to pay various sums 
between 600.000 and 1.100.000 Hungarian forints. In order to avoid such cases, 
the reform of the Hungarian judicial system and the codes of civil and criminal 
procedure is inevitable. Some elements of the reform have already been 
implemented but it remains to be seen whether they are more effective in 
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avoiding procedures exceeding a reasonable time. A new body has been 
established for the administration of the judiciary consisting of 9 judges elected 
by courts through delegates, the Minister of Justice, the Chief Public Prosecutor, 
the President of the National Bar Association and two members of the 
Parliament, and its president is the president of the Supreme Court. This body 
of ^//-administration (since two tliirds of its members are judges) is the 
National Council of the Judiciary which shall have as its task to analyse the 
causes of excessive length of proceedings and to propose measures to prevent 
similar cases. 
Reopening of proceedings before domestic courts following decisions by the 
Convention organs is a current topic in the Council of Europe. Athough there 
has not yet been a case in respect of Hungary where the necessity of reopening 
a domestic procedure following a finding of a violation by the Commission 
would have arisen, the new Code on Criminal Procedure which is to enter into 
force in 2000 provides that such decisions of international human rights organs 
are to be considered as "new evidence" for the purposes of reopening a criminal 
case. Similar provision is likely to be included in a new Code on Civil 
Procedure. 
Independently of the cases agains Hungary, the adaptation of the Hungarian 
legal system to the requirements of the Convention must be a constant process 
because of the evolutive interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights. 
This statement underlines that the application of the Convention is likely to have 
an increasing impact on the Hungarian legal system in the future. 
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Renard DEHOUSSE (ed.): An Ever Larger Union? (The Eastern Enlargement in 
Perspective), Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998. 155 p. 
"An Ever Larger Union?" edited by Renard 
Dehousse in the result of the "Session 
d'études 1996 de l'Institut Universitaire 
International Luxembourg" and represents 
already the 30rd volume of this series. 
The "séance inaugurale" by George 
Wohlfart, ("Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires 
Etrangères, au Commerce Extérieur et á la 
coopération, Luxembourg"), precedes the 
contributions of the authors. It's the only 
text written down in the French Language, 
which breaches somewhat the style of the 
book. This presentation gives a short 
overview of the integration procedure into 
the European Union for the form East 
European countries, the conditions thereto, 
and some of the difficulties encountered. 
Reviewed book has a very clear struc-
ture. It is divided into two parts, each 
consisting of three contributions. Part I 
describes Eastern Europe in Transition. Part 
II deals with the challenges. Each of the 
contributions is of a remarkable quality pro-
viding an interesting debate. Jab Zielonka 
tackles the "Decalogue of Democratic 
Consolidation in Eastern Europe". In his 
contribution Zielonka focuses on the 
question how to construct a new workable 
democratic system after the fall of com-
munism. More specifically he debates on 
the consolidation process. 
Krzysztof Drzewicki looks at the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and the Formation 
of Civil Society. He therefore explains first 
both key concepts before transposing this 
relationship to the former Eastern European 
countries. The first concept has three 
distinct stages: idealisation, positivisation 
and realisation. The second concept under-
wentan evolution through history until the 
modem comprehension as a collectivitey 
independent of government that can operate 
freely within a conducive system of gov-
ernance. Civil society is then a remedy 
against failures of democracy. The rela-
tionship between the two concepts is 
illustrated with the accession of former 
Eastern European States to the Council of 
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Europe and the European Convention of 
Human Rights. 
Susan Senior Nello discusses "The 
European Union and Central-East Europe: 
Background to the Enlargement Question." 
This large contribution tackles the economic 
developments and transformation process 
form a central planning system towards a 
changed role for the State and private 
property, identifying thereby the chief tasks 
faced by the Central-East European coun-
tries. 
The challenges of Part II starts with a 
contribution by Alasdair Smith About the 
"Integration into the Single Market." 
Subsequently he discusses the European 
Economy, the relationship with the Central 
and Eastern European countries and the 
integration of those countries into the 
economy of the European Union. 
John Roper continues with "Enlarge-
ment and Security". In this contribution the 
concept of security is explained and defined, 
and brought in relationship with not only 
the European Union, but especially with the 
existence of the NATO as institution estab-
lished to defend security. Security dimen-
sions have always been a key issue in the 
enlargement of the European Union. Roper 
examines in his contribution the political 
and security reasons leading to applications 
to join the European Union and/or the 
NATO. 
The book closes up with contribution 
by Renard Dehousse, discussing "Institu-
tional Models for an Enlarged Union: Some 
Reflexions on a Non-Debate". The European 
integration has been more functional in the 
first place rather than institutional. This also 
explains its effectiveness which could how-
ever be endangered by the enlargement if 
no adequate preparation has taken place. 
Dehousse discusses possible solutions like 
increasing the Parliamentary powers, but 
warns at the same time for the risk of a 
majoritarian option. 
This book is not only a must, but 
obligatory reading for everyone who wants 
to understand better the background and the 
diverse aspects of the enlargement of the 
European Union with the Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
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PREFACE 
Zoltán Péteri at Seventy 
On this occasion, the editor-in-chief, the editors and the staff of Acta Juridica 
Hungarica take this opportunity to congratulate the internationally known and 
recognised scholar, an eminent professor, a dear colleague and friend, who has 
been author to this journal ever since its inception. The Acta Juridica Hungarica 
is a periodic of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences attributed to the Institute 
for Legal Studies of which Professor Zoltán Péteri has been a research fellow 
for almost 50 years. Nothing is more natural for the colleagues and members 
of staff of the Institute than to express their sincere best wishes to him as it is 
conveyed in the given statement. 
It is in this Institute that Professor Péteri has carried out his research activity, 
its fields of research being political and legal philosophy and comparative law, 
their theoretical and methodological aspects in particular. As a young research 
fellow, his interest was in the problems concerning the forms of government 
and wound up writing his Doctorate Thesis and many scholarly writings on 
the form of government. It is impossible not to mention his exceptional writings 
on the theory of the state which exposed its problems like a constitutional state 
and/or a welfare state. This was considered alien from the era's mentality. A 
similar tendency is shown by his works on legal philosophy in which it is evident 
that he was attracted to natural law and its theories and demonstrated by his 
published studies on the history of ideas and the revived analysis of natural 
law after the II World War. 
1 2 2 Peschka Vilmos 
The legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch had a great influence on Professor 
Zoltán Péteri 's thinking on legal theory. His profound writings on Gustav 
Radbruch evoked a great interest in contemporary Hungarian thinking on legal 
theory and had an impact not only on the fascination in natural law but, also 
expressed Professor Zoltán Péteri's legal thinking and his entire philosophy of 
life. Natural law and its values are an integral part of that notion of legal 
philosophy, what we call human rights. Hence it is not surprising that the celebrity 
has devoted many of his writings to the natural law element of human rights 
and the history of human and civil rights. 
It is from the doubtful validity of the natural law, human rights and the eternal 
values poised above people and nations that legitimately leads to the examination 
of the categories, elements, institutions, characteristics and values that are both 
similar and different in positive law and legal systems. Consistence in legal 
thinking necessities one to acquaint oneself with the study of comparative law 
in order to look for the similarities found in laws and legal systems and to identify 
the special, particular and distinctive features thus leading Professor Zoltán Péteri 
to the problems of comparative law and given his interest in the theory, it was 
natural for him to familiarise himself with the history and methodology of 
comparative law. The problems of comparative law were not only an object of 
his scientific research but also a centre of his professorial work. 
Professor Zoltán Péteri is not only a legal scholar, a theoretical on legal 
philosophy and political science and comparative law but also a professor 
specialised in these academic areas. In him we find the optimist, belief and hope 
of a teacher, that he can pass on the acquired knowledge to his students or at 
least guide them into this area of studies. Other than excellency in the field, it 
is through articulacy accompanied with irony and self-irony that he has been 
able to use his capabilities to the aid of his students, a style Goethe referred to 
as the „salt of lite". He has been a lecturer at the Eötvös Loránd University 
Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, the Péter Pázmány Catholic University 
Faculty of Law, a rapporteur and speaker at many international forums, congresses 
and conferences and for years now he is been a professor at the International 
Faculty of Comparative Law in Strasbourg. 
To be a scholar, professor is not just a profession. In the present case it is 
the deep and thorough knowledge of law and science as the great Hungarian 
specialist in civil law Béni Grosschmid wrote that „the legal profession is 
erudition". Even more is the law professorship! He is widely read in Hungarian 
fiction literature starting from Balassi to Árpád Tóth, from Zsigmond Kemény 
to Ferenc Herczeg let alone his acquaintance with world literature, whether Roger 
Martin du Gard, Galsworthy, Thomas Mann, Tolstoy or Tsechov is the topic 
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of conversation. Reading is a function of his life. His knowledge of arts is not 
limited to literature but is also he has a passion for opera, and as globe trotter 
he is an expert and admirer of Gothic Cathedrals and not forgetting his familiarity 
with fine art it is worth mentioning his favourites like Vermeer or Rodin. Science, 
art and diverse education in one word culture, as Huizinga emphasised in his 
works, sprouts from a game: culture has the character of a game. In the person 
of the celebrity is a true Homo ludens: a master at chess, a brilliant bridge player 
and a sport fan. 
This appraisement showing the achievements and capabilities and at the same 
time expressing our birthday wishes to Professor Zoltán Péteri would not be 
complete without mentioning the integrant and definite element of his personality: 
morals. There has been mention of the orientation and commitment to values 
and this is obviously not only devotion to philosophy or legal philosophy, but 
is suggestive of the celebrity's personality and morality. He made is choice among 
relative values and to him the most important value is human life. He weighs 
everything in context with human life. It is this value that moulds his moral 
attitude, as represented by Horatio "integer vitae scelerisque purus" to pay tribute 
to this excellent latinist as well. Another rare moral character of his is one of 
tolerance and patience which is expressed in the words of Gustav Radbruch, his 
favourite legal philosopher that "wins the permanent value from the ephemeral, 
retains the evanescent moment, prevails over time, for it is in no fear of losing 
it, reaches home at every station of the road and, while at work, enjoys the work 
created. Tolerance is balance, faith and trust. It has created the Persian carpet 
and the Gothic cathedral. It is the gentle mother of culture". It is knowledge, 
erudition, moral stature and playfulness that give a full picture of Professor Zoltán 
Péteri's personality and human element. 
It is this totality of human quality that motivates the respect, esteem and 
affection contained in the following few articles.* All is with the heart-felt best 
wishes on this occasion of his 70th birthday. 
Vilmos PESCHKA 
* The editors of Acta Juridica I Iungarica wish to express their thanks to Professor Csaba 
Varga for his kind assistance in the preparation of that number. 
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STUDIES 
András BRAGYOVA CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND 
DEMOCRACY 
The "countermajoritarian difficulty" 
I met for the first time Professor Péteri as a first year law student many 
years ago. He lectured on one of his favourite subjects, English law, 
common law, the peculiarities of the Anglo-American legal thought. I still 
remember well, how exhilarating these lectures were, how they stimulated 
my interest in what might be called (and in his case rightly) legal science. 
It was he who first acquainted me with the idea of constitutional review, 
and the foundations of constitutional theory. Moreover, without his active, 
assistance I would never have been able, about a decade later to study in 
Strasbourg at the International Faculty of Comparative Law; where. I 
collected unforgettable, experiences. One among them was the first meeting 
with judgements of constitutional courts; and I could not even fancy that I 
will ever live to in my country the same I so envied of others. Since our 
first meeting there came many others; for instance I passed my last exam 
at the law faculty with him. Later, again, I had the pleasure to be a junior 
colleague of him at the. Institute for Legal Studies; afterwards, as a 
not-so-junior fellow of the. institute even worked together with him for 
years. All that time I learned to appreciate his wit, and sarcastic humour, 
inseparable, from a great deal of self-irony. All this has been and buttressed 
by his vast erudition in many fields outside his own, as in history, classics, 
and literature. I wish him to conserve this wit and good humour all along 
his life. 
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Introduction: Setting and Stating the Problem 
"Judicial review [is] particularly hard to justify in a democracy"—remarked 
H. L. A. Hart in a seminal article.1 Indeed, probably the most difficult question 
in the justification of constitutional review of legislation is what has been called 
the "antimajoritarian" or "counternajoritarian difficulty".2 To put it roughly, the 
countermajoritarian problem questions the legitimacy of constitutional review 
on the ground that the judicial review of legislation has no democratic 
legitimation, since constitutional review inevitably opposes to decisions (laws, 
acts) of state organs with unquestionable democratic legitimacy. Titus, it is 
possible, or indeed quite plausible, to argue that the judicial review is, or 
appears to be, ex hypothesi antidemocratic, since it has been established exactly 
to turn down, reverse or invalidate, briefly to control, "democratic" decisions. 
For this reason it might be interesting to examine the relationship between 
democracy and constitutional review.3 Conversely, for those who for some 
reason oppose, dislike or distrust democracy, constitutional review is attractive 
just for this: strong or weak anti-(or simply non-)democrats would probably see 
in the alleged or real "anti-democratic" nature of constitutional review an 
important argument for, rather than against, constitutional review. What I am to 
say about the relationship of democracy and constitutional review is, therefore, 
applicable (with inverted signs, of course) to this argument too. 
In constitutional democracies already practising judicial review the counter-
majoritarian problem arises somewhat differently (since the discussion on the 
justification of the constitutional review in its pure form is moot), i.e. as the 
problem of the proper limits of judicial review. A theory aiming at the definition 
1 Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes" in HART, 11. L. A.: Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford, 1983, 125. 
2 THAYER, J. В.: "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" 
Harvard Law Review 7 (1893) 129 ff was first to expose it. The term itself stems, so far as 
I know, from Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, New York, 1962, 16. For a 
more recent view see TUSHNET, M.: "Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: 
Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty" Michigan Law Review, 94 
(1995) 245 ff and see TRIBE, L.: American Constitutional Law, St. Paul, 1978, 9 ff. 
3 From the recent lion Anglo-American writing on the subject see first of all: DOLZER, 
R.: Die staatstheoretische und staatsrechtliche Stellung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 
Berlin, 1972, EBSEN, I.: Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Element gesellschaftlicher 
Selbstregulierung, Berlin, 1985., and in particular KÄLIN, W.: Verfassunsgerichtsbarkeit 
in der Demokratie, Bern, 1987 and TROPER, M.: "Justice constitutionelle et démocratie" 
reprinted in his Pour une théorie juridique de l'Etat, Paris, 1994, 329 ff. 
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of the constitutional limitations of judicial review requires something that might 
be called the "background theory" of the constitution that, in turn, should by 
necessity contain a justificatory theory of judicial review too. In this way, the 
problem of the limits of the constitutional review—especially the definition of its 
scope and the cases not falling within it, such as "political questions"—is 
reducible to a general theory of constitutional review. 
Indeed, the argument from democracy against constitutional review is the 
most powerful argument against it: if this argument can be defeated, there will 
be hardly any reason for democrats to oppose in principle judicial overview of 
legislative acts. Thus, in this paper I shall argue that there is a "democratic" 
justification for judicial review that must be accepted by any sufficiently rational 
democrat. What 1 want to do is, more precisely, to demonstrate that there is a 
democratic justification of constitutional review: in the following I will 
distinguish between weak and strong democratic justification of constitutional 
review. 
A more precise setting of my task requires certain (admittedly relatively 
vague) definitions. First, by "constitutional review" I mean a set constitutional 
norms (written or unwritten) ascribing a competence to a "court" or a "tribunal" 
to invalidate any norm of the legal system if it finds that it is contrary to the 
constitution, except the constitution itself. In practice the key question is the 
invalidation of legislative acts, i.e. norms made by a democratically legitimated 
(that is, elected) organ of the state. Another fundamental concept is here that of 
a "conri": it denotes an organ of the state that is a "court" in the sense of being 
independent of any organ of the state and decides exclusively based on law. A 
satisfactory definition of a "court" is, by the way, not so an easy task as it 
might seem to be,4 but here it is sufficient to limit myself to certain well-known 
features of courts, first of all to the circumstance that a court is exclusively an 
organ of the legal system designed to function exclusively for the system, such 
as banks are organs of the economic system whose function is to work 
exclusively from the point of view of the system, disregarding any other 
consideration.5 The really decisive argument seems to be that the concept of a 
"democratic court" is no less an absurdity than the concept of the "exploding 
goldfinch". It is difficult to explain briefly why is this so, but the main point 
appears to be that courts ex hypothesi are not making arbitrary choices, and they 
are not allowed to do so. Indeed the very idea of a court bound by law excludes 
4 See e.g. SHAPIRO, M.: Courts, Chicago, 1977. 
5 The metaphor is borrowed from LUHMANN, N.: Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt, 
a.M., 1990. 
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this. Thus, even if courts are "democratically" elected (as it sometimes happens, 
especially in jury systems or where the professional judges are elected too), the 
election does not—indeed cannot—change in any way their function, which is 
inherently non-democratic (but not, of course, for that matter, anti-democratic). 
It does not interest me here why the "ordinary" courts of law (as distinct from 
constitutional courts) are essentially non-democratic. Obviously, the answer to 
this question would presuppose a definition of "democracy" which I shall 
analyse below; suffice it to say here that ordinary (non-constitutional) courts are 
essentially non-democratic because their decisions—contrary to that of 
constitutional courts—do not invade, in theory at least, into the domain reserved 
to democratic decision-making.6 
I shall define a "constitutional court" as a court that has the power to strike 
down (i.e. render by its decision invalid, in fact repeal) any law which otherwise 
should be considered perfectly constitutional. In that sense any court, including 
the US Supreme Court or the Swiss Bundesgericht (Tribunal fédered) possessing 
the power, but not only that, to declare a legislative act contrary to the 
constitution and therefore void (invalid) is "constitutional court". The important 
distinctive feature of these courts is that they are bound to the constitution as 
law; so that they are required to base their decision on legal argument 
exclusively, excluding any other, say prudential, political, economic, moral, and 
other reasoning as fas as they could not be couched in terms of legal argument 
of some kind. The scope and contents of "legal argument" cannot be defined 
invariably, since it is very much different in various jurisdiction and times. All 
this being true, in any legal system there is a set of propositions accepted for 
good or bad as "legal argument", completely distinguishable from any other 
kinds of argument. The distinctive characteristic of the legal argument is, briefly 
and summarily, that at least one of its premises is a statement of positive law 
and its conclusion is also a proposition of law: it could be pure or mixed 
depending on whether its truth conditions are only its correspondence to norms 
or to facts too.7 Much of the legal argument pertains to interpretation, i.e. 
6 Apart from judicial law-making; but, since it is always open to the legislation to change 
the norms made by courts, judicial law-making could be regarded for this purpose as sub-
ordinated legislation. This does not apply, of course, and this is the core of the problem, lo 
constitutional courts: their decisions may not be overruled by legislation. Of course, if an 
ordinary court is at the same time a constitutional court, this applies only to its decisions not 
performing constitutional review. 
7 I borrow this concept from RAZ, J.: The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford, 1970, 2d 
ed. 1980. 
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(roughly) to establishment of the "precise" meaning of norms; in the case of 
constitutional courts this means that their main task is to interpret constitutional 
norms. Since the authority of the interpretation is parasitic upon the norm 
interpreted, that is, interpretation follows the authority of the norms (at least in 
the case of judicial interpretation), the authority of the dictum of constitutional 
court us higher than that of the legislation. 
The argument from democracy against constitutional review could be summa-
rized in (or reduced to) the following two propositions (and the arguments 
supporting them): 
(1) constitutional courts exercise, without having right to do so, [arrogate 
themselves, usurp] the constitution-making power of the people; 
(2) constitutional courts illegitimately exercise the law-making power of the 
people 
Proposition (2) is much weaker than proposition (1), since if legislative (law-
making) power is a power derived from (or based on) the constitution, than even 
the legislative power could (conceptually) usurp it. In practice, however, the 
conflict between democracy and constitutional review only appears to be a 
conflict between the "democratic" legislative power and the constitutional court. 
A dispute on the conformity with the constitution of a law—a legislative act—is 
in fact a conflict on the proper meaning (interpretation) of the constitutional 
norms defining the powers and so the limits of the legislation, whatever they 
are.8 It might be understood also as a dispute over the power to interpret the 
constitution, since "he who has the power to interpret, has the power to say 
what the norm is" as Bishop Hoadly said.9 
In fact, proposition (1) presupposes that the power to interpret the consti-
tution is equivalent to the making of the constitution. Moreover, it tacitly 
assumes a second premise, viz. that the interpretation of the constitution should 
be reserved to the constitution-maker alone, any other interpretation of the 
constitution being the usurpation of the power of the pouvoir constituant of the 
8 These norms usually are of two types: first, norms of competence (defining which organ 
of the state has the power to decide) or substantive norms defining the contents (acceptable 
outcomes) of the law (mostly fundamental constitutional rights). I shall revert to this subject 
below. 
9 As quoted by KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law and State, transi. A. Wedberg, 
Cambridge, 1946. The point is marvellously illustrated by Lewis Carroll in the dialogue 
between Alice and Humpty-Dumpty ill the Through the Looking Glass. 
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people. It is easy to discern that the reservation of the power of interpretation 
of the constitution to the people or to their representative organ(s) (Parliament) 
amounts to the denial not only the very possibility of the constitutional review, 
but also to the refusal of the legally binding character of the constitution. Since 
no norm is able to determine its own application.10 if one accepts the idea that 
a constitution is (among others) a set of binding normes, one should also accept 
that it will be inevitably interpreted, and sometimes in different ways. If the 
organ that made the norm has the power to interpret it too—that is, the power to 
decide in a legally binding way the disputes on the correct interpretation of the 
norm—the norm will not exist as a norm, properly so-called. In other words, a 
norm does not exist as a legal norm unless the power to make it and the power 
to interpret it are separated.11 Thus, in speaking of the existence of consti-
tutional review by a court, one has already assumed the possibility of an 
objective interpretation12 of the constitutional norms. 
By the way, proposition (1) would certainly be true in a constitutional system 
based on parliamentary sovereignty, merging the power to modify the consti-
tution and the law-making power in a single organ of the state (usually, in 
modern times in a parliament or, for instance in the king, president etc.). Indeed, 
in a constitutional system of parliamentary sovereignty, the most conspicuous 
case of which is Britain,13 any form of constitutional review is excluded a 
priori, since here the legislative power is not bound legally by the constitution. 
Kelsen very pertinently remarked that in a constitutional arrangement not 
providing for the review of the constitutional conformity of the legislation, there 
are in fact two constitutions in force: one setting limits to the legislation and 
another implied one accepting the violation of the constitutional provisions;14 
one might add that there is only one, at least in the legal sense: the latter. This 
Rousseauian conception15 of legislative power in fact assumes at the outset the 
10 WITTGENSTEIN, R.: Philosophische Untersuchungen, § 193 ff. See BAKER, G. P. and 
HACKER, P. M. S.: Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (An Analytical Commentary 
on the Philosophical Investigations 2) Oxford, 1985 See also SCHAUER, F.: Playing by the 
Rules, Oxford, 1991, 118 ff. 
11 This argument echoes that of Montesquieu on the danger of uniting in one organ the 
legislative and the judicial power. See Esprit des lois, XI. VI. 
12 GREENAWALT, К.: Law and Objectivity, New York, 1992. 
13 One might add to it nearly all the constitutional systems of the European continent in the 
19th and early 20th century, modelled on the French constitutional theory. 
14 KELSEN, H.: "La garantie juridictionelle de la constitution" Revue du droit public, 1928. 
See also KELSEN: General Theory of IMW and State, op. cit. 
15 Du contrat social II. II. 
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absolute superiority of the "democratic" legislator as sovereign. In this model, 
at any rate, there could be only a minimal and relative constitution, since the 
legislator as sovereign could not, by definition, be limited by norms (if not in 
fact).16 For this reason alone it could not endorse anything even remotely 
similar to the separation of powers. If so, there is no room for constitutional 
review either. 
As we have seen, the proposition (1) above is of decisive importance. This 
shows that the countermajoritarian difficulty is essentially a problem of 
constitutional theory. By the term "constitutional theory" I mean a theory—a set 
of normative propositions—justifying a given constitution.17 This theory might, 
of course, be very different from the actual theory or articulated doctrine (if 
any), which lead the historical constitution-maker. The essential point is that 
a background theory is a set of normative propositions ascribed to an ideal 
constitution-maker (and not to any empirical one); it is the best possible 
justification of the constitutional norms that could be given.18 The background 
theory method (if not the term) is highly characteristic of constitutional 
interpretation although it is applicable in many other fields. It is a normative 
construction that allows to deduce the best possible norm-variants of the 
constitutions, I. e. those norm-variants which cohere the best with the justifi-
catory theory of the constitution. Furthermore, it allows to fill the gaps left open 
in the constitution. The background theory is, needless to say, not part of the 
constitution as a set of norms, though it is an indispensable tool to its under-
standing and interpretation. In the case of a constitution the background theory 
is far more important than usual in legal interpretation mainly because the 
constitutions typically consist of norms much more vague than normal legal 
rules. Hence constitutional texts containing norms are, on the one hand, much 
more context-dependent; on the other, they allow much more norm-variants 
consistent with the text—acceptable interpretations consistent with the norm 
text—than other legal norm texts typically do. The background theory is ascribed 
to the constitution, i.e. it is in a normative connection with it, in the sense that 
the background theory contains a set of propositions from which the norms of 
the constitution should be reducible to. Indeed, I shall argue that any 
constitutional arrangement necessarily has at least one background theory, 
explicit or implicit; it might have many at the same time or successively. 
16 "Le souverain est, par ce qu'il est ce qu'il doit être." ROUSSEAU: Du contrat social. 
17 See DWORKIN, R.: Law's Empire, London, 1986, 176 ff. 
18 The developments above have been insprired by Ronald Dworkin's theory of constitutional 
interpretation, as the reader will recognize. 
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Thus, the background theory (or the relevant part of it) relating to constitu-
tional review is decisive for any constitutional system. In this paper I shall try 
to construct a background theory of constitutional review appropriate to any 
reasonable democratic constitutional system. In doing so, I endeavour to construct 
a justificatory theory of constitutional review in a democratic constitution. That 
means that I shall not attempt to examine the relations between constitu-
tionalism and democracy independently of the justification of constitutional 
review. In this way, I shall not examine the justification of constitutional 
review based on the argument from the binding force of the constitution alone; 
if this argument is considered conclusive, no more effort is needed. But the fact 
is that the legal binding force (validity) of the constitution itself is hardly ever 
admitted as a conclusive reason to accept constitutional review. This is a 
necessary, but by far not sufficient justification of the control of constitu-
tionality of norms emanating from a pre-eminently "democratic" organ by an 
admittedly non-democratic one. 
On the whole my aim is to put forward a possible constitutional democratic 
justificatory theory of constitutional review. The novelty (if any) of my 
argumentation is only that it accepts the democratic premisses as a starting 
point and argues that a thorough analysis of the concept of democracy itself 
provides sufficient ground to admit constitutional review. To do this, I shall 
proceed in the following way. First I propose to distinguish between two 
concepts of "democracy": a procedural concept and a substantive one; next I 
suggest a distinction between statute-type and Rawls-type (as I call it) 
constitutions. Then I proceed to construct two fundamental types of democratic 
justification of constitutional review: a weak, or procedural and a stronger, 
substantive justification of constitutional review. In this way I hope to prove 
that a reasonable idea of democracy makes not simply acceptable but, in a 
stronger (and for me at least better) version, even necessary the adoption of 
constitutional review in any democratic constitutional system. 
Two types of the concepts of democracy 
I begin my argument with an analysis of the concept of "democracy". I suggest 
two divide, exclusively for the purpose of the present essay, all possible concepts 
of democracy into two clusters: the first cluster includes those concepts which 
define "democracy" as a procedure; the second cluster comprises all concepts 
of "democracy" which construe "democracy" as the property, i.e. correctness, 
goodness etc. of a social arrangement, institution or norm. I maintain that any 
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concept of "democracy" whatsoever used in political theory as well as in 
ordinary political rhetoric, i.e. from the most refined to the crudest forms of 
discourse in politics and society could be allotted to one of these clusters, or, 
at least could be analysed as a combining the two concepts. I do not say that 
all the concepts of "democracy" could be reduced to these clusters without a 
remainder; but I do claim that any concept of "democracy" which is not a plain 
abuse of the language should necessarily contain at least an element assignable 
to one of the two clusters defined above.19 
The clusters I suggested are not intended to be understood as corresponding 
to the types of democracies, but only as the concepts of democracy. Of course, 
concepts of democracies are inevitably used in describing political, social or 
constitutional systems, but I do not intend to give the classifications suggested 
above an unnecessary "ontological" connotation. Furthermore, the concept of 
democracy is not an equivalent of a democratic theory: it is much less than 
that. A democratic theory should include a justification of democracy, while a 
concept of democracy claims much less: it wishes to suggest simply what 
democracy is, but not what it ought to be and why. My analysis therefore does 
not claim, and cannot do so, to be a moral, rational, political etc. justification 
democracy (or one of its variants or "conceptions"). In fact there is no need to 
go further, since the problem of justifying democracy is different from its 
concept although there is some kind of overlap between them. This approach 
is, I think, justified by the undeniable fact that in modern constitutional theory 
there is, by now at least, hardly any discussion about the inevitability of some 
form of "democratic" basis for any constitutional system; the difficulty is much 
more with the concept of democracy suitable for constitutionalism. The 
justification of democracy, in its pure form, is not immediately a problem for 
constitutional theory. 
19 The main works I used as basic for the understanding of the concepts of democracy are, 
in addition to those referred to elsewhere, the following standard works. KELSEN, H.: Wesen 
und Wert der Demokratie, Berlin, 1928, SCHUMPETER, J.: Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, New York, 1942, DAHL, R.: A Preface to Democratic Theory, New Haven, 
1956, SARTORI, G.: Democrazia e defizioni, Florence, 1962 (English translation: Democratic 
Theory, Chicago, 1966); CHRISTOFERSEN, J. A.: The Meaning of ••Democracy" in 
European Ideologies, Oslo, 1966; MacPHERSON, С. В.: Democratic Theory, Oxford, 1973, 
SINGER, P.: Democracy and Disobedience, Oxford, 1973; ARBLASTER, A.: Democracy, 
Minneapolis, 1987; HELD, D.: Models of Democracy, Oxford, 1987; BIRCH, A. H.: Concepts 
and Theories of Democracy, London, 1991; Beetham, D. (ed.): Defining and Measuring 
Democracy, London, 1994. 
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The question remains, nonetheless, why are these two types of concepts of 
democracy are really types (or variants) of one and the same concept. My 
answer is this: the common core of the two types of democracy is the idea and 
concept of equality. In European tradition of politics since the Greeks 
"democracy" has always been a form, or implementation of an idea of, equality. 
The two types of democracy, I suggest to distinguish, as I shall try to point it 
out, differ in the way they conceive of equality within the political community: 
the procedural concepts of democracy could be associated to formal equality, 
while the substantive or "justificatory" concept of democracy is affiliated to 
substantive equality. Moreover, the idea of equality connects very much the 
concepts of democracy to the justification of democracy, since undoubtedly 
equality is one of the strongest justifications of democracy. Besides, on a 
different level the idea equality in law ties the concept of democracy to the 
working, validity and binding force of the legal system. 
The Concept of Democracy as a Procedure 
The concept of "democracy" in the procedural sense denotes, of course, a kind 
of "procedure" as a condition of validity (or binding force) to every member 
of a political community of a decision. Thus, a "procedure" is a condition of 
validity or binding force of the decision to the community. In the following I 
shall examine only norm-(or law-)making decisions, i.e. the outcome of which 
is a valid and binding norm (or a rule of law), since this case is of foremost 
importance for the analysis of constitutional review and in a constitutional 
democratic state any decision is either itself a norm or bound to be at least 
authorized by a norm. It is no doubt true that in a modern political community 
formed by citizens of a state the only tool at the disposal of the state to make 
decisions binding all the citizens severally is legislation; the constitution is, 
seen from this point of view, is but a set of norms determining the conditions 
of validity (or binding force)20 of those norms in the sense that the no norm 
is binding unless it was created by a specified procedure. 
The key concept of procedural democracy is, most obviously, "procedure". 
Although (or perhaps just because) this term is used quite often in law and 
politics, it is not easy at all to define its meaning.21 For my part I shall call 
20 It is possible to distinguish between "validity" and "binding force" of a norm, but I shall 
use these terms as synonyms here. 
21 Cf.: LEHMANN, N.: Legitimation als Verfahren, Neuwied, 1969, 1 1. stating that there 
is no general concept of "procedure" in legal science. 
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"procedure" a set of relationships between subject, agents etc. resulting in an 
obligation binding the participants of it too. Thus, in short, a procedure is 
decision-making the result of which binds the decision-makers. At the same 
time, it is not a requirement that the result be binding exclusively to the 
participants of the procedure; but its essential that it bind them; for example, 
in a judicial procedure the judgement does not "oblige" the court which made 
it, but nevertheless "binds" it, in the sense that the court has no power to 
change its own final decision. The concept of "procedure" proposed here is 
much broader than the one used in legal dogmatics or legal theory, since it 
includes any action (or conduct) leading to, or creating, an obligation. (The 
obligation should not be a legal obligation, though I shall examine only this 
case.) Accordingly, the conclusion of a contract or a making of a promise, for 
example, are also "procedure" in this sense, albeit they are usually not regarded 
as such in legal or even in ordinary language. 
An essential feature of any procedure is that it consists of a series of actions 
(or, in a limiting case, a single action) governed by rules; I shall call the 
specific rules whose exclusive function is to regulate procedures "procedural 
rules". Their distinctive feature is that these rules are in an important sense 
constitutive for the procedure they govern: if these rules were missing, it would 
be impossible to conduct a procedure, since they determine what the procedure 
is and in particular the conditions of the binding (obligatory) force of the result 
of the procedure. Moreover, they tell us, when a procedure is at all has taken 
place. By the constitutive nature of the rules of procedure I mean approxima-
tely the same as Rawls or Searle meant in describing the nature of constitutive 
norms.22 To sum up roughly their view, a rule is constitutive of a "practice" 
when a given action (say, writing an X on a paper, or pronouncing the words 
"I promise to pay £ 50 to Mr X") is not possible without the rule and, more 
importantly, at the same time the rule is part of the action itself. Norms of 
procedure not only define, they create the procedure. On the other hand, there 
is no "procedure" without rules. A further property of the rules of procedure 
follows from their constitutive nature: they could not be "obeyed" but only be 
"made use o f ' , since the rules of procedure are not "obligatory" to anybody: 
they are preconditions for certain actions (like voting, promising, law-making 
etc.) but they could not disobeyed, but only not violated or not fulfilled. The 
rules of procedure, in other words, do not impose duties or obligations, but 
simply define courses of actions as conditions for producing certain effects. 
22 RAWLS, J.: "Two Concepts of Rules" repr. In. Foot, Ph. (ed.): Theories of Ethics, 
Oxford, and SEARLE, J.: Speech Acts, 1969. 
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These rules can only be followed, but not, strictly speaking, "disobeyed".23 
Accordingly, the consequence of their violation (i.e. their non-following) is 
essentially invalidity: Actions not fulfilling the conditions defined in procedural 
rules simply do not count as an action corresponding to the rule; for instance, 
fiddling when one asked to vote in parliament does not count as a vote.24 
A second essential characteristic of procedural rules is that they ex 
hypothesi do not determine the outcome of the procedure but only what counts 
as a valid outcome. This might be trivial, but still not without importance; so, 
for instance, the rules of parliamentary procedure do not define what kind of 
act adopted by the Parliament is acceptable, but only when it counts as an act 
of parliament. Exactly he same is true to the rules of judicial procedure too. 
Hence, the outcome of the procedure is always and of necessity contingent, that 
is to say, it has more than one valid (permitted) outcome. This condition is 
important, since it makes possible to separate exclude from the scope of 
procedures those winch are outside controlled or faked, like pseudo-parliaments 
or show trials; at the same time it is not a matter of the empirical predictability 
of the outcome, since the outcome of a parliamentary voting may be fairly 
predictable and still a "procedure" in the proper sense. It is a necessary part of 
the rules of procedure that they should define the conditions of the final 
decision in the procedure, or, more exactly, they should determine the cases in 
which the procedure is terminated: there could be no infinite procedures. Such 
a rule is, for example, the rule of the counting the votes. It is of course 
possible that the substantive outcome of a procedure will depend on certain 
norms, like in the case of a judicial procedure, but they could not be procedural 
"rules". 
Thus, procedural concepts of democracy are inherently normative because 
they always define certain norms, the acceptance and/or validity of which 
constitute a democracy. These norms are labelled by Norberto Bobbio as "rules 
of the game".25 This metaphor of Bobbio reveals a significant property of the 
procedural rules of a democracy: they are like the rules of a game, they are 
presupposed (or accepted) before the playing of the game, sot that they are 
logically prior to the act of playing just as the rules of democracy are logically 
prior to the practice of democracy. Thus, it seems to be inevitable to admit the 
23 See MART, H. L. A.: The Concept of IMW, Second ed., Oxford, 1990. 
24 It is possible that one might be under a duty to participate in a procedure on other 
grounds, e.g. the judge is obliged to participate in the judicial procedure. 
25 BOBBIO, N.: II futuro delta democrazia, Torino, Einaudi, 1984, 4 ff. ("regole di gioco"). 
See also HABERMAS, J.: Faktizität und Geltung, Frankfurt a.M., 1992, 367 ff. 
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paradoxical inference: the rules of democracy cannot be adapted democratically, 
and consequently they are not, and could not be, procedurally democratic.26 
This paradox demonstrates that the justification of democratic rules themselves 
should be drawn from sources other than the procedure itself. 
A more comprehensive (but still not exhaustive) definition of a "procedure", 
including democratic procedure, may contain several elements all of them 
specified by the rules of procedure, such as the 
actors, participants of the procedure; 
rules of procedure in the narrow sense (rules governing exclusively the 
relations among the participants/actors of the procedure), like the rules of 
order of an assembly; 
rules of competence which determine the subject matter in which a 
procedure is allowed to decide, i.e. defines the legitimate scope of choices 
in the procedure; 
rules of decision which define the terms of the validity and finality 
conditions of the decision (e.g. "2/3 majority" [of the actors]). 
As far as the definition of actors of the democratic procedure is concerned, this 
is usually regarded as a key in the concept of democracy, If "democracy" is a 
procedure in which "everybody" participates on equal footing, there remains 
to define who is a member of the set of "everybody", and who is not. The 
discussion about the range and content of citizenship—e.g. the long struggle for 
general franclrise—in many democracies shows that the question of the proper 
definition of actors is a democracy is far from being insignificant. In a 
constitutional democracy the definition of the actors of democratic procedure 
is equivalent of extent of the demos, the subject of democracy. Since modern 
democratic constitutions normally claim to be derived from (in the normative 
sense) from the sovereignty of the people, whatever that means, the constitu-
tional norms defining the scope of the people, and all those supposed to be 
derived from them in particular the rules on the "rights of the people", are 
procedural norms. The constitutional principle of the "sovereignty of the 
people" is also a procedural norm, as Habermas pointed it out.27 Even more 
26 See on this paradox of democracy HOLMES, S.: "Pre-commitment and the paradox of 
democracy" (J. Elster and R. Slagstad eds.), Constutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge, 
1988, 195 ff; see also MacCORMICK, N.: "Constitutionalism and Democracy", 
Internationales Jahrbuch fur Rechtsphilosophie und Gesetzgebung, 1989. 17 ff. 
27 HABERMAS: Faktizität und Geltung, 600 f f . 
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important for the working of democracies is to observe that the concept of 
political representation is a procedural concept, for all "really existing" 
democracies are, of course, essentially representative. The concept of political 
representation28 is, in the light of my previous reasoning, clearly a rule of 
procedure. Political representation is a normative construct (a set of procedural 
norms) to the effect that given certain conditions—the validity of the electoral 
procedure and so forth—the acts of a specific organ of the state (Parliament, 
National Assembly etc.) ought to be regarded as if those acts were the acts of 
the electorate, who probably themselves represent the "people" as a larger 
whole. This proposition is true even in cases where it can be established that 
the empirical people would have decided differently. So, political representation 
is a complex norm of procedure. 
The rules of political representation (and that of sovereignty even more) 
contain norms of competence although consist not exclusively of norms of 
competence. Here I shall examine only briefly the norms of competence which 
are, by the way, the most important type of norms of procedure in constitu-
tions, given that the norms of competence define the set of choices—legitimate 
outcomes—assigned to a procedure. If for instance Parliament has no compe-
tence ("power") to ordain ф than making ф-ing obligatory is not an allowed 
outcome of the parliamentary procedure. This example reveals, by the way, that 
indirectly procedural norms are capable too to restrain substantively the 
outcome of a procedure. In the case of political representation (and its limiting 
case of sovereignty) this is also a essentially a norm competence. "Sovereignty" 
is a procedural rule (of competence) which gives theoretically unlimited 
competence to the organ having the "sovereignty competence", such, as e. g. 
the organ of the state (or the procedure) competent to modify the constitution. 
The rules of competence are closely related (and subordinated) to the rules that 
define the subject matter of the procedure, i.e. the permitted outcomes standing 
for choice which should remain within the competence assigned to the 
procedure, lest the outcome become invalid (i. e. not binding). In a democratic 
procedure, the general subject matter of the procedure should be a public affair, 
a matter that concerns the whole of the political community.29 
28 See in particular PITKIN, H. F.: The Concept of Representation, Berkeley, 1967. 
29 This is not prima facie a conceptual necessity. One important difference between the 
antique and the modern democracies is that the Greek did not recognise, or to a very limited 
extent, the division between public and private shpere of the citizens. 
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In political democracies the most characteristic rule of decision, without any 
doubt is voting.30 Trivially, voting is a procedure of social choice which 
concerns a public affair and its outcome binds in principle jointly and severally 
the political community and its members. In the case of the market choice, the 
outcome of the market procedure is valid to the society, since its result, say the 
distribution of income and property resulting from the market procedure, is not 
opposable by any member of the community, except for its irregularility. It 
should be noted that voting in itself is not inherently (conceptually) democratic; 
there is hardly anything "democratic" in the voting of the shareholders of a 
trading company . Nonetheless, voting is necessary for a procedural democracy 
if it satisfies certain conditions. The most important of them is the scope of 
participants in the voting procedure, as discussed above. Another essential 
condition of a democratic voting procedure is the rule of majority. Majority 
rule is in fact a criterion of decision-making: it defines the actions and their 
properties the fulfilment of which creates a final and valid outcome, but not 
what the outcome should be. Since much of the democratic character of 
procedures depend on the character of voting, it is crucial to the understanding 
of procedural democracy. It is noteworthy that voting is ancillary to the basic 
procedural idea of democracy that is, to the postulate that a democratic 
procedure is a procedure in which the actors themselves decide. Thus a voting 
procedure is democratic if it is designed in a way that satisfies the following 
ideal postulate: 
the outcome of the procedure should the in the greatest possible conformity 
with the greatest number of the actors' choices if they were individually in 
the position to decide. 
This postulate is countered by another one essential in constitutional democracies 
which require that the competence—the set of its possible outcomes—of democratic 
procedures ought to be restricted to social or political choices. Democratic 
procedures are applicable, from a procedural point of view, only if its possible 
outcomes are (at least in a constitutional democracy recognising liberal rights) by 
definition indivisible, since the scope of democratic decision-making should 
concern, in principle, the community as a whole, the sphere covered by of liberal 
rights—in particular individual liberties—being outside the competence of the 
democratic decision-making procedure. Therefore, ideally, in public affairs there 
is no "individual outcome"; but a given state of the polity (society, community) 
30 See in particular DUMMETT, M.: Voting Procedures, Oxford, 1984. 
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is equally valid for each member of it.31 For instance, if the outcome of the 
democratic voting procedure in Parliament is a law setting a speed limit on the 
road, it will be equally obligatory (or "valid"), of course, those who agree with 
it and for those who do not. Theoretically at least, the democratic procedure 
would be conceptually justified (falling within the concept of democratic 
procedure) if it touches upon the aggregated state of the society in which 
individual decisions are excluded or they are for some reason unacceptable. 
Majority voting is, then, a tool in a democratic procedure to approach the ideal 
case of democratic decision-making: the greatest possible satisfaction of the 
actors in terms of the reflection of their preferences in common decisions. 
The purely procedural concept of democracy does not (and indeed cannot) 
recognise any substantial limitation of democratic decisions: if a decision is 
procedurally perfect (final), it is at the same time binding independently of its 
content. Thus, the binding force of the decision is based exclusively on 
correctness of the procedure followed. The most important difficulty with the 
procedural concept (and conceptions) of democracy is that no procedure can 
guarantee that its outcome will be (1) substantially correct but not even that (2) 
it will properly reflect the opinion of the participants. Substantial limitations 
of the outcome couched in terms of procedural rules e.g. is as limitation of 
competence of the procedurally democratic decision-maker are nevertheless 
possible: they determine the outcome only indirectly, since it is never true that 
the outcome will be contrary to the rules of competence. In fact, the concept 
of the "rules of procedure" in itself excludes the possibility of such conflict, 
since a rule of procedure must be neutral in its relation to the substantive 
outcome: a procedural rule conceptually unable to be in conflict with the result 
(outcome) of the procedure. Rules of competence, however, do not determine 
directly the outcome of the procedure but specify the scope of permitted 
outcomes but never one single outcome. As I argued earlier, any procedure 
includes at least one rule of competence which could consist in unlimited 
competence; such a procedure might be called "sovereign", since an unlimited 
procedure is similar to the concept of the sovereignty. In an unlimited 
procedure there could b y the way no distinction between "private" and 
"public" given that this distinction is a (negative) rule of competence that 
excludes certain matters from the competence of the democratic procedure. In 
addition, there could be only one sovereign procedure in any community, for, 
31 In practice the question is often whether a subject matter, like abortion, is a public affair 
at all. 
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if there are more than one than they will at least limit each other and so will 
not be unlimited. 
The scope of procedural rules in constitutional democracies may be 
interpreted more broadly, in such a way that at a least a part of constitutional 
rights are in fact rules of procedure. This is applies first of all to constitutional 
freedoms: they are in fact in an important sense procedural rules. Certainly, 
political freedoms may be reformulated and understood in procedural terms 
or are in an important sense truly procedural rules, because political liberties 
are rules determining the shape of political procedures in a constitutional 
democracy. Their importance is just this: the freedom of speech, probably the 
most prominent political liberty, is the most significant within the range of 
political freedoms since it renders the democratic (or political) procedure 
open to any member of the community.32 A prominent representative of the 
procedural view of the freedom of speech is John Stuart Mill: in his famous 
defence of the freedom of opinion in his On Liberty,33 he justifies free speech 
as the best possible procedure of discovery of the best possible decision. 
Second, free speech is certainly procedural in the sense that it does not allow, 
ideally, any distinction among the views according to their content and that no 
view expressed has a claim to be accepted by others. The right of to free 
speech is, trivially, a right to take part in the discussion—it is the right to argue, 
not the claim to win; the choice among the conflicting or mutually exclusive 
views is taken, if needed, on the ground of voting. The same applies to other 
political freedoms: freedom of association, for instance, is also as it is easy to 
discern a procedural freedom too: it guarantees the right to participate in public 
life to groups of individuals. Generally, if one admits that argumentation is a 
procedure it is possible to extend the concepts (or conceptions) of procedural 
democracy to the public reasoning in general and conceive public liberties as 
rights to participate in the democratic procedure lato sensu. 
The principal problem with the procedural democratic conceptions might be 
formulated in the following way. Is there any guarantee (or could it exist) that 
a procedurally correct decision will be substantively correct as well? Of course, 
it is possible to define substantial correctness as a necessary result of the 
majority decision, like Robert Bork does34 or to deny the distinction at all, but 
32 Cf.: RAZ, J.: " Free Expression and Personal Identification" in Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain, Oxford, 1994, 131 ff. 
33 Chapter II. 
34 BORK, R.: "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana IMW 
Journal 47 (1971) 1, 30. 
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such methods beg, or at best avoid, the question. This I shall address a bit 
later, following the analysis of the substantive-justificatory concepts of 
democracy. 
Democracy as justification 
The other group of the concepts of democracy might be called "substantive", 
as the concepts belonging to this bundle of concepts conceive democracy as a 
property of norms, institutions, states of affairs or, perhaps better, as a norm 
to assess the correctness, acceptability etc. of them. "Correctness" or "being 
just" is, strictly speaking, not the quality (or property) of a norm, an institution 
etc. but their relation to another norm or to a value (provided one regards 
values as a reducible to norms).35 Thus, speaking of "correctness" etc. of 
norms is a shorthand expression for their assessment according to a certain 
measure. 
The distinction between the procedural/substantive concepts of democracy 
is ultimately grounded in the isolation of two interrelated aspects of any 
procedure, which is expressed very clearly by Eugenio Bulygin, dealing with 
judicial decisions: the term "judicial decision" according to Bulygin, has two 
meanings, one the decision as a series of actions (i.e. a procedure) and a second 
one its content.36 Of course, Bulygin's distinction can be extended to any 
procedure and decision (which is itself a procedure); this is significant because 
usually we do not distinguish between the two meanings and use the term rather 
indiscriminately, causing confusion. Moreover, it is possible to speak of 
"justification" only in relation to the content of a decision, i.e. the outcome of 
the procedure. This argument, by the way, demonstrates the primacy of the 
procedural concept of democracy, due to the fact that the substantive-justifi-
catory concepts, as we shall be later, are in an important sense parasitic upon 
the procedural concepts. Procedural concepts are presupposed by the justifi-
catory concepts and conceptions, since the procedural rules define the decisions 
the content of which should or could be justified. The inverse does not exist: 
no justification will define a procedure. 
The justificatory concept of democracy concentrate on the conditions 
determining the "democratic" character of norms, institutions, or (as in Rawls) 
the structure of a society. Certainly, the justificatory concept of democracy is 
35 WRIGHT, Cf. G. H. von: Varieties of Goodness, London, 1962. 
36 BULYGIN, E.: "On Legal Interpretation" Archiv fiir Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, ВН. 
53. (1994). 
Constitutional Review and Democracy 1 4 3 
close to a democratic theory of justice,37 For this reason I shall examine the 
relationship between democracy and justification; or, to put it differently, is it 
reasonable to speak of specifically "democratic" justification methods. I shall 
argue that the democratic justification is equivalent to the general acceptability 
of a norm, decision or institution.38 By "general acceptability" I mean the 
examination (in view of its justification) of a norm etc. by the demonstration 
that it would have been accepted or adhered to by any reasonable and well 
informed member of the political community concerned. The specifically 
"democratic" element in this concept consists in the extension of the criterion 
of hypothetical or construed assent to each member of the community. 
Moreover, the democratic nature of this criterion can be demonstrated by 
pointing out that the condition of general assent is an idealisation of the criteria 
inherent in the idea of democratic procedure which should have lead, in ideal 
conditions which never could obtain in reality, to a result generally acceptable. 
(This should apply to decisions involving bargaining, since even there could 
be a result ideally satisfactory to each person, or group, involved.) Viewed 
from this perspective, the substantive-justificatory concepts of democracy 
regard the result of the procedure rather than the procedure itself and try to 
define the criteria of the ideal outcome of the procedure (if this were possible). 
The justificatory concepts (and conceptions) of democracy endeavour to 
determine the limits of procedural outcomes by going back to the pre-
procedural state of a society and discover the limits of the outcomes any 
reasonable person should have set to democratic procedures before agreeing to 
play the procedural democratic game. So, in other words, the limits set at the 
pre-procedural state applies to the post-procedural one.39 So the justificatory 
concepts of democracy are democratic in an important sense: they are also, and 
not less than the procedural concepts and conceptions, striving to achieve 
equality within a political community. The substantive concept of democracy 
attempts to accomplish this task by defining the limitations to the democratic 
outcomes. This is attained basically by the stipulation of norms serving to 
37 For views considering "democracy" and "justice" as synonyms (or near synonyms) see 
WEINBERGER, O.: "Der normativistische Institutionalismus und die Theorie der 
Gerechtigkeit. Gerechtigkeit als Leitidee der Demokratie" Internationales Jahrbuch für 
Rechtsphilosophie und Gesetzgebung, 1989, 99 ff. And MÜLLER, J. P.: Demokratische 
Gerechtigkeit, Munich, 1992. 
38 "Norm" is the central category here, because institutions, or even the Rawlsian "basic 
structure" are inconceivable without norms (if they are not themselves norms). 
39 This is, of course, the method of John Rawls' "original position". RAWLS, J.: Л Theory 
of Justice, Oxford, 1971. 
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control the outcome of the democratic procedures. These are in modern 
constitutional democracies usually constitutional limitations on the contents of 
procedurally correct decisions, mostly in the forms prohibition of laws of 
certain content—either specifically determined or through general postulates in 
form of constitutional rights such as life, property, personal freedom etc.—or by 
(relatively) content-neutral prohibitions such as the exclusion of bills of 
attainder or ex post facto laws. The most important limitation is, then, that the 
legislator is obliged constitutionally not to make norms not justifiable by the 
constitutional criterions of correctness/acceptability. They are "constitutional 
essentials" a Rawls called them recently.40 
In the justificatory concept and conception of democracy constitutional 
rights function not as procedural devices breaking the way to correct decisions, 
but rather as measures of the justification of norms. In this conception the 
justification of the norms as outcomes of the legislative procedure is the use 
of substantive idea of "public reason" in the community.41 The most important 
"constitutional essentials" are particular norms that define the principles as 
accepted starting points for the discussion on the substantive correctness of 
public decisions. These are "principles"—norms defining the contents and 
justificatory limits for other norms42—are indeed "essentials", or even more: 
constitutive, in any community. Their constitutive nature is explained by the 
insight that no community can exist without adopting common norms (or, if 
one prefers to say, values) they consider as determining the essential nature and 
identity of their community. Thus, no community can be based exclusively on 
procedures, if it wishes to be more than a system of peaceful toleration, like 
in international relations where the relationship of states among themselves is 
purely defined by procedures. But in human communities claiming exclusive 
and comprehensive authority over their members this is not sufficient: "One 
cannot take an oath on a procedure of modification" as Carl Schmitt pertinently 
remarked.43 In short, substantive democratic principles define the distinctive-
individual features of democratic communities, and since there are several 
value principle-systems which are mutually (at least in part) exclusive they 
should be determined in advance by the community preferably in its 
constitution. For instance, trivially enough, a community may not be governed 
40 RAWLS, J.: Political Liberalism, New York, 1993, 137 ff 227 ff. 
41 Cf.: RAWLS, J.: "The Idea of Public Reason" in Political Liberalism, 212 ff. The concept 
is itself of Kantian origin. 
42 See DWORKIN, R.: Taking Rights Seriously, New York, 1977. 
43 SCHMITf, C.: Verfassungslehre, Berlin, 1928. 
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at the same time by parliamentary or presidential government or it could not 
be monarchy and republic equally at once, although none of these forms is 
inherently unacceptable, still a substantive, and properly "constitutional" choice 
is inevitable among them. 
The relationship between the two concepts 
The relationship between procedural and justificatory has been touched upon 
earlier, when I pointed to a certain priority of the procedural concept of 
democracy. Now I examine briefly those ideas which purport to unite (rather 
than to combine) the two concepts of democracy, in particular the theories of 
"discursive democracy"44 put forward in rather different versions e. g. by 
Ackerman and Habermas.45 Their general tendency of argumentation is to 
establish that the two concepts of democracy are reducible to each other or 
yield the same result. 
The main thesis of a unified theory of democracy should be that the 
democratic procedure (or at least one of them) will necessary, and in each case, 
produce the substantially best result.This might be, perhaps (or logically) true 
in ideal cases, for example in an ideal discourse situation. But in ideal situations 
of various kinds—like the "original position" or the "argumentation before a 
universal audience46"—there is no room, and could not be, for majority voting, 
because the these ideal situations are themselves normative constructs where 
conceptually only the unanimity rule is possible. (Conceptually because the 
unanimity rule necessarily applies in any case where the rationality is in 
question since there can be no two rationalities at this level of abstraction.) 
Another theoretical approach claims that empirical democratic procedure 
necessarily leads to a substantially correct result. It is traceable back at least 
to Rousseau, viz. to his famous theory on the relationship of the volonté 
générale and volonté de tous:41 that is the relationship between the empirical 
(procedural) and the rational will determining what the empirical will ought to 
44 Generally DRYZEK, J.: Discursive Democracy, Cambridge, 1990. 
45 ACKERMAN, В.: Social Justice in a Liberal State, New Haven, 1980; HABERMAS: 
Faktizität und Geltung, op. cit., and Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt, 
1973; he developed his views in many publications elsewhere too. 
46 RAWLS: op. cit., and PERELMAN, Ch.: Éléments d'une théorie de l'argumentation, 
Paris, 1968., Justice et Raison, Bruxelles, 1963. 
47 Du contrat social Livre II., Ch. III. (Halbwachs ed., 145.). 
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be.48 The most radical formulation of the thesis that democratic procedures 
lead to correct result I know of is from Ottfried Höffe: 
If the Parliament is elected by the whole people, the constitution-making 
and law-making activity of the Parliament by necessity guarantees the 
liberty of the people, on the ground that everybody participates in the 
making of laws and on the other because nobody will decide against his 
own interest. Democracy will thus guarantee the minimum of force 
[Herrschaftszwang] and—in the positive sense—the maximum liberty for each 
citizen.... 
Democracy and human rights coincide49 
One of the problems of this argument is that it is by far not clear what kind of 
"necessity" is claimed: either empirical or conceptual-logical. In the first case, 
if it is empirical claim, then it depends on empirical proof which is not easy to 
produce. If Hoffe's claim is logical-conceptual it hardly seems to realise the 
problem that except the case of a petitio principii—definition of their correctness 
of the result hy the procedural regularity-substantive correctness could hardly be 
proved to follow with logical necessity from the concept of procedural regularity. 
Hoffe, of course, speak here only about the "freedom of the people" but it is 
clear that any legislation in fact constrains the freedom of the people. 
The two concepts of democracy are, of course, interrelated. First, as argued 
above, some kind of procedural concept of democracy is presupposed by the 
justificatory-substantive concepts, since the justificatory concept is conceived 
invariably as a critical idea (of the procedural democracy). On the other hand, 
the substantive concept of democracy—just on the ground of its critical 
focus—ought to possess a certain precedence over procedural democracy, since 
it should be allowed to overrule or override, in a sense, the outcome of the 
democratic procedure. At any rate it will always claim to override if not legally, 
morally or politically, the outcome of democratic procedures and this by 
conceptual necessity: the substantive concepts and conceptions of democracy are 
made (by conceptual necessity) to control the result of procedural democracy. 
48 See PLAMENATZ, J.: Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2. ed. Oxford, 1968, 
26 ff. 
49 HOFFE, О.: "Die Menschenrechte als Legitimation und kritischer Maßstab der 
Demokratie" (J. Schwartdländer, ed.), Menschenrechte und Demokratie, Kehl/Strasbourg, 
1981, 241., 259. (Italics added; my translation.) 
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Two Concepts of Constitutional Democracy and Two Justifications of 
Constitutional Review 
I distinguished elsewhere between two concepts of constitution (and consequently 
two justifications of constitutional review):50 the procedural, statute-like and the 
substantive or "Rawls" constitution. The procedural constitution is a set of 
procedures (as defined above) constitutionally defined, while the substantive 
(Rawls-type) constitutions aim at the definition of the just structure of society (or 
at least elements of it) in the constitution, so that their most important function 
is to define the principles by which the just basic structure of the community can 
be preserved. The two types of constitutions correspond to the two concepts of 
democracy distinguished above, so that one could contend that procedural 
democracy matches to the statute-type, procedural constitution while substantive 
democracy fits to the Rawls-type, substantive constitution. Accordingly, it is 
possible to construct two elementary groups of democratic constitutions: the first 
type of a democratic constitution sets up a procedural democracy and contains 
but (or primarily) the rules of democratic procedures, while the substantive 
constitution, if it is democratic, will establish a justificatory type constitutional 
system. Of course, both types of constitutions and the concepts of democracies 
are idealisations: save a few exceptional cases, most constitutional democracies 
combine the elements of procedural and substantive constitutions in variety of 
ways. Here too, the priority of the procedural constitution over the substantive 
element applies. 
The connection between the justification of constitutional review and the 
constitutional democracies is as follows: there is a procedural and a substantive 
justification of constitutional review from democracy. This once again corres-
ponds to the two fundamental types of constitutional review I recommended to 
distinguish: the procedural and the substantive. I will, then, distinguish between 
the weak and the strong justifications of constitutional review. The weak 
justification of the constitutional review from (or relative to) democracy is 
procedural: it is weak, because it justifies the constitutional review as a 
corrective of the democratic process; thus, it is based on the inescapable and 
unsurmountable weakness of the democratic procedure by its own measure which 
require correction. Furthermore, there are two sorts of weak justifications of the 
constitutional review: one based on the control over procedural rules and a 
second one which is capable to justify, at least indirectly, the (substantive) 
overriding of the result of a democratic procedure. In the second case the 
50 BRAGYOVA, A.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás elmélete, Budapest, 1994. 
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"weak" nature of the justification is due to its secondary character: if the 
democratic procedure were itself complete and perfect, there would have been 
no justification for judicial review. The strong justification of constitutional 
review differs from the weak one since it does not derive the justification of 
judicial review from the defences of the democratic procedure: it claims to be 
itself "democratic" on its own right. 
The weak (procedure-based) democratic justification of constitutional review 
is based on the following reasoning. In its simplest version die reason for 
constitutional review the necessity to uphold the procedural rules of the 
constitution.51 Hence the constitutional court ensures the observance of the 
rules of democratic procedure, including the procedurally interpreted constitu-
tional freedoms. The constitutional court has in this case no power to review 
a procedurally flawless legislative act: it does not scrutinise the content of the 
democratic decision but exclusively its regularity (in a very broad sense, it is 
true). Any procedurally impeccable norm is constitutional—it has full democratic 
credentials and consequently may not be challenged. Plainly, the scope of the 
procedure-based constitutional review depends on the concept of "procedural 
rules": if it is understood as broadly as to include (as I have suggested) all the 
norms of competence, than the procedural-democratic justification of constitu-
tional review will allow a rather extensive constitutional review, however. In 
fact, the practical result may be quite similar to the effect of non-procedural 
justifications, but the procedure oriented justification of judicial review remains 
invariably conceived as limitation of the democratic process. For this reason 
the procedural justification of the constitutional review is essentially a theory 
of judicial restraint, recognising the priority of democratic procedures: any law 
may be unconstitutional only on the ground that the democratic procedure 
leading to its adoption was imperfect 
An important corollary of the weak justification, used as background theory 
of constitutional review, is the prohibition to the courts to legislate, i.e. to 
replace their judgement with that of the procedurally democratic law-maker. 
For this reason a weak democratic justification of constitutional review does 
not justify a constitutional court to create legislative norms, not even to 
suggest a solution: it may say strictly "no", that is, to annul acts of the legis-
lation. This philosophy is inherently procedural: it regards unconstitutional 
norms as procedurally flawed because they transgress a procedural rule, the 
51 It is possible that a constitution contains substantive democratic norms, and still does not 
enforce but procedure-based constitutional review. In such a case the constitution were legally 
a procedural constitution, but politically substantive. 
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rules of competence defined in the constitution. Thus, in this approach an 
unconstitutional law is procedurally unconstitutional, since the legislator has, 
of course, no competence to make an unconstitutional law, thus unconstitu-
tionally consists in violating the rules of competence. But, since constitutional 
competence to legislate confers a power of decision—a power to choose among 
alternative outcomes (i.e. possible norms)—to the legislative organ, this power, 
even if unduly exercised on occasion, invariably remains its power and not that 
of the court. No wonder that most theories advocating judicial restraint 
typically adopt a version of the weak justification of constitutional review 
allowing them to reproach excessive judicial activism in terms of democratic 
theory. Convinced and radical democrats usually distrust judicial review on the 
ground of its (procedurally) undemocratic character; Justice Felix Frankfurter 
expressed this idea in the following way: "democracy need not rely on the 
courts to save it from its own unwisdom".52 But, it should be once again 
emphasized, procedural norms include the (procedurally interpreted) political 
and personal freedoms. 
The weak justification of constitutional review regards the constitutional 
court as a referee in the sense of an arbiter whose exclusive task is to control 
the compliance with procedural rules just as a referee does: it has nothing to 
do with the result of the game, although, quite obviously, his decisions 
influence the outcome indirectly. The point in the procedural justification of 
constitutional review is just this; constitutional review guards the correctness 
of the democratic procedure, and does not decide the substance of the constitu-
tional question. Generally speaking, the constitutional review upon this theory 
is conceived as a tool to assist the majority decision-making, or, better, to 
ensure that the majority decision be properly made, while the "property of 
decision-making" includes of course the freedom political discussion and the 
appropriate protection of minority rights too.53 
52 AFL v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 556 (1949). 
53 The most influential procedure-based justification of judicial review in the United 
States is certainly the theory propounded by John Hart Ely in his Democracy and Distrust, 
New York, 1980. See also TRIBE, L.: "The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories" Yale Law Review 89 (1990) 1063 ff. Cf. also CRAIG, P. P.: Public 
Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and in the United States, Oxford, 1990, 94 ff, 
and PERRY, M.: The Constitution, the Courts and the Human Rights, New Haven, 1992. 
78 ff. 
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Any procedure-based justification of judicial review accepts, however, the 
basic premises of procedural democracy, in particular majority rule.54 The 
strong justifications of constitutional review differ from them exactly in this 
respect: they do not accept majority rule as decisive in any constitutional 
question. On the contrary, they regard procedural democracy as one of the 
versions of democracy, but not as its exclusive principle; thus it does not deny 
the necessity of procedural democracy, only its conclusiveness in every 
possible issue. There are several versions of non-procedural justifications of the 
judicial review; I shall here consider three of them, distancing gradually from 
the procedural concept. 
The first is based on the inherent limits (or deficiencies) of democratic 
procedures, so that it is the best compatible with the procedural justification of 
judicial review. Starting point of this reasoning is the well known theorem, 
discovered in its simplest form in the 18th century,55 that the voting procedures 
used in procedural democratic decision-making are necessarily imperfect in 
several respects. First, they do not necessarily reflect properly the preferences 
(choices) of the participants of the procedure. This is an inherent limitation in 
the sense that it proves that democratic procedures do not necessarily will 
produce the best result or the result best in conformity the "real" choice of the 
community. This in itself might justify substantive review of the decisions 
made in democratic procedures. Even if one accepts arguendo, the otherwise 
doubtful proposition that any majority decision properly reflecting the values 
("preferences") of the members of the community is necessarily good, there 
will be always a great deal of doubt as to the quality of the outcome, still 
assuming its procedural correctness. Moreover, once again assuming the 
correctness of the decision-making procedure, it is always possible to manipu-
54 Of course, it is possible to protect minorities by procedural rules too: typically this is 
achieved by requirements of supermajority: this gives to numerical minorities a right to veto. 
But the value of this protection is more than doubtful since it protects the number, not 
necessarily a "real" minority. See on minority protection (against majority) the still classical 
essay of JELLINEK, G.: Das Recht der Minoritäten, Wien, 1898. 
55 Usually Condorcet is credited with the discovery of it, though, it might be his elder 
contemporary Borda, too. See CONDORCET: Mathématiques et société, (ed. R. Rashed), 
Paris, 1974, 172 ff 183 ff. I have relied on several classical works in voting and social choice 
theory such as ARROW, K.: Social Choice and Individual Values, 1951, SEN, A.: Social 
Welfare and Individual Values, San Francisco, 1971, RIKER, W.: Liberalism against 
Populism, San Francisco, 1982., and also to DITMMETT, op. cit and BLACK, D.: Theory and 
Committees and Elections, Cambridge 1958. The technical details of these theorems are 
immaterial here, except, of course, their truth. 
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late the voting procedure in such way that the outcome can be defective or 
imperfect. If so, the constitution-maker might be well justified to exclude 
certain outcomes of democratic procedures ab initio as invalid regardless of the 
majority it accepts. 
A second version of the strong justification of constitutional review is akin 
in some respect to the first one. It is based on the fact that political democracies 
are representative democracies, sometimes combined with some ingredients of 
direct democracy. Representative democracies are, by definition, derivative, in 
the sense that the democratic decision-making process in the representative 
assemblies is only indirectly can be regarded as democratic at all by virtue of 
a constitutionally authorised transfer of powers from the "people" to its 
representatives. Since the selection of the representatives is itself a voting 
procedure—with all the limitations briefly outlined above—the representativity 
of the assembly is certain not perfect. Still less guaranteed is its continuos 
representativity, as it were, in choices not being debated in the election process. 
One seriuos constraint is that the preferences expressed in the votes in selecting 
the representatives56 are restricted on several counts: their range is rather 
limited and far from being comprehensive of all the possibilities open; further-
more, they could be manipulated seriously. As a result, the overwhelming 
majority of the preferences is left unarticulated in this procedure. 
Thus, the argument from representative democracy is based on the 
unavoidable deficiencies of political representation as a variant of procedural 
democracy. Here too, the starting point of the reasoning is the inescapable 
imperfection of the procedure, which justifies certain safeguards against its 
outcome. In addition, in the case of representative democracy one may argue 
that since representation involves a transfer of powers from the original holder 
(the "people"), the transfer operated by the constitution may properly be a 
restricted one. There are two general techniques to do this, one procedural, the 
other substantive. First, certain types of decisions might be withheld from the 
competence of the representative procedure and reserved to the electorate 
(normally this is the case of the modification or amendment of the constitution 
itself). Second, the constitution may restrain, as a measure of precaution, 
substantively the content of the outcome adopted in the representative 
assembly. In this case the representatives are denied the right to choose 
according to their own judgement in matters defined by the constitution. 
56 I do not examine here the complex problems connected with the choice of the optimal 
electoral system. 
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Both justificatory theories set out above, however, explain only the 
possibility or necessity of limitation of the democratic procedures, in terms of 
the democratic procedure, or at least remain within the ultimate assumptions 
of the procedurally oriented theories. This ultimate assumptions accepted, or 
at least not questioned, by the justifications analysed in preceding parts might 
be stated as follows: 
any perfectly democratic procedure will produce necessarily the best (most 
optimal, just etc.) outcome by the properties immanent in procedure. 
The justification of the constitutional review I propose here is not based on this 
assumption, that is, it does not accept that any procedure can be more than 
more or less reliable aggregation or selection procedure among the choices, 
values etc. of the participants of the procedure. If they are irrational, 
unreasonable or deliberately wicked, the outcome will be accordingly irrational, 
unreasonable or wicked. This result is inevitable by purely procedural means; 
even the most perfect procedure cannot eliminate this opportunity. I do not 
conceive any possibility to avoid this conclusion. 
If so, we must accept that the democratic procedure in its best form will 
never guarantee the substantive justification of its resulting norm]. This is, I 
think, the groundwork of the theory of constitutional democracy. I shall argue 
that it is necessary to adopt a substantive concept of democracy for the 
completeness of a system of constitutional democracy. Historically the most 
important case of substantive limitation of (procedural)democracy is the 
protection of human (or, as I prefer to call them, constitutional) rights. The 
declaration of human rights in constitutions has been always based on the 
explicit or implicit idea that they are constraints on the majority decisions 
conceived as tools to control the "tyranny of the majority". The most influential 
theoretical basis of the control of the outcome of democratic procedures has 
been the social contract theories, although, it must be admitted, there are 
versions of it which might be called purely procedural;57 but most of them are 
based on the idea that reasonable individuals will never renounce of certain 
right, that is will never agree to any result of a democratic procedure. Thus, 
constitutional rights are best regarded as constitutional norms limiting in 
advance the outcome of democratic legislative procedures. In fact, "consti-
tutional rights" is a shorthand expression for principles (in the Dworkinian 
57 This is the case of Hobbes and probably Rousseau. 
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sense);58 they set out the constitutional norms serving as substantial limits to 
the content of procedurally democratic (legislative) decisions. 
This substantive concept of constitutional democracy may also be a starting 
point to a full-fledged theory of democracy. It is "democratic" in the sense that 
it also defines the conditions of acceptability or consent of the members of 
community. But, contrary to procedural theories explaining the equal consent 
of the members of the community to the outcome of the democratic procedure 
in terms of their consent to the rules of procedure which entails the consent to 
the result, substantive theories aim at defining the consent by setting out the 
conditions of acceptability of the outcome. This dualism of consent as 
agreement and as acceptability is abundantly clear in the classic concept of the 
statute (Law) of the constitutional theory: on the one hand, the statute should 
originate from the democratic legislative procedure, on the other, however, it 
ought to be reasonable too.59 Hence procedural-democratic legitimation, and 
the consent based on it, is not enough: a law be should be rationally acceptable 
too. That explains the requirement that laws should be general, i.e. reasonable 
and applied generally to each member of the community without distinction. 
The best democratic justification of this requirement is as follows: a statute 
should be reasonable in such a way that any reasonable citizen in the 
community would have decided exactly in the same way if he or she had the 
necessary time and information to the legislator had (or supposed to have). This 
conflict between the two types of democracy were called by Richard Wollheim 
"the paradox of democracy"; he points out that there are cases when a citizen 
of a democratic community might say "this is an obligatory decision" while her 
or she may be convinced that the same decision is unreasonable or simply 
bad.60 This paradox—explained by Michael Walzer as a conflict between 
procedural and substantive justice61—is the clash between "consent" and 
"acceptance": although I consented to the democratic rules of procedure, I find 
its result (sometimes) unacceptable. Perhaps the most important task of the 
constitutional review is to resolve this kind of conflicts within the constitutional 
framework. 
58 DWORK1N: Taking Rights Seriously, cit., "The Forum of Principle" in A Matter of 
Principle, 1985, 33 ff. 
59 The classic work on this subject remains: JELLINEK, G.: Gesetz und Verordnung, 
Leipzig, 1887. 
60 WOLLHEIM, R.: "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy" in Laslett, P.-Runciman, W. 
G. (eds.:) Philosphy, Politics and Society, Second Series, London, 1962, 71 ff. 
61 WALZER, M.: "Philosophy and Democracy" Political Theory, 10 (1981) 386. 
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The strongest substantive justification of constitutional review allows the 
constitutional court (at least in some cases) not only to declare void a law 
contrary to the constitution but to define which are the laws compatible with 
the constitution. The court, in this theory, has the power to say positively what 
is constitutional, not only to pronounce which is not. A weaker justification 
would certainly allow the constitutional court to declare void a law establishing 
"separate but equal" school facilities for blacks and whites, but it is only the 
substantive theory which explains why the court is justified to prescribe equal 
facilities in mixed schools, that is to offer a constitutional solution to the 
conflict.62 In other words, the substantive theory justifies to some extent 
judicial activism. It is bale to define, on the other hand, the limits of this 
activism too. There are fields or aspects of legislation where the activism is 
justified in the following way. In any legislation there are two main components: 
one part of it might be called the "utilitarian" component, the other one "constitu-
tional". The utilitarian element is, in principle a matter for the majority decision-
making procedure and it is indifferent from the constitutional point of view, 
provided that the requirements of constitutional equality are respected and it has 
no connection with constitutional questions.63 The constitutional justification of 
legislation is the judgement of the justifiability of the legislative decision on the 
ground of the substantive constitutional principles as defined in the constitution 
and interpreted by the court in the light of the best background theory. Thus 
the control of substantive justification of legislation through constitutional 
review reveals the court as an agent of the "public reason".64 So, while there 
is nor ground to suggested that matters of utilit^-which take the great majority 
of questions decided by legislators—be overruled by constitutional review, there 
remains a domain where the constitutional justification of the democratic 
decisions must be submitted to scrutiny of the constitutional review. 
The difference between weak and strong justification of constitutional 
review is well shown on the example of different scope and content of the 
principle of constitutional equality. Equality is fundamental, since democracy 
is the political form and implementation of equality. Hence it is quite natural 
that the two concepts of democracy entail different conceptions of consti-
tutional equality. Procedural democracy entails equality before the law. it 
requires that the same norm, irrespective of its content, be applied in each 
case of the norm applies; accordingly, it demands that the rules of law should 
62 I have in mind of course the famous Brown decision of the US Supreme Court of 1954. 
63 This is a serious limitation, but I cannot pursue the matter further here. 
64 See, once again, RAWLS: "The Idea of Public Reason" cit. 
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be formulated generally not allowing privileges (exceptions to generally 
formulated rules) to groups or individuals, but it does not demand that the 
norms of the legal system be justified in their content. Thus, formal equality 
dictates that any law democratically adopted be considered unconditionally 
valid and obligatory to every citizen without distinction. Clearly enough, formal 
equality is essentially a procedural equality, for its main criterion of equality 
is procedural: it is, expressed in other language, not the result but equal 
application of procedural rules—including, as argued above, the rules defining 
the conditions of validity and obligatory force of the outcome of the 
procedure—to each participant.65 
On the other hand, the substantive equality demands that the laws be 
substantially justified in the sense of being rationally-constitutionally acceptable; 
this conception of equality demands equal concern to be expressed in the 
contents of the norm66 to the interests and "dignity" of each citizen into con-
sideration. In this interpretation equality means not simply non-discrimination, 
but it may well demand reasonable distinction; here equality consists in, 
expressed in a well-known formula, equal respect67 to every member of the 
community. If a constitutional court adopts this view (or conception) of consti-
tutional equality the control of the constitutionality of the legislation will 
amount to the control of its constitutional (and rational) justifiability.68 This 
conception of constitutional equality presupposes equality before the law ("due 
65 Classical in the 19th-20th ccntury parliamentarism in France denied the possibility of the 
judicial review exactly on the ground that procedural democracy guarantees the best possible 
result. See e.g. DUGUIT, L.: Traité de droit constitutioneI, 3rd ed., Tome II. Paris, 1928, 172 
ff and CARRÉ DE MALBERG, R. : La loi, expression de la volonté générale, Paris, 1925; 
see also his Contriubutions à la théorie générale de l'Etat, Tomes I—II., Paris, 1920. 
66 By the term "contents of the norm" I mean the conducts deontically qualified (prohibited, 
permitted etc.) I the norm. 
67 See e.g. DWORKIN: A Matter of Principle, cit. and his Taking Rights Seriously. 
68 N. Luhmann expressly identifies the general rule of equality within this requirement—ob-
viously in view of the case law of the German Constitutional Court. See LUHMANN, N.: 
Grundrechte als Institution, Berlin, 1965. The philosophy of the German Constitutional Court 
has been heavily influenced in the respect by the writings of Gerhard Leibholz, who was a 
long time member of the court. See LEIBHOLZ, G.: Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, Berlin, 
1927. 
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process of law" and "equal protection of laws")69 but its goes well beyond it: 
it demands content based constitutional justification of the norm. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I tried to demonstrate that there are two essentially different 
though interrelated democracy-based justifications of constitutional review, 
corresponding to the two types of concepts of "democracy" and the two types 
of constitutions. The weak democratic justification of constitutional review is 
based on the procedural concept of democracy in conjunction with the pro-
cedural idea of constitution; its main argument is, to recapitulate, that procedural 
democracy is based on constitutional rules and their observance is conceptually 
necessary for any procedural democracy. Further, still based on the concept of 
democratic procedure, it could be pointed out that the deficiencies inherent and 
in eliminable in democratic procedures require content based constraints on the 
outcome of the democratic procedure. The imperfections of the democratic 
procedure is basic to any content-based (strong) justification of the constitu-
tional review, for, obviously, if democratic procedures were perfect an would 
guarantee in each case the best possible result, there were no room for any 
other kind of constitutional review, except the procedure-based one. But, since 
political democracies are inevitably imperfect on various counts, a combination 
of democratic procedures with content-based constitutional review will guarantee 
a more "democratic" result of the constitutional decision-making as a whole. 
It should be pointed out, however, that any strong justification of consti-
tutional review would be acceptable even in cases of a "perfect" democratic 
procedure, since it is based on an alternative (and not less acceptable) 
conception of democracy as a equality: on the conception of equal respect to 
each member of the community. This kind of equality could not be guaranteed 
by the best possible empirical democratic procedure; indeed it may be inter-
preted as a projection (or an approximate substitute) for an ideally democratic 
procedure which never obtains, where the participants are perfectly reasonable 
and neutral and the decisions are taken by unanimity (like in Rawls' original 
position or Habermas' ideal discourse situation). I do not argue that a consti-
69 It is worth to recall how different the interpretation of these clause has been in US 
constitutional history oscillating between the two conceptions of equality outlined above. 
See generally Pennock, J. R.—Chapman, J. (eds.): Due Process: Nomos 18, New York, 
1977. 
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tutional review is an ideal discourse situation, but simply that it is closer to it 
than any democratic procedure even can be. 
My final conclusion may well be trivial, but for this reason alone not 
necessarily unimportant. A constitutional democracy adopting constitutional 
review is, other conditions being equal, more democratic than a constitutional 
democracy without constitutional review. This proposition seems to be admitted 
rather widely (if not in the terms exposed above) but, the arguments from 
democracy remains the strongest possible argument against constitutional 
review, either in the form of pleading for its abolition or arguing in favour of 
a restrictive approach to it. In this essay I tried to undermine the theoretical 
foundations of those views. 
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This paper has been written in honour of Zoltán Péteri on the occasion of 
the celebration of his seventieth birthday. One of the main fields of his 
activity has been comparative law. Generations of students of the Faculty of 
Law of Eötvös University, Budapest, and since some years also of the 
Pázmány Catholic University, have listened to his lectures on legal theory 
and comparative law. Since the beginning of the post-graduate theoretical 
training at the Faculty of Law of Eötvös University he has given the 
foundation course on comparative law serving as a basis for all research 
work. Since many years he has been lecturing at the Faculté Internationale 
pour l'Enseignement de Droit Comparé, Strasbourg. Starting from the 1960s, 
when it became possible, for Hungarian lawyers to participate in inter-
national scientific cooperation mainly through channels of comparative law, 
Zoltán Péteri has been careful organiser and active, researcher presenting 
Hungarian contributions to international conferences and played an impor-
tant role in organising the. Xth International Congress of the. International 
Academy of Comparative Law held in Budapest in 1978. It has been natural 
that he has been present among the Hungarian participants at all major 
international multilateral and bilateral conferences and his words have-
always been grounded on serious work and, consequently, listened to with 
interest. He is well known in the. international scientific community on basis 
of his lectures, his papers and the books edited by him in foreign languages. 
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It is understandable, on basis of the above said, that the paper written 
on Professor Péteri's honour concerns comparative law. Taking into 
consideration the abundant literature on comparative law it is also 
understandable that the paper deals with only one of the numerous questions 
connected with comparative law. It is the role of comparative law in 
attempts to understand changes in law which have taken place during the 
last century. 
1. One of tlie basic problems that everyone faces when dealing with comparative 
is law the understanding of the rationale of comparative law. I find Koschaker's 
statement particularly well formulated when he stressed that comparison must 
not be self-centred: "Droit comparer ne signifie pas cataloguer les droits 
étranger et les aligner comme les produits de civilisations étrangères et 
primitives dans les vitrines d 'une musée éthnographique. Comparer c'est 
mettre en rapport, ce qui présume quelques points de vue dirigeants."1 
The main idea and the objectives of the comparison are dependent on the 
interest of the scholar doing the work. In a general description of comparative 
law Max Rheinstein has pointed to the fact that interest in comparative law was 
first exhibited among philosophers and jurists, and later it was growing among 
sociologists and anthropologist. In the sphere of law the role of comparative law 
has been growing in jurisprudence.2 Zoltán Péteri's works have been 
strengthening this line of development as his approach to comparative law has 
always been characterised by Iiis interest in jurisprudence. 
Different tendencies of comparative research have been developed. As it has 
been put by Kahn-Freund comparative law is the common name for a variety 
of methods of looking at law, and especially of looking at one 's own law.3 
From the point of view of the present paper a useful categorisation of different 
tendencies has been made by Gutteridge according to whom there are works of 
descriptive comparative law, those of applied comparative law, and those of 
abstract or speculative comparative law.4 There might be different opinions of 
1 KOSCHAKER, P.: L'histoire du droit et le droit comparé surtout en Allemagne, in: 
Introduction à l'étude du droit comparé, Recueil d'études en l 'honneur d'Édouard 
Lambert, Paris, 1938. vol. I. 276. 
2 RHEINSTEIN, M.: Gesammelte Schriften, hrg. H. Ci. Leser, Tübingen, 1979. 241. 
3 KAHN-FREUND, О.: Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, The IMW Quarterly 
Review, 1966. 41. 
4 GUTTERIDGE, H. C : Comparative Law, Cambridge 2nd ed. 1949. (reprinted in 1971) 
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the role and value of the work done according to these categories. It cannot be 
doubted, however, that comparative legal studies have performed valuable 
services in checking the results of legal theory.5 Comparative studies are thus 
connected with theory of law and at the same time, by their nature, focus on 
changes. Comparative law and history of law are also close to each other in 
many respects.6 
At a time when the lapse of time is present in such a spectacular way that 
the date changes from the years of 1900s to those of 2000s there is a special 
interest in trying to give an account what has happened during a given period 
of time and the evaluation needs some kind of comparison. In countries of 
Central and East Europe there are additional reasons for studying history as well 
experiences of the development of law in other countries. The transformation 
of the political, economic and legal systems require analyses of historical and 
comparative character for understanding better the present situation and for 
deciding what steps should be taken in the short and the long run, what way 
should be chosen. 
The need for comparative analyses is even more evident if the complex 
nature of comparison is taken into consideration. Kahn-Freund has put it in a 
convincing way that when doing comparative research work it is evident that 
questions should be answered like what the reason of differences in methods, 
structures, traditions in the countries compared is, what social factors decisive 
in changes are, what kind of legal and non-legal control mechanisms in the 
given countries important role have, what the function of different legal 
instruments is, where the frontiers between law and non-law are.7 
Several of the questions mentioned above can be found with several other 
authors in a different context as the topic discussed is not the comparative 
analysis but something else. The aim of the present paper is not to give an 
account of the opinions on comparative law but to hint at the relationship 
between the studies on legal changes and comparative law. Nevertheless, it 
seems necessary to refer to the fact that the above comprehensive and ambitious 
concept of comparative analysis is not an exception. Zweigert and Kötz in the 
basic book on comparative law have considered similar legal history, way of 
thinking, institutions, legal sources ideology as factors of decisive importance 
5 LAWSON, F. IF: The Comparison, Selected Essays, Amsterdam—New York—Oxford, 
1977. Vol. II. 59. 
6 SACCO, R.: Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 1991. 24-25, 389. 
7 KAHN-FREUND: (supra note 3) 45, 47, 51, 55-56. 
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from the point of view of forming categories of legal systems.8 Merryman has 
underlined, also in connection with creating a category of the laws of different 
countries, the importance of historically conditioned common attitudes about the 
nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the 
proper organisation and operation of a legal system, about the way law is made, 
applied, taught. He summarised his ideas saying that these factors under the 
name of legal tradition relate the legal system to the culture of which it is a 
partial expression.9 The aim of comparing not only legal rules but factors, too, 
belonging to the general culture has increased in recent publications.10 
In Hungary there is a tradition of applying the method of comparison, of 
doing comparative analysis but, under the special historical circumstances, the 
importance of comparative law has increased recently considerably. The danger 
is, however, that conditions for complex comparative research work as outlined 
above are not favourable. 
2. In the second part of the twentieth century the trend of the development of 
the legal system has been discussed in most countries. The topics of discussion 
included problems having a more technical legal nature as well as policy issues 
and those which concern the legal system as a whole. 
One of the problems coming to the forefront of the interest at national and 
at international level was the role of codification. Taking into consideration the 
differences existing between countries having codified legal system and 
countries without codes the problems was interesting from the point of view of 
comparative law, too. (In modern legislative work in general, and in codification 
particular the comparative work, of applied and basic character alike, has played 
considerable role since some time but it has been growing11.) In some of the 
countries the question of codification was complicated by the fact that there 
were codes in force which were of high quality and influenced the law of 
8 ZWEIGERT, К.—KÖTZ, H.: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, Tübingen 3. Aufl. 
1996. 67-71. 
9 MERRYMAN, J. It.: The Civil Law Tradition, Stanford 2nd cd. 1983. 2. 
10 BLANKENBURG, E.: Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to 
Neighboring Germany, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1998. 4, 39-40, M. Van 
HOECKE, M. van and WARRINGTON, M.: Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, International and Comparative IMW 
Quarterly, 1998. 498. 
11 See an overview IIAMZA, G.: Az összehasonlító jogtudomány kibontakozásának útjai 
Európában (The Ways of Development of the Comparative Legal Studies in Europe), Allâm-
es Jogtudomány, 1996-1997, 275-295. 
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several other countries but they had been worked out long time ago and since 
that time there have been fundamental changes. 
In France the work on the reform of the Code civil started in 1945 and at the 
first session of the Codification Committee the Minister of Justice has outlined 
tliree groups of questions where new rules were needed. There were solutions 
worked out by the courts and legal theory after the enactment of the Code civil, 
problems requiring new regulation irrespective of the social and economic 
development and problems of property law and the law of obligations which can 
be solved taking into consideration the social and economic conditions. From 
the very beginning the President of the Commission, Professor Julliot de la 
Morandière was of the opinion that the reform cannot be worked out without 
knowing the trend of the political and social development.12 The work of the 
Commission ended without result because of the lack of the political will 
necessary for codification.13 The German attempt to amend the Civil Code has 
ended witli result either: in 1978 the Minister of Justice announced that the 
Ministry planned a refom, the work limited to amending the part on the Law of 
Obligations started in 1984 and its aim was to find solutions to problems 
observed in the practice, the draft was published in 1992.14 According to 
available information it has not been discussed by the Parliament up to now. 
The role of codification was questioned. Doubts were expressed by the topic 
of aging codification discussed at the conference of ministers of justice of 
European countries in 1980. The problems were formulated even in a more 
direct way at the eleventh Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law held in 1982 where the question was whether codification was 
an outmoded form of legislation. Doubts seem not to have increased since that 
time, on the contrary, a new enthusiasm for codification can be observed. It is 
due to a great extent to the success of the Dutch Civil Code. Recently, the idea 
of a European Civil Code (unifying civil law rules of the member-states of the 
European Union) seems, however, to have a greater role.15 
12 Travaux de la Commission de Réforme du Code civil, Année 1945-1946, Paris 1947. 
21 -22 . 
13 D E LA MORANDIÈRE, J.: La réforme du Code civil. Recueil Dalloz 1948. Chr. 
120-121. 
14 Abschlußbericht der Kommission zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, hrg. Bundesminister 
der Justiz, Köln, 1992. 14-15. 
15 See on overview IlONDIUS, E.: Towards a European Civil Code, in: Towards a 
European Civil Code, ed. Hartkamp, Л,—Hesselink, M.—Hondius, E.—Joustra, C.—du Perron, 
E. T h e Hague—London—Boston 2nd ed. 1998. 3-19. 
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3. Although the idea of codification has not been denied and a new belief in the 
comprehensive, systematic legislation has grown there are some other signs 
which can observed at the same time and which warn us to be cautious about 
forming an opinion. 
Very probably the Dutch Civil Code (put into force in 1992 resp. 1993) is 
considered to be the greatest result of the codification movement in Europe. 
There are several interesting new solutions in the Code which are to be studied 
when drafting a new Code or a part of it in any European country. 
As to the general character of the codification two remarks are made. The 
first one concerns the main aim of codification. It has been stressed that the 
main aim was the inclusion of the solutions of the court practice into the Code, 
while the special statutes which had not been incorporated into the old code 
remained outside the new Code, too.16 The German history of codification is 
very different from the Dutch one. Nevertheless, the neglect of special statutes 
may remind us to the German situation where the economic policy issues having 
a great importance were regulated outside the German Civil Code,17 and the 
majority of the rules in the German Civil Code are purely technical.18 On this 
background it is interesting to observe that one can hardly find detailed 
explanation of policy issues of the new Dutch Civil Code in the foreign 
language literature informing of important features of the Code. The second 
remark concerns the role of court practice. Hartkamp has clearly formulated the 
idea of the codification: a large amount of discretion has been granted to the 
courts to the develop the law where its provisions are silent and to derogate 
from specific provisions on contracts to avoid an unjust result. The Code has 
refrained from laying down a specific hierarchy among the various sources of 
law (statute, custom, equity), and thus, a statutory provision of mandatory 
character can fall into disuse and be neglected.19 On this basis it can be said 
16 IIONDIUS, E.: Das Neue Niederländische Zivilgesetzbuch. Allgemeiner Teil, In: 
Renaissance der Idee der Kodifikation, hrg. E. Bydlinski—T. Mayer-Maly—.1. W. Pichler, 
Wien-Köln-Weimar, 1991. 40^14,; WESSELS, В.: Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: 
System, Contents and Future, Netherlands International IMW Review, 1994. 174—175. 
17 SCHUBERT, W.: Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch von 1896, in: Kodifikation als Mittel der 
Politik, hrg. II. Hofmeister, Wien-Graz-Köln, 1986. 17. 
18 NÖRR, K. W.: A Symbiosis with Reserve: Social Market Economy and Legal Order in 
Germany 1948-1989, in: Toward Comparative Law in the 21st Century, Tokyo, 1998. 247. 
19 HARTKAMP, A.: Judicial Discretion Under the New Civil Code of the Netherlands, The 
American Journal of Comparative IMW, 1992. 568-569. 
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that the Dutch Code is somewhere midway between Continental laws and the 
Common Law.20 
4. The debate on decodilication and decreasing importance of codes is no more 
on the agenda. The victory of codification movement is, however, not linal. The 
whole situation is far more complicated than it may seem at first sight. In 
Germany Zweigert and Puttfarken pointed to the fact that important political 
aims cannot be achieved by means of civil law codification, therefore, special 
statutes are worked out and they become more and more important.21 
Although some years later Kötz could state that the opinions which were far 
more critical of the role of codification had not won the battle and in the 
practice of legislation a turn of the tide could be observed.22 A foreign lawyer 
can hardly see hidden main tendencies in changes of the law of other countries. 
It is a fact, however, that the activity of legislation has not stopped. On the 
contrary, according to some recent indications it is increasing (according to the 
data published in 1996, the number of legislative projects brought into the 
German Federal Parliament during its tenth session was 612, and during the 
twelfth session it was 895).23 The growing number of special statutes cannot 
create favourable conditions for maintaining the importance of the existing 
codes or for new codification. 
In France the situation is similar. A so-called codification was going on 
since many years for consolidating legal rules of administrative law. In 1989 a 
new codification committee was organised and it has been working on 
systématisation and clarification of legal rules without changing its content.24 
The all the time increasing numbers of legal rules are frightening (the task of 
codification included about 8.000 statutes, 80.000 decrees and several hundred 
thousand circulars25). Guy Braibant, vice-president of the codification committee 
20 IIARTKAMP, A.: Das neue niederländische Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch aus europäischer 
Sicht, Rubels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 1993. 682. 
21 ZWEIGERT, K.—PUTTFARKEN, H.-J.: Allgemeines und Besonderes zur Kodifikation, 
in: Festschrift für Imre Zajtay, hrg. R. H. Graveson—K. Kreuzer—A. Tunc, Tübingen, 1982. 
578-579. 
22 KÖTZ, IT: Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, The Modern Law Review, 1987. 13. 
23 MÜLLER-C.RAFF, P-Ch.: The Quality of European and National Legislation, 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 1998. 328. 
24 BRAIBANT, G.: Codifier: pourquoi? comment? Revue française d'administration 
publique, 1995. 128-131. 
25 DRAGO, R.: La codification en droit administratif français et comparé, Droits, 1996. 99. 
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has recently suggested a fundamental change in the production of law.26 Jean 
Carbonnier devoted a book to the topic of the inflationary production of law and 
in Iiis opinion the phenomenon is the result of a system. The increasing number 
of legal rules can be understood taking into consideration the growing importance 
of public law and the voluntarist use of legal rules serving political aims.27 
It has no reason to go on with the data of other countries as the phenomenon 
is similar. As a result of the changes which took place since the XIX. century, 
the number of legal rules have increased in an unprecedented way and 
consequently the structure of the legal system has changed influencing the 
position of the codes, too. 
An additional remark to this topic is made only because of its Hungarian 
connection. The changes mentioned above had an effect on England, too and it 
was a lawyer of Hungarian origin, Dr. Andrew Martin who worked out a draft 
of a Law Reform Bill and the Law Commission Act of 1965 was based on this 
draft.28 The Law Commission could not bring about a new situation either. 
5. The changes in the legal system had important consequences in the 
relationship of the statutes and court practice, too. The different legal systems 
have their own concept of the role of courts. It is usual two speak of two main 
types of codification and legislation in general. In the so-called open system the 
legislator does not try to work out complete regulation and leaves free way to 
the judge for interpreting and adjusting, developing the rules. On the contrary, 
in the closed system the legislator aims at a complete regulation without leaving 
place to the judge for free interpretation. Political history had an important role 
in the decision which system was chosen. The Swiss solution was explained for 
example by the Swiss history.29 The German system belonged to the second 
type of legislation. Under the changed conditions the court practice of the XX. 
century has slowly transformed the character of several civil law institutions30 
26 BRAIBANT, G.: Penser le droit sous la Ve République: cohérence et codification, Revue 
du Droit Publique, 1998. 1777. 
27 CARBONNIER, J.: Droit et passion du droit sous la Ve République, Paris 1996. 19. 
28 CRETNEY, S. M.: The Law Commission: True Dawns and False Dawns, The Modem 
Law Review, 1996. 635. 
29 MERZ, П.: Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht von 1881, in: Hundert Jahre 
Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, hrg. Ii. Peter-E. W. Stark—P. Tercier, Freiburg, 1982. 
16-20. 
30 WIEACKER, F.: Das Sozialniodell der klassischen Privatrechtsgesetzbücher und die 
Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft, Karlsruhe, 1952. 18-20. 
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and the position of the court practice has changed, too.31 In other countries the 
change has not been so important as the concept had been different. 
The increased role of public law has been mentioned already. It is to be 
referred to at this point, too. Lawson has emphasized the change in the frontiers 
between public law and private law saying that earlier courts played a 
predominant role in developing private law and legislative bodies in developing 
public law, but now it is not easy to draw the line between public and private 
law.32 It can be added that legislation is developing civil law, too and another 
important change is that public law is also developed by the courts. 
6. The above short remarks on some elements of the changes reflect the 
transformation of the law of different countries in the twentieth century and 
reflect at the same time bow important the comparative law is for understanding 
the transformation. 
31 WIETHÖLTER, R.: Privatrecht als Gesellschaftstheorie? in: Funktionswandel der 
Privatrechtsinstitutionen, hrg. Baur, F.—Esser, J—Kühler, F.—Steindorff, E. Mohr, Tübingen, 
1974. 649. 
32 LAWSON: Comparison {supra note 5), Vol. II. 161-162. 
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Vanda LAMM The Reform of the Nuclear Liability 
Regime 
/ started my career as a legal scholar in the Comparative Law Department 
of the Institute for Legal Studies headed by Professor Zoltán Péteri. Since 
that time I have worked closely together with Professor Péteri. Although my 
research interest has been quite different than his, I have always benefited 
from his advise and relied upon his judgement in many different questions. 
I also never ceased to admire his astute intellect as well his tact and 
diplomacy. The latter was in particular, often needed in our long collabo-
ration in organizing scholarly conferences and cooperation with scholars of 
the most different countries, convictions, interests, habits, cultures and 
languages. I am pleased to pay tribute with this paper to Professor Péteri's 
seventhieth birthday. 
The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 caused the Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage (hereafter: Vienna Convention), adopted in 1963 
under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to awaken from 
its sleep of Briar Rose. For over two decades there was little, if any, public 
concern, apart from that shown a segment of the professional world, with this 
instrument.1 The reasons were several. 
1 The revision of international nuclear liability conventions was on the agenda of the 1984 
Symposium of Munich and the Nuclear InterJura'85. Cf. Nuclear Third Party Liability and 
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The 1963 Vienna Convention was adopted in 1963, three years after the 
1960 Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 
known as the Paris Convention, and that it governs issues of civil liability for 
nuclear damage on the same conceptual basis as does the Paris Convention.2 
The main difference between the two Conventions, other than those existing in 
their provisions, consists in that the Paris Convention had been signed by a 
group of States of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and 
Development, whereas the Vienna Convention was intended to regulate the 
related issues on a world-wide scale. In this connection, however, the greatest 
problem was no doubt presented by the fact that by the time the Vienna 
Convention was concluded the said Paris Convention had existed between the 
States most affected by this complex of issues, notably between the highly 
industrialized Western European States.3 
From the mind 1960s onwards, the two Conventions have followed rather 
different paths. During the 1960s and the 1970s the Paris Convention kept 
"developing", grew into a living system, with more and more States acceding 
and with the limit of liability raised on several occasions, and in 1963 the 
Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention was adopted to 
provide additional compensation from public funds to supplement the 
compensation payable under the Paris Convention.4 By contrast, the Vienna 
Convention did not even come into force for nearly 15 years, although it 
required ratification by as little as 5 States.5 When after so many years the 
Vienna Convention finally came into force, certain of its provisions called for 
revision. Its dormancy is amply evidenced by the fact that only 11 States were 
parties to the Convention at the end of the 1980s.6 
Insurance—Status and Prospects, Proceedings of the .Symposium of Munich, 1984. (N. Pelzer 
ed.) Baden-Baden, 1986. 
2 On the basic principles of nuclear civil liability conventions see TREVOR, J. P. H.: 
"Principles of civil liability for nuclear damage." In: Nuclear Law for a Developing World. 
IAEA, Vienna, 1968. 109-115. and STROHL, P.: "La Convention de 1971 relative a la 
responsabilité civile dans le domaine du transport maritime de matières nucléaires", Annuaire 
Francais de Droit International, 1972. 755-760. 
3 Both the Paris Convention and its Additional Protocol signed in Paris on 28 January 1964 
entered into force on 1 April 1968. 
4 On the Brussels Supplementary Convention see, LAGORGE, M.: "The Brussels Supple-
mentary Convention and its Joint Intergovernmental Security Fund." In: Nuclear Law for a 
Developing World, op. cit. 143-148. 
5 The Vienna Convention entered into force on 12 November 1977. 
6 On the signatures, ratifications, etc. of the Vienna Convention see Document 
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However, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 had shown that a nuclear accident 
was likely to cause enormous damage not only in the Installation State, but also 
thousands of kilometres away. After the Chernobyl disaster it appeared obvious 
that the dormant Vienna Convention might be an appropriate tool for settling 
claims of foreign victims in similar cases, and everyone came to realized the 
absolute necessity of adjusting the provisions of the Vienna Convention to the 
requirements raised by technological development over the past 25 years. It is 
know that after the Chernobyl accident the one-time Soviet Union refused to 
pay compensation to any foreign victim, and some people believed that if the 
Soviet Union had been a party to the Vienna Convention, the foreign victims 
would still have had a chance to receive some compensation. It is a separate 
matter, of course, that any amount of compensation eventually payable under 
the Vienna Convention would have been enough to satisfy but a minor, an 
almost ridiculous fraction of the claims in comparison with the extent of the 
accident. 
Following the signature in 1988 of the Joint Protocol establishing a bridge 
between the Vienna and the Paris Conventions,7 several fora of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency addressed the question of revising the Vienna 
Convention, and the necessity of doing so was stated in resolution GC 
(XXXII)/RES/491 of the Agency's General Conference on 23 September 1988, 
which emphasized that the existing civil liability regime "does not cover all 
liability issues that might arise in the event of a nuclear accident." Next year the 
Board of Governors by its decision adopted of 23 February 1989 established an 
open-ended Working Group "to study all aspects of liability for nuclear 
damage" and to "consider ways and means of complementing and strengthening 
the existing civil liability regime and consider also the question of international 
liability."8 In an other decision of 21 February 1990 the Board of Governors 
dissolved the above mentioned Working Group and at the same time it 
established a new open-ended Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear 
Damage with wide mandate empowering it to "consider international lia-
bility for nuclear damage, including international civil liability, international 
NL/DC/INF.4. prepared by the IAEA to the Diplomatic Conference of 8-12 September 
1997. 
7 On the Joint Protocol see VON BUSEKJST, O.: "A bridge between two conventions on 
civil liability for nuclear damage: The Joint Protocol elating tot he Application of the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention." In: Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 43. June 1989. 
8 IAEA document GOV/OR. 707. 13. 
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State liability, and the relationship between international civil and State 
liability".9 
After more than 8 years of negotiations in the frame of the Standing 
Committee,10 which had 17 sessions and several intersessional working group 
meetings, a Diplomatic Conference to revise the 1963 Vienna Convention took 
place at Vienna in 8-12 September 1997 and the delegates adopted two treaties, 
the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage (hereafter: Protocol)11 and the Convention on Supplementary Compen-
sation for Nuclear Damage. 
In the first stage of the revision process the only goal was to amend certain 
provisions of the Vienna Convention. Later, in what might be called the second 
stage, the question was seriously raised of establishing a supplementary 
convention on additional funds to be provided by the international community 
of States. Most experts felt that the nuclear liability regime of the Vienna 
Convention as amended would really serve the interests of potential victims of 
nuclear incidents only if supported by an international supplementary fund 
which provides additional payment for compensation of nuclear damage supple-
mentary to those provided by the operator. Titus the Standing Committee started 
to consider the establishment under the Vienna Convention of a mechanism for 
mobilizing additional funds for compensation of nuclear damage. During the 
negotiations it was held necessary to elaborate a separate treaty on such a 
supplementary fund, and, indeed, efforts were undertaken to draw up a relevant 
instrument concurrently with the revision of the Vienna Convention. 
The outcome of the revision process of the Vienna Convention is a Protocol 
containing 24 articles, some of them being completely new provisions, others 
only revised the existing articles. Before describing and analysing the outcome 
of the revision of the Vienna Convention the following preliminary remarks 
should be made: 
9 This decision of the Board was based on the second report of the Working Group which 
recommended that the Board revise the mandate of the Standing Committee and include the 
questions of international liability and the relationship between international and State liability. 
See IAEA NL/2/3. 
10 In the work of the Standing Committee experts from more than 55 States took part, and 
the representatives of several international organizations were present as observers. The high 
quality of work of the IAEA Secretariat and the NEA expertise on liability issues largely 
contributed to the success of the negotiations. 
11 See Consolidated Text of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
of 21 May 1968 as Amended by the Protocol of 12 September 1997 established by the IAEA 
Secretariat. GC(41)INF/13/Add.l. 
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a) The provisions of the Protocol can be divided into three main groups. 
Some of the new and revised articles deal with matters of substance, and, we 
may add, with matters of great importance indeed. Other amendments contain 
rules of a basically procedural nature, which afford facilities to victims in 
enforcing their claims for compensation. The third category of amendments in 
fact affect no new issues, either substantive or procedural, and essentially serve 
to refine existing provisions of the Convention or to bring other provisions of 
the Convention into line with the newly incorporated rules. 
b) As regards the articles dealing with matters of substance, it should be 
stressed that the revision did not affect the basic concept of the Vienna 
Convention, although attempts in that direction were also made during the 
negotiations in the Standing Committee, particularly in the early stage. I refer 
to efforts to have the basically civil liability regime of the Vienna Convention 
replaced by State liability. 
c) There is no doubt that the revision clarified numerous provision of the 
Vienna Convention, for an effective liability regime can only work if a 
considerable part of nuclear liability issues are uniformly regulated by the 
national legislation of Contracting Parties. Nevertheless, the revised Vienna 
Convention continues to leave certain matters to the national laws, and, despite 
significant efforts at unification of laws as reflected in the Convention, a large 
part of questions relating to compensation for damage remains controlled by 
the domestic law of the Installation State or of the law of the competent court. 
I. Civil liability, or State liability? 
The nuclear liability conventions currently in force govern liability in respect 
of third parties on the basis of civil law, with the regulation conceptually based 
on the analogy of liability for activities involving increased12 danger under the 
national laws of States. 
In the first stage of the negotiation in the Standing Committee crucial to 
further advance was the debate about the need to devise a regime of State 
liability that was to replace the civil liability regime of the Convention. 
The experts raised a number of theoretical and practical arguments for and 
against introduction of a State liability regime. An in-depth analysis of these 
12 Cf. DE LA FAYETTE, L.: 'Toward a New Regime of State Responsibility for Nuclear 
Activities." In: Nuclear IMW Bulletin, No. 50. And LOPUSKI, J.: Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, National Atomic Energy Agency, Warsaw, 1993. 
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arguments would go far beyond the scope of this paper. Those arguing in 
favour of State liability referred to the Chernobyl disaster, claiming that only 
the financial resources available to the State could be sufficient to compensate 
victims of an accident of such a scale. Some authors in the pertinent literature 
and several experts to the Vienna negotiations referred to State liability in 
respect of space activities as providing an example very similar to matters of 
liability for nuclear damage and stated that the related international treaties 
provide for State liability. The final outcome of the discussions was a decision 
to retain the conceptual basis of the Vienna Convention and to uphold its civil 
liability regime. However, and that is a great improvement of the Vienna 
Convention, the Protocol expressly provides on compensation from public 
funds (see section VI. below). 
II. Geographical scope of the Vienna Convention 
The 1963 Vienna Convention is silent on its geographical scope, and pursuant 
to the general rules of international law, which are clearly laid down in Article 
29. of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,13 the Convention 
applies to damage occurring in the territory of a State party to the instrument 
and on board of aircraft registered in that State and on the ships flying its flag. 
The Protocol adds a new article on the Convention's geographical scope 
(Article I.A, of the revised Vienna Convention), which, on the one hand, 
determines the rules relative to the Convention's geographical scope and, on 
the other extends its geographical application. Article 3. of the Protocol states 
as a general rule that "this Convention shall apply to nuclear damage wherever 
suffered" (para. 1.). This essentially means that the Convention may, at least 
in principle, be applied to nuclear damage suffered anywhere in the world, even 
to damages occurring in the territory or territorial waters (internal waters, 
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf) of a non-Contracting 
State. Nevertheless, the Protocol allows certain exceptions from the said general 
rule, permitting the Installation State to exclude, by legislation and under 
specific circumstances, the application of the Convention in the territory of a 
non-Contracting State or in respect to damage occurring in a maritime zone 
established by such State in accordance with the international law of the sea 
13 Article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says that "Unless a 
different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon 
each party in respect of its entire territory." 
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(para. 2.). Any exclusion may apply only in respect to a non-Contracting State 
which has a nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone on the 
one hand and does afford equivalent reciprocal benefits on the other (para. 3.). 
The Protocol here refers to the principle of reciprocity,14 and as a consequence, 
the application of the Vienna Convention may in no way be excluded in respect 
of non-nuclear States, and in case of a nuclear incident a non-Contracting non-
nuclear State or its nationals or legal persons under its jurisdiction are entitled 
to compensation on an equal footing with nationals of Contracting States. 
It should be noted that application of the aforesaid provision on exclusion 
in respect of a nuclear State on the basis of lack of reciprocity may in practice 
give rise to problems, since the existence of reciprocity can always be estab-
lished on the basis of some practice between States, and, given the fortunately 
rather rare occurrence of nuclear incidents, cases are in fact infrequent in which 
a nuclear State is likely to apply this provision in respect of another nuclear 
State. In theory, such a case may occur when damage is suffered in a successor 
State of the one-time Soviet Union, and a State party to the revised Vienna 
Convention tries to evade compensating damages suffered in the territory of the 
former Soviet Union by invoking the Soviet refusal to pay compensation to 
foreign victims after the Chernobyl disaster. 
III. Concept of nuclear damage 
The greatest change effected by the Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention 
is perhaps in the concept of nuclear damage. 
Well before the Chernobyl disaster, professional circles had been fully aware 
that the définition of nuclear damage given by the 1963 Vienna Convention was 
too narrow or incomplete, because the Convention did not even refer to certain 
forms of damage (e.g. environmental damage or costs of preventive measures). 
The 1963 Vienna Convention made compensation for any nuclear damage other 
than loss of life, personal injury, and loss of or damage to property subject 
exclusively to the law of the court having jurisdiction. In other words, victims 
could not expect compensation for any other damage except when compensation 
was allowed by the law of the State of the competent court. 
During the revision of the Vienna Convention it became completely clear 
that the definition of nuclear damage could not be treated with such a 
14 On the principle of reciprocity see, DECAIIX, E.: La réciprocité en droit international. 
Paris, 1980. 129-159. 
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highprofile touch, because domestic laws show rather great differences in the 
interpretation of, e.g., loss of profit or economic loss. If, on the other hand, 
there can be so significant differences between the domestic laws of States in 
the definition of nuclear damage, such differences may in practice operate to 
produce situations in which compensation to victims of nuclear damage tends 
to depend in no small measure on the location of the occurrence of damage or 
on the interpretation of nuclear damage by the law of the competent court. This 
in turn will but ultimately increase the no insignificant differences already 
existing between victims of different nuclear incidents. 
The definition of nuclear damage is, from a certain aspect, a key provision 
of the Vienna Convention. The point here is that the entire nuclear liability 
regime rests on limited liability amounts, namely on the principle that, 
regardless of the number of victims and the size of damage, the amount of 
compensation, however great, payable by the operator or from public funds is 
a specified sum after all. (Indeed, such is the case even in States under the 
national law of which the operator's liability is unlimited, as is otherwise 
suggested by Article 9.2 of the Protocol to be discussed at a later stage.) 
Therefore, the inclusion of certain forms of environmental damage or indirect 
damage in the concept of nuclear damage is bound to enlarge the number of 
victims, direct or indirect, of a given nuclear incident. In the event of a large 
nuclear incident causing enormous damage, this in turn necessarily puts 
individual victims in a more unfavourable positions, since the more the victims 
the smaller their chance of receiving full compensation. 
Almost from the beginning of the discussions to revise the Vienna Con-
vention, the Standing Committee agreed on the need to broaden the concept of 
nuclear damage and, to include certain forms of environmental damage, costs 
of preventive measures and consequential losses in the definition of that term.15 
The revision produced a rather detailed definition of nuclear damage in 
Article 2.2. of the Protocol16 which really gives an almost exhaustive listing 
of the possible types of damage17 and, what is particularly important, it is 
15 Cf. RUSTAND, H.: "Updating the concept of damage, particularly as regards 
environmental damage and preventive measures, in the context of the ongoing negotiations 
on the revision of the Vienna Convention." In: Nuclear Accidents, Liabilities and Guaranties, 
op. cit. 218-238. 
16 Article I.(k) of the revised Vienna Convention. 
17 This notion of "damage" is much more detailed than the notions of damage included in 
recent treaties on on liability for environmental damage. Cf. Article 1.(6), (7) of the 1992 
London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, and Article 2(7), (8), (9) of 
the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Laibility for Damage Resulting from Activities 
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only the extent of damage, in respect of damages, other than loss of life, 
personal injury, and loss of or damage to property, that it renders subject to the 
law of the competent court. By so doing the Protocol has considerably 
restricted, but not fully eliminated, the significance of the law of the competent 
court, for, if the legislation of the competent court fails to recognize certain 
economic loss, victims of a nuclear incident can hardly expect compensation 
for such damage in a given case. 
In addition to loss of life, personal injury, and loss of life or damage to 
property, which are already covered by the 1963 Vienna Convention, the 
Protocol clearly includes in the definition of nuclear damage such other loss as 
is incurred as a result of a significant impairment of the environment and the 
costs of certain preventive measures or measures to minimize damage taken 
under specific circumstances. Accordingly, "nuclear damage" also means: 
a) further "economic loss" incurred above loss of life, personal injury, loss 
of or damage to property, provided that the loss is incurred by a victim who 
can claim in respect of such loss or damage; 
b) the costs of measures of reinstatement of significantly impaired 
environment, if such measures are actually taken or to be taken, and insofar as 
not included in the category of 'economic loss'; 
c) loss of income, also related to the environment, deriving from an economic 
interest in any use or enjoyment of the significantly impaired environment, 
insofar as not covered by the preceding paragraph (such use of the environment 
should be taken to mean use for business purposes in the first place); 
d) costs of preventive measures and consequential losses caused by such 
measures. It should be noted on this point that, owing to the widened scope of 
the definition of 'nuclear incident' introduced in Article 1.1.(1.) of the Vienna 
Convention,18 nuclear damage may also be deemed to be caused by the costs 
of preventive measures taken before the occurrence of the incident if there is 
to remove a grave and imminent threat of causing damage, and according to 
an additional sentence added at the Diplomatic Conference, provided they were 
fund under the law of the competent court to be appropriate and proportionate 
having regard to all the circumstances. 
e) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the 
environment, if permitted by the general civil liability law of the competent 
Dangerous to the Environment. 
18 Article 2.3 of the Protocol provides that "Nuclear incident means any occurrence or series 
of occurrences having the same origin which causes nuclear damage or, but only with respect 
to preventive measures, creates a grave and imminent threat of causing such damage." 
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court. Tills element of damage is likewise mentioned by die Protocol in a 
general clause. 
The redefinition by the Protocol of nuclear damage is clearly reflective of an 
intention to ensure as full compensation as possible to victims of nuclear damage. 
As it virtually covers the most different types of damage, the Protocol has 
essentially developed civil liability for nuclear damage in the direction of the 
fullest measure of compensation in an attempt to break with the implied principle 
that victims of a nuclear incident cannot expect to receive full compensation. 
Furthermore, the Protocol in Article 2.4 gives very precise definitions of 
"measures of reinstatement", "preventive measures" and "reasonable measures", 
which must (i) be reasonable; (ii) be approved by the competent authorities of 
the State where the measures were taken (the national law of the State where the 
damage suffered must determine who is entitled to take such measures); and (iii) 
aim to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components of the environment 
or to introduce, where reasonable, the equivalents of these components into the 
environment. "Preventive measures" are likewise subject to previous approval by 
the competent authorities of the State. As for "reasonable measures", a further 
criterion for them to constitute nuclear damage is that they must19 be found 
under the law of the competent court to be appropriate and proportionate having 
regard to all the circumstances. 
19 Article 2.4 of the Protocol adds among others these new paragraphs to Article I of the 
Vienna Convention: 
"(m) 'Measures of reinstatement' means any reasonable measures which have been 
approved by the competent authorities of the State where the measures were taken, and which 
aim to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components of the environment, or to 
introduce, where reasonable, the equivalent of these components into the environment. The 
law of the State where the damage is suffered shall determine who is entitled to take such 
measures. 
(n) 'Preventive measures' means any reasonable measures taken by any person after a 
nuclear incident has occured to prevent or minimize damage referred to in sub-paragraph (k)(i) 
to (v) or (vii), subject to any approval of the competent authorities required by the law of the 
State where measures were taken. 
(0) 'Reasonable measures' means measures which arc found under the law of the 
competent court to be appropriate and proportionate having regard to all the circumstances, 
for example 
(1) the nature and extent of the damage incurred or, in the case of preventive measures, 
the nature and extent of the risk of such damage, 
(ii) the extent to which, at the time they are taken, such measures are likely to be 
effective, and 
(iii) relevant scientific and technical expertise." 
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It can be stated, therefore, that the Protocol has considerably broadened the 
definition of nuclear damage and has taken a definitely important step towards 
unification in this respect of the legislation of States Parties. There is no doubt 
that the Protocol would have created a more clear-cut situation by giving a 
uniform, all-embracing definition of nuclear damage in respect to all States 
Parties to the amended Vienna Convention. However, considering the differences 
existing between the national laws of States in this field, one cannot but 
recognize that the Protocol is in touch with reality when it upholds the principle 
that the extent of damage should ultimately be determined by the law of the 
competent court. At any rate, this rather precise enumeration of the types of 
damage can be seen as a significant improvement of the Vienna Convention, 
since in effect it clearly calls the attention of both legislators and practising 
lawyers to the need for the various types of nuclear damage listed in the Protocol 
to be taken into account when they occur. Essentially, it gives a model or pattern 
to be followed by States not having legislation containing similar provisions. 
IV. Nuclear installations covered by the Convention 
The 1963 Vienna Convention was silent whether it covers all nuclear installa-
tions or only those used for certain peaceful purposes. It was only possible on 
the basis of interpretation a contrario to state that the Convention was not 
applicable to nuclear damages resulting from military installations.20 The 
Standing Committee wanted to create a "clear" situation in this respect as well, 
and, already at its first meeting acting upon proposals by several delegates, it 
tried to amend the Vienna Convention in the sense that it should cover military 
installations as well. This proved to be a rather delicate issue and brought to 
light quite a few political and legal problems concerning the extensions of the 
application of the Convention to nuclear installations used for non-peaceful 
purposes, especially the problem of damage arising in connection with those 
nuclear installations which were not under the control of the territorial State. 
For a while, a compromise solution was sought to bridge over this difficulty 
by allowing individual States to declare that military installations on their 
territory are not covered, under special circumstances present, and till the 16th 
session of the Standing Committee the draft protocol contained a provision 
20 According lo the Preamble of the Vienna Convention "The Contracting Parties, having 
recognized the desirability of establishing some minimum standards to provide financial 
protection against damages resulting from certain peaceful uses of nuclear energy." 
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stating that the "Convention shall apply to all nuclear installations, whether 
used for peaceful purposes or not."21 Later, in the last stage of negotiations, 
the Standing Committee realized the related difficulties of and rejected the 
extension of the application of the Vienna Convention to nuclear installations 
used for non-peaceful purposes. The Protocol finally succeeded in clarifying the 
situation by adding a new Article I.B. clearly stating that "This Convention 
shall not apply to nuclear installations used for non-peaceful purposes." 
V. Exoneration 
Article 6.1 of the Protocol amended the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on exoneration from liability and formulated definitely stricter rules in two 
aspects. On the one hand, the Protocol repealed "a gerave natural disaster of 
an exceptional character" as a ground for exoneration, which, even under 
Article IV.3. of the 1963 Vienna Convention, had operated as such only insofar 
as the law of the Installation State contained no contrary provision in this 
respect. It means that, if a grave natural disaster was no ground for exoneration 
under the domestic law of the Installation State, it could not serve as one under 
the Vienna Conventions either. On the other hand, the regulation became 
stricter also in that the other events (act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war 
or insurrection) do not exonerate the operator from liability except on proving 
that the nuclear damage is directly due to such events. The earlier regulation 
did not require such proof by the operator. 
Other amendments of the same Article IV. increased the liability amount for 
damages to the means of transport upon which the nuclear material involved 
was at the time of the nuclear incident, and made a clear situation by excluding 
damages to other nuclear installations, including those under construction, 
operating on the same site, and also any property on the same site used in 
connection with any such installation.22 
21 Cf. SCNL/16/INF.3. 
22 The revised Article IV. 5 and 6 reads as follow: 
"5. The operator shall not be liable under this Convention for nuclear damage 
a) to the nuclear installation itself and any other nuclear installation, including a nuclear 
installation under construction, on the site where that installation is located, and 
b) to any property on that same site which is used or to be used in connection with any 
such installation. 
6. Compensation for damage caused to the means of transport upon which the nuclear 
material involved was at the time of the nuclear incident shall not have the effect of reducing 
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VI. Liability amount 
Perhaps the most important other amendment of the Vienna Convention by the 
Protocol is the increase in liability amounts, which can be explained by the fact 
that one of the main motives of revising the Vienna Convention was precisely 
the consideration that the 5 million dollar limit as the lowest amount at which 
the liability of the operator may be established become unrealistically low in 
view of the extent of damage that might result an eventual nuclear incident. 
It should be remembered that all the amendments of the Vienna Convention 
mentioned above, in particular the extension of the geographical scope of the 
Convention or of the concept of nuclear damage entails a larger number of 
victims of nuclear incidents, and, as a consequence, there will be more victims 
to share one and the same amount. 
The problem of increasing the amount of liability was lengthy discussed in 
the Standing Committee, and as a result according to the revised Article V. of 
the Vienna Convention23 the legislation of the Installation State may limit the 
operator's liability for any one nuclear incident to not less than 300 million 
SDRs. [This also means that in future the limits of liability amounts for nuclear 
damage will be fixed, not in US dollars, but in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
used as the unit of account defined by the International Monetary Fund].24 
The operator 's liability amount may be lower than this, but may in no case be 
less than 150 million SDRs, which naturally means that the upper limit of the 
operator's liability may be a higher amount. If, under the national law of the 
Installation State, the upper limit of the operator's liability is lower than 300 
million SDRs, the differential between the upper limit and the 300 million 
SDRs must be secured from public funds. 
The provisions for a phasing-in mechanism were included in Article V.l.(c) 
of the Vienna Convention on the motion of some States coping with economic 
difficulties. It allows a transitional period of 15 years from the date of entry 
into force of the Protocol, and during the phasing-in period the minimum limit 
of liability of an operator for nuclear damage occurring during that period may 
be 100 million SDRs. The new provision makes it possible to the Installation 
State to limit the operator's liability to an amount less than 100 million SDRs 
the liability of the operator in respect of other damage to an amount less than either 150 
million SDRs, or any higher amount established by the legislation of a Contracting Party, or 
an amount established pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Article V." 
23 Article 7.2 of the Protocol. 
24 Cf. Article I.l.(p) of the revised Vienna Convention. 
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within the transitional period, provided that the difference between that lesser 
amount and the 100 million SDRs is secured from public funds. 
No doubt that non-inclusion of the provisions on the aforesaid transitional 
period would have been a solution more favorable to victims of an eventual 
nuclear incident. One should not overlook the fact, however, that the 300 
million SDRs liability amount established by the Protocol is to high for some 
States on the one hand, and the amount of liability will be much higher, over 
4 0 times the previous amount, even in this transitional period. Many believe 
that the phasing-in mechanism do a great deal to promote accession by more 
States to the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention. 
VII. Financial Security 
Since at the t ime the Vienna Convention was adopted one hardly anticipated 
that the internal law of any State would provide for the operator 's unlimited 
liability, little attention was paid to the question of reconciling cases of 
unlimited liability with the Convention's provisions fixing the amount of 
financial security. This problem was settled by Article 9.1 of the Protocol, 
which adds to Article VII. of the Vienna Convention a sentence providing that 
where the liability of the operator is unlimited, the Installation State shall ensure 
that the operator's financial security shall not be less than 300 millions SDRs. 
VIII. Amendmen t of liability amount 
The article on the adjustment of liability amounts under a relatively simplified 
procedure in view of inflation and other factors is a new Article V.D of the 
Vienna Convention. This "simplified" procedure is in fact a rather complicated 
multi-tier mechanism. Its main advantage lies in leaving scope for raising the 
liability amount without the need for the traditional time-consuming procedure 
generally followed for amendment of treaties. 
The procedure governed by Article 7.2 of the Protocol is this: a meeting of 
the Contracting Parties shall be convened by the Director-General of IAEA on 
the proposal of one-third of the States party to the revised Vienna Convention 
to amend the limits of liability; amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority, provided that at least one-half of the Contracting Parties are present 
and voting; any amendment adopted shall be notified by the Director-General 
of IAEA to all Contracting Parties and shall be considered accepted at the end 
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of a period of 18 months after it has been notified, provided that at least one-
third of the Contracting Parties have communicated to the Director-General that 
they accept the amendment; an amendment accepted under this procedure shall 
enter into force 12 months after its acceptance for those Contracting Parties 
which have accepted it. 
This simplified procedure undoubtedly makes it possible for the amounts of 
liability to be amended by a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Parties 
present and voting, provided that one-half of the Parties are present. In point of 
fact, however, this can only be regarded as a concrete proposal for amendment 
and in no way impinges on the interests of the other States party to the Conven-
tion. It should be stressed that the increased amount applies only to those States 
which have expressly accepted it and, even in that case, 12 months after 
acceptance. The period of 12 months may, inter alia, enable a State accepting 
the amended liability amount to prepare for fulfilment of its resultant obligations 
to adopt the required national laws and regulations, enable the operators to 
make contracts of insurance for higher amounts, etc. If the regulation is seen 
under this approach, the question also arises whether the said 12 month period 
is really sufficient for a State to prepare for fulfilment of its obligations 
resulting from the acceptance of a considerably higher amount of liability. 
Of course, States may happen to disagree with an amended liability amount. 
This possibility is also contemplated by the Protocol when it spells out that if, 
within a period of 18 months from the date of notification by the Director-
General of IAEA, an amendment has not been accepted, the amendment shall 
be considered rejected. According to Article V.D.6 a State which becomes 
party to the Vienna Convention after the entry into force of an amendment 
adopted under the simplified procedure shall be considered bound by the 
liability amount so amended only if it has failed to express a different intention 
can be viewed as a rule serving as a guarantee in respect to any increased 
amount of liability. In other words, a State acceding to the Vienna Convention 
at a later date may exclude the application of a probably higher liability 
amount as amended under a "simplified" procedure. 
IX, Time limit for submission of claims 
The time limit for submission of claims for nuclear damages was similarly 
affected by the revision of the Vienna Convention, with Article 8.1, 8.2 and 
8.3 of the Protocol differentiating between various types of damage and 
omitting the rules on special prescription period with respect to lost, stolen. 
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jettisoned or abandoned nuclear materials. The Vienna Convention originally 
established a prescription period of 10 years for nuclear damage, specifying 
a period of 20 years only for nuclear damage caused by lost or stolen, etc. 
nuclear materials. The Protocol recognized that personal injury caused by 
radioactive contamination might not become manifest for some time after 
exposure occurred and accordingly its new regulation establishes a longer 
period of 30 years from the date of the nuclear incident for actions of compen-
sation of loss of life and personal injury, while retaining the 10-year prescrip-
tion period for all other types of damage. As it was already mentioned, the 
special period of prescription with respect to lost and stolen nuclear material 
was repealed, so in future it will be irrelevant whether or not the nuclear 
material causing a nuclear incident was under the operator's control at the time 
of the incident. 
It should be noted that the 10-year prescription period is much longer than 
that established by national laws of numerous States for damage resulting from 
certain ultra hazardous activities, and it practically allows for the fact that 
damage caused by radioactive contamination to the flora and fauna, livestock, 
etc. becomes evident many years after exposure. The revised Article VI. of the 
Vienna Convention appears to be sufficiently flexible to address problems of 
such nature and leaves it up to the legislation of the competent court to 
regulate related matters. 
The discovery rule or the so-called subjective prescription period was 
likewise modified. Whereas under Article VI. 3. of the 1963 Vienna Convention 
"the law of the competent court may establish a period of extinction or 
prescription not less than 3 years from the date on which the person suffering 
damage had knowledge of the damage and the operator liable", the revised 
Article provides that an action for compensation shall be brought within 3 years 
from the date on which the person suffering damage had knowledge or ought 
to have had knowledge of the damage and the operator liable. It was upheld the 
rule that not even the subjective prescription period of 3 years may exceed 
beyond the aforementioned periods of 10 and 30 years or a longer period of 
extinction or prescription established by the national law of the Installation 
State. 
The extension of the prescription or extinction period may inevitably give 
rise to certain practical problems, notably the question of financial coverage for 
claims of compensation lodged for loss of life or personal injury decades after 
the occurrence of a nuclear incident. Since according to the national legislation 
of most States the amount of liability for nuclear damages is a specific amount, 
this may in practice convey the suggestion that certain portion of the liability 
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amount available, to be allocated to compensation for claims of loss of life or 
personal injury lodged by victims decades after an incident. Article 8. 1 (c) of 
the Protocol was intended to eliminate similar solutions by providing that 
actions for compensation which, pursuant to the extended period of prescription 
or extinction noted above, are brought after a period of 10 years from the date 
of the nuclear incident shall in no case affect the rights of compensation of any 
person who has brought an action against the operator before the expiry of that 
period. 
The new regulation definitely keeps it in view that any extension of the 
prescription or extinction period either by the Protocol or by the law of the 
Installation State makes sense only if the operator's liability is covered, to the 
extent of the liability amount, by insurance or other financial security, 
including State guarantee, for such longer period. It is with attention to this that 
Article 8. 1 (b), of the Protocol provides the following: "If, however, under the 
law of the Installation State, the liability of the operator is covered by 
insurance or other financial security including State funds for a longer period, 
the law of the competent court may provide that rights of compensation against 
the operator shall only be extinguished after such a longer period which shall 
not exceed the period for which his liability is so covered under the law of the 
Installation State." 
It is clear that the Protocol definitely, increased the role of insurers or their 
burdens, since, on the one hand, the new rules require insurers to satisfy claims 
to the extent of a higher amount because the revised Vienna Convention has 
considerably enlarged the minimum liability amount to be fixed for operators, 
and, on the other hand, insurers will, pursuant to the provisions extending the 
prescription periods, have to satisfy claims not only to the extent of a higher 
amount, but also for a longer period of time.25 As a discussion of this 
question would go far beyond the scope of this paper, I would rather confine 
myself to emphasizing the need to rely in such cases on the solidarity of the 
society and the national and international community, it being clear that these 
victims should, regardless of whether or not they are covered by legislative 
provisions, receive compensation from public funds in cases when due to the 
progress of time the operators liability is not covered by insurance. 
25 On this question see, WARREN, G. C.: "Vienna Convention revision: a review of the 
exercise and insurance implications in the provisions under discussion." In: Nuclear Law 
Bulletin, No. 55. June 1995. 
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X. Non-discrimination between victims 
Article III. of the Vienna Convention prohibiting any discrimination between 
victims suffering nuclear damage was amended by Article 15. of the 
Protocol,26 the result being that in certain extreme cases, rather rare in practice, 
some foreign victims may be excluded from the compensation provided by the 
Convention. Derogation from the non-discrimination principle is allowed by the 
Protocol within very narrow limits. Accordingly, discrimination may only be 
practised (a) in respect of amounts in excess of the operator's liability, namely 
it may affect compensation from public funds only; and (b) in respect of nuclear 
damage suffered in the territory or any maritime zone of a State which has a 
nuclear installation in such territory, to the extent that it does not afford 
reciprocal benefits to the Installation State. This latter restriction makes clear 
that such discrimination is not allowed in respect to victims of non-nuclear 
States. For that matter, the underlying motive of this article is similar to that of 
the article on the geographical scope of the Convention. 
In point of fact the new Article XIII. 2. of the Convention is understandable, 
for what we have here, too, is that compensation from public funds should not 
be paid to victims whose State ensures no compensation under similar circum-
stances. Still, an approach that innocent victims of nuclear damage should 
receive no compensation because their State once failed to comply with its 
obligations under similar circumstances raises the question of how to reconcile 
it with the principle of improving the situation of victims and with humanitarian 
considerations, but this is a separate matter which to discuss would go far 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
XI. Priorities given to certain victims 
During the revision of the Vienna Convention the view was almost commonly 
held that victims claiming compensation for loss of life, or personal injury 
26 Article ХШ. 2.of the revised Vienna Convention (Article 15 of the Protocol) reads as follow: 
"Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, insofar as compensation for nuclear damage 
is in excess of 150 million SDRs, the legislation of the Installation State may derogate from 
the provisions of this Convention with respect to nuclear damage suffered in the territory, or 
i9n any maritime zone established in accordance with the international law of the sea, of 
another State which at the time of the incident, has a. nuclear installation in such territory, to 
the extent that it does not afford reciprocal benefits of an equivalent amount." 
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should be brought into a more favourable position and priority should be given 
to those claims. This intention is reflected not only in the aforementioned rule 
on the period of prescription or extinction extended to 30 years, but also in the 
provision amending Article VIII. of the Vienna Convention on the nature, form 
and extent of compensation. 
Article 10. of the Protocol clearly states that "priority in the distribution of 
the compensation shall be given to claims in respect of loss of life or personal 
injury". This provision accords priority only to those claims of compensation 
for loss of life and personal injury which were submitted within 10 years from 
the date of a nuclear incident, that is to say that the priority rule is inapplicable 
to claims raised beyond the 10 years period. Moreover, the priority rule applies 
to cases where the damage to be compensated exceeds or is likely to exceed 
the maxiqium amount of liability made available pursuant to Article V.l. It 
may be rtoted that the extension of the priority rule to the whole period of 
prescription or extinction would entail the danger of attempts being made to 
withhold a part of the liability amount on the ground that personal injuries 
would become evident at a later period of time. Obviously enough, this would 
not serve the interests of victims who bring actions for compensation within 10 
years from the date of a nuclear incident, for they could only expect a reduced 
amount of compensation, because of personal injury or death manifesting at a 
much later time. Thus, in the interest of all victims, it appears much more 
equitable to give priority to claims in respect of personal injury or loss of life, 
but only for a certain specified period. 
In reality, it is naturally rather difficult to make any specification as to how 
to prioritize claims for compensation in respect of a certain group of victims. 
Precisely for this reason, it appeared to be a wise solution to preserve the 
relevant provision of the Vienna Convention, which states that, "Subject to the 
provisions this Convention, the nature, form and extent of compensation, as 
well as the equitable distribution thereof, shall be governed by the law of the 
competent court" (Article VIII. 1), that is to say that the rules concerning 
priorities given for claims of compensation in respect of loss of live or personal 
injury is for the law of the competent court to decide. 
XII. Jurisdictional provisions 
The revision of the Vienna Convention witnessed a rather sharp debate on the 
question of jurisdiction for claims of nuclear damage practically until the 
adoption of the Protocol at the Diplomatic Conference. Interestingly, the debate 
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addressed not so much the question of jurisdiction in general as rather one 
instance thereof, notably the occurrence of nuclear incidents in an exclusive 
economic zone of a Contracting Party. The debate focused on problems of the 
law of the sea associated with the fact that issues relating to exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) were not precisely regulated by the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, since that Convention gives costal States jurisdiction 
with regard to the preservation of the maritime environment in its EEZ, 
however, to what degree a State would be able to exercise this jurisdiction is 
still a matter of controversy.27 States favoring inclusion in the Protocol of 
jurisdictional provisions on exclusive economic zones advanced the main 
argument that, according to Article 56. 1. (b) ii) of the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea the coastal States have jurisdiction with regard to the 
preservation of the marine environment, that if nuclear damage occurred in 
such a zone, damage would be suffered chiefly by the natural resources for 
which they bear responsibility under maritime law. This argument is otherwise 
supported by the fact that cases are actually very frequent of carriage of nuclear 
material in exclusive economic zones. 
The provisions on jurisdiction were finalized only at the Diplomatic 
Conference and the outcome is a rather complicated paragraph broking with the 
general rule, characteristic of nuclear liability conventions, that jurisdiction over 
actions for compensation lies with the Installation State. Under Article XI. 1. 
bis. of the revised Vienna Convention "When nuclear incident occurs within the 
area of the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting Party or, if such a zone 
has not established, in an area not exceeding the limits of an exclusive 
economic zone, were one to be established, jurisdiction over actions concerning 
nuclear damage from that nuclear incident shall, for the purposes of this 
Convention, lie only with the courts of that Party." Provided that there is a 
notification by that Contracting Party to the Depository of such area prior to 
the nuclear incident. In order to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the law 
of the sea, the same paragraph adds that "Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
interpreted as permitting the exercise of jurisdiction in a manner which is 
contrary of the international law of the sea, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea." 
There is an other new paragraph in Article XI. on jurisdiction, which 
incontestably serves the interest of potential victims and facilitates the equitable 
distribution of compensation funds, that paragraph provides that the Contracting 
27 Cf. ATTARD, D.: The exclusive economic zone in international law. Oxford, 1987. 
94-106. 
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Parties shall ensure that only a single juridical forum has jurisdiction in relation 
to any one nuclear incident. 
XIII. Actions for compensation 
The addition to the provisions on jurisdiction of the Convention a new Article 
XI. A. concerning actions for compensation is highly important and protects the 
interests of potential victims as it allows States to bring actions on behalf of 
its citizens and other victims who have suffered nuclear damage and have their 
domicile or residence in its territory. This provision was inspired by the fact 
that the litigation in a foreign forum may subject the victims to undue 
inconveniences. It should be noted, that it is very important for cases of 
industrial accidents when there could be thousands of victims to decide in 
advance who have the right to represent the victims,28 
e.g. after the Bhopal catastrophe of 2 December 1984, one of the greatest 
industrial accident of all time, one primary issue was whether India had the 
right to represents the victims. 
The article in question, which is a procedural innovation of the Protocol to 
Amend the Vienna Convention, accords to victims a kind of protection rather 
special in terms of legal nature. That protection differs f rom traditional 
diplomatic protection since the protection is not being subject to exhaustion of 
local remedies and the damage to victims not being caused by a foreign State. 
Therefore, to this extent, protection is closer in nature to consular protection, 
but, at the same time, it also differs from it chiefly in that protection in this 
case is accorded not to a persons staying abroad. Since the paragraph accords 
protection on an equal footing with nationals, to those foreigners who are 
permanent residents of the particular State, this does not rule out the possibility 
for a victim, if there are victims in several States, for example, to rely on 
action and protection by both the State of Iiis nationality and the State of Iiis 
domicile, or residence. 
The last paragraph of the new Article XI. A. is dealing with claims by 
subrogation or assignment and states that those claims should be also admitted 
by the competent court. 
28 Cf. FREEDMAN, W.: Foreign Plaintiffs in Product Liability Actions. The Defense of 
Forum Non Conveniens. 1988. 135. 
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XIV. Involvement of public funds in compensation of nuclear damages 
One of the greatest novelty of the Protocol is that it expressly provides on 
compensation from public funds for nuclear damage. It should be added that 
the compensation from public funds occurs only if a State Party decides to 
exempt an operator for up to half of his liability (during the fazing-in period 
even for a greater portion), and in those cases the Contracting Party must make 
public funds available to make the total amount up to at least the sums 
mentioned in Article V.l. To counterbalance the above mentioned provisions 
the Protocol incorporated certain guarantees to protect public funds. 
Article 4. of the Protocol can be said to contain such a new provision, 
added to Article II. of the Vienna Convention, under which the Installation 
State may limit the liability amounts payable from public funds in cases where 
several operators are jointly and severally liable. This amendment is intended 
to ensure that, although several operators are liable for nuclear damage, only 
one payment is made in respect of the incident itself. 
Article 7.2 of the Protocol inserts a new Article V.C in the Vienna 
Convention providing on cases when the competent court is not that of the 
Installation State.29 Again the protection of public funds appears here since 
the Installation State is naturally required to reimburse to the State of the 
competent court all payments made from public funds. According to the 
Protocol, the States concerned shall agree on the procedure for reimbursement. 
Another new provision quite logically allows the Installation State to intervene 
in proceedings and to participate in any settlement concerning compensation. 
A similar provision, added to Article X. of the Vienna Convention, extends 
a right of recourse to the Installation State insofar as it has provided public 
funds for purposes of compensation. 
In point of fact, Article 15. of the Protocol mentioned earlier similarly 
restricts compensation from public funds, protecting them by allowing 
derogation from the non-discrimination principle in certain cases. 
29 Article V. C. 
"1. If courts having jurisdiction are those of a Contracting Party other than the Installation 
State, the public funds required under sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article V. 
and under paragraph 1 of Article VII, as well as interest and costs awarded by a court, may 
be made available by the first-named Contracting Party. The Installation State shall reimburse 
to the other Contracting Party any such sums paid." 
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XV. Dispute settlement 
The Vienna Convention originally contained no provision on dispute 
settlement30 Therefore, almost from the very beginning of the discussions in 
the Standing Committee the experts generally agreed on the need for the 
Convention to be supplemented in this respect. There were discussed a variety 
of rather detailed proposals for the settlement of disputes, including setting up 
a separate international tribunal or a claims commission, and even a plan was 
drawn up for a separate Annex to the Vienna Convention to settle matters 
relating to the aforementioned tribunal.31 
Of the many proposals, a rather low-key one was incorporated into Article 
17. of the Protocol. The core and substance of the new dispute settlement 
mechanism (Article XX.A of the revised Vienna Convention) devised by it is 
this: in the event of a dispute between State Parties to the Vienna Convention 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention "the parties to 
the dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by 
negotiation or by any other peaceful means acceptable to them"; if a dispute 
cannot be settled within 6 months from the request for consultation, any party 
may submit the dispute to arbitration or refer it to the International Court of 
Justice; where a dispute is submitted to arbitration and the parties to the 
dispute are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration any party may 
request the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. It should be 
noted that in this paragraph the Protocol refers to the disagreement in 
organization of the arbitration, which it could be a disagreement not only on 
the composition of the arbitral court, but on the rules of procedures as well. 
However, the Protocol points only to the first mentioned difference of opinion 
by stating that, in cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the 
request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority. For 
that matter, the Contracting Parties are not under obligation to accept the 
dispute settlement mechanism provided by the Protocol, and when ratifying, 
accepting, etc. of the Convention, any of them may declare that it does not 
consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute settlement procedures. 
Such declarations may of course be withdrawn at any time, the consequence 
30 There is an Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
appended to the Vienna Convention concluded at the same day as the Vienna Convention, 
however, that Protocol never entered into force. 
31 Cf. SCNL Third Session, Note by the Secretariat, 13-16. 
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being that the article governing dispute settlement are not to be regarded as 
valid in the relationship of the State making such a declaration to the rest of 
the Contracting Parties. 
XVI. Textual adjustments 
The Protocol contains some provisions which are simply textual adjustments 
to the Vienna Convention. Mention may be made of the following parag-
raphs. 
1) Article 7.2 of the Protocol, which simply reworded the relevant article 
of the Vienna Convention that the costs and interest awarded by courts in 
actions for compensation of nuclear damage shall not be chargeable against the 
liability amounts fixed by the Convention, namely that such costs and interest 
shall be payable in addition to those amounts, can definitely be regarded as a 
minor refinement of wording. 
2) The new version of Article XII. of the Vienna Convention on recognition 
and enforcement of judgements can similarly be regarded as nothing but a 
revised wording of the relevant provisions. 
3) Article 2.1 of the Protocol, which revised Article I. (j) of the Vienna 
Convention defining "nuclear installation" to empower the IAEA Board of 
Governors to include, from time to time, certain facilities resulting f rom 
technological development in the category of nuclear installation can be 
conceived as a comparatively minor amendment, meaning that the Board 
practically may from time to time determine the scope of facilities covered by 
the definition of "nuclear installation". 
4) Again, Article 16. of the Protocol affecting Article XVIII. of the Vienna 
Convention which governs the relationship of the Vienna Convention as lex 
specialis to international law as lex generalis, can be viewed as more like a 
minor amendment refining the existing text, and, unlike the earlier text, the 
revised wording refers not only to rights, but also to obligations under 
international law, which shall not be affected by the provisions of the 
Convention. 
5) Another amendment of no great importance, relating to carriage of 
nuclear material, affects Article III. of the Vienna Convention and allows the 
Installation State to exclude the liable operator's obligation to provide the 
carrier with a certificate, in respect of carriage of nuclear material within that 
State, issued by the insurer and other financial guarantor. 
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XVII. Peaceful coexistence of two Vienna Conventions 
As it was already mentioned, technically the Vienna Convention was revised 
by the adoption of the Protocol to amend the instrument, and according to 
Article 19. of the Protocol "A State which is Party to this Protocol but not to 
the 1963 Vienna Convention shall be bound by the provisions of that 
Convention as amended by this Protocol in relation to other States Parties 
hereto, and failing an expression of a different intention by that State at the 
time of deposit of an instrument ... shall be bound by the provisions of the 
1963 Vienna Convention in relation to States which are only Parties thereto." 
It should be noted that this solution has created a special situation, because 
after the entry into force of the Protocol32 there will be living together or 
operating in practice "two" Vienna Conventions, notably the Convention's 
original text of 1963 and its new version as amended by the Protocol. 
After the Protocol has come into force, a State may only accede to the 
amended version, but in the inter se relations of the States party to the "old" 
Vienna Convention the provisions of that Convention will be in force in respect 
of them until such time as they have acceded to the new Protocol. This rather 
complicated situation is nevertheless understandable and is fully in accord with 
Article 40. of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
provides on amendment of multilateral treaties. 
* * * 
In 1989 the negotiations on the revision of the Vienna Convention had started 
with the aim to strengthen the existing nuclear liability regime and to improve 
the situation of potential victims of nuclear accidents. The Protocol to Amend 
the Vienna Convention serves that purpose and it reflects a good compromise 
since it is the outcome of a negotiation process in which the experts of nuclear 
States and of non-nuclear States as well as the Contacting Parties and the Non-
Contracting Parties to the 1963 Vienna Convention were very active. That 
affords some assurance that the compromise solution reached is acceptable to 
all States participating in the elaboration of the Protocol. All this holds out the 
hope that, and this is perhaps what matters most, the Protocol will enter into 
force within a relatively short period of time. 
32 According to Article 21 "This Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date 
of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance and approval." 
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Now that the Vienna Convention has been revised it is to be expected that, 
on the one hand, there will be accessions to the revised Vienna Convention by 
further States, chiefly those which have so far steered clear of its liability 
regime precisely because of its insufficient regulation and that, on the other 
hand, the present States Parties to the Vienna Convention will ratify the 
Protocol and accede to it, thereby causing the 1963 version of the Vienna 
Convention to lose effect sooner or later. 
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Thought 
A personal note: In the fall semester of 1978 at the Law School of the 
Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest I attended the class of Professor 
Péteri on the so-called "Theory of the State". During that seminar he 
introduced me systematically to the basic questions of not only that 
discipline, but to those, of political science, too. Since then I have been 
studying the. same subject, and for years we were lecturing on the same 
department. Professor Péteri has been well-known among students at least 
for three, reasons: they appreciate his deep and wide-ranging knowledge 
and his comparative method; he has a unique ability to explain to students 
the. even most abstract theories in a clear, intelligible way; and he has been 
just but severe, at the exams. The present paper is a modest attempt to sum 
up certain aspects of a subject to which Professor Péteri has devoted much 
time both in research and in teaching. 
The far best study on the history of American political science is Bernard 
Crick's book, titled "The American Science of Politics".1 The author introduces 
his investigation into the subject with the following observation: "The study of 
politics in the United States is something in size, content and method unique in 
1 CRICK, В.: The American Science of Politics. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959. 
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Western intellectual history."2 The book correctly emphasizes the paradoxical 
ambiguity of the ambitious goal of American political thought: the linkage of 
science and politics. An outstanding figure of the American political science, 
who arrived to the United States from Florence, Italy, Giovanni Sartori devoted 
an entire book to the difficult relation of science and politics. Sartori warns us 
of the great tension between the abstractness of science and the everyday com-
monness of political action and ideologies.3 In the present short outline of the 
rich and really unique history of American political thought I attempt at to sum 
up the great steps of this history. This is the history how American intellectuals 
tried to elevate thinking and speculating about politics to the rank of science: 
and by science has been meant the objectivity of natural sciences, the utiliza-
tion of scientific and quantitative research methods in the study of politics. 
This attempt has created a persistent tension between the desired science of 
politics and the theory of politics as a value-oriented, normative, all-embracing, 
philosophical approach to the study of the entirety of political phenomena. 
The Intellectual Origins and the Birth of American Political Thought: 
"The Divine Science of Politics" 
In its first phase American political philosophy faced a solemn but grandiose 
task: founding a new political order embodied in the Constitution. The Founding 
Fathers of the American Republic explicitly had spoken of a "science of 
politics", as Alexander Hamilton in the Ninth Paper of The Federalist,4 or with 
die frequently used words of John Adams: "the divine science of politics". 
Science of politics is a rather ancient expression of European intellectual history, 
invented already in the XIII. century during the translation of Aristotle's work. 
This Latin scientia politica had been turned into science of politics. Obviously 
this political science at that times had different meanings; it referred both to a 
rather speculative, rational way of thinking, and to a practical knowledge of 
governmental action. 
The American science of politics already in the early times was committed 
to the latter approach. The aim of the Founding Fathers was to create a working 
political order. The early years of the Republic created a rather unique oppor-
2 Id., p. xi. 
3 SARTORI, G.: La politica. Logica e nwtodo in scienze sociali. Milano, 1980. 44. 
4 "The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improve-
ment." Hamilton, Madison, Jay, The Federalist Papers. Ed. Clinton Rossiter, 1961, 72. 
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opportunity for the practical implementation of political theories. The two 
great European thinkers who influenced this process most had been an English-
man: John Locke, and a Frenchman: Montesquieu. Locke's 7vvo Treatises on 
Government (1690) had a great impact on Americans for the praise of liberty 
including the right to resistance. It also suggested them that America, 
resembling the idea of natural sociability of men in Locke's book, was founded 
on the principles of nature.5 John Adams, later second president of the United 
States, in an essay written in 1776 and widely discussed among members of the 
Continental Congress, quotes the names of Englishmen like Sidney, Harrington, 
Locke, Milton: 
"The wretched condition of this country, however, for ten or fifteen years 
past, has frequently reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will 
convince any candid mind, that there is no good government but what is 
republican. That the only valuable part of the British constitution is so; because 
the very definition of a republic is 'an empire of laws, and not of men.'"6 
The principle of "government by laws" stemmed from an ancient idea first 
formulated by Aristotle. It became a basic principle of the American Republic7, 
defined also as "constitutional government". 
As for the other great source of inspiration, Montesquieu's Spirit of the 
Laws, out of the countless references the most famous is perhaps the Forty-
seventh Paper of The Federalist by another future president of the United 
States, James Madison. Discussing the question of the separation of powers, 
Madison wrote: 
"The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the 
celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the 
science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending 
it most effectually to the attention of mankind."8 
The Founding Fathers did not satisfy themselves by the creative adaptation 
of political ideas, and the creation of genuinely new political institutions. They 
planned also by the means of education prepare apt men to the task of govern-
mental work. Washington several times urged the introduction of politics and 
government to the university education; we must confess that his efforts 
5 POCOCK, J. G. A.: The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, 1975. 527. 
6 Great American Political Thinkers (ed. Bernard E. Brown), New York, Vol. 1., 167-168. 
7 SANDOZ, E.: A Government of Laws. Political Theory, Religion, and the American 
Founding. 1990. 228-231. 
8 Great American Political Thinkers, op. cit. Vol. 1., 242-243. 
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remained unsuccessful. Nevertheless, it may be surprising to quote the title of 
an academic disputation at Harvard University as soon as in 1788: "Is it more 
necessary in a Republic than in any other form of government that young men 
should be instructed in political science?"9 
The first, undoubtedly glorious period of the American "science of politics" 
contributed to the development of political thought enormously by applying 
axioms and principles of political philosophy to the needs of government and 
politics. They did not formulated abstract axioms, but framed workable 
institutions. Political science had meaning for them as statesmanship, statecraft, 
practical wisdom. They could achieve, indeed, a constitutional system that had 
never existed before. They implemented and made to work the theories of 
separation of powers, federalism, checks and balances, they invented judicial 
review: in brief, Americans succeeded in making democracy work. 
The Expansion of Education Under German Influence 
Despite the fascinating beginnings of a practically oriented but normative and 
theoretical science of politics at the early years of the Republic, political theory 
in most of the XIX. century was far from being original and significant. The 
most common explanation for this decline hints at the altered historical 
circumstances. XIX. century Americans lacked the great challenges faced by 
their ancestors. The constitutional framework had been set by the outstanding 
theoretical and practical skill of the Founding Fathers, and it worked well. It 
helped to survive the Union even during such a great crisis as the Civil War. 
The famous historian, Henry Steel Commager argued: 
"Most Americans ... rightly assumed that the bankruptcy of political theory 
was a product of the prosperity of political practice. As long as the institutions 
established by the Fathers and the principles expounded by Jefferson worked 
well, there was no felt need for theoretical justification: success was its own 
justification."10 
Not surprisingly, the presumably most original thinker of the century was 
a Southerner, John C. Calhoun, who before the Civil War made serious efforts 
to justify the claims of the Southern states, and to establish a new constitutional 
order for the Confederation. His ideas on the different meanings of majority 
9 CRICK: op. cit. 5. 
10 COMMAGER, H. S.: The American Mind. An Interpretation of American Thought and 
Character since the 1880's. New Haven—London, 1950. 311. 
Theory or Science of Politics: Ambiguities of American Political Thought 1 9 9 
explored a basic problem of all democracies; he distinguished between the 
numerical majority, and the concurrent majority, the latter taking into regard 
the different and conflicting interest of the entire community.11 
However, two tendencies can be outlined that contributed to the develop-
ment of American political science, and slowly prepared the way to the 
emergence of the scientific approach of the political phenomena. The two 
correlative trends were the growing influence of German political philosophy, 
and the introduction of political studies to the university curriculum. 
Foreign influence on XIX. century American political analysis is by far not 
limited to German scholars. The most original and comprehensive examination 
of American democracy of the period is to be found in the work of a 
Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville.12 One has to remark that the observations 
of De Tocqueville were not very welcomed in the United States. The first 
German scholar who had an outstanding influence on American political studies 
was Francis Lieber. He was a Prussian, imprisoned in his country for his liberal 
and nationalist sentiments, who fled to America in 1827. For twenty years he 
taught in South Carolina. Finally, in 1858 he was appointed to a newly 
established Chair at Columbia College. This privilege was due to his book on 
"Civil Liberty and Self Government". The work was published in 1853, and 
gained him considerable reputation. Lieber tried to elevate political science to 
the rank of an autonomous discipline. He renamed his Chair at Columbia from 
the suggested "History and Political Economy" to "History and Political 
Science". The title of Iiis Inaugural Address at Columbia was "History and 
Political Science, Necessary Studies in Free Countries". He pointed out the 
great mission of political studies in preparing students for the tasks destined 
them by their country.13 Actually, the real influence was exercised by German 
historiography, more than any other discipline. 
The road opened by Lieber after the Civil War led to a considerable 
expansion of both college and university education of political science, and of 
the German influence. The today scarcely remembered, in their day important 
partisans of political science were educated in Germany (Charles Eliot — 
President of Harvard in 1869, Daniel Coit Gil man, Andrew White — first 
President of Cornell). Out of these Herrn Doktoren the most famous was 
undoubtedly John William Burgess. He succeeded Lieber at Columbia and in 
11 CALHOUN, J. C.: A Disquisition on Government (1850), Great American Political 
Thinkers, op. cit. Vol. 1., 23. 
12 TOCQUEVILLE, A. de: Democracy in America (ed. J. P. Mayer), New York, 1835. 
13 CRICK: op. cit. 15-18. 
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1880 organized there the first School of Political Science of the country. (The 
second major university teaching political science was Johns Hopkins in 
Baltimore.) At both universities, under Continental influence, the historical-
comparative method prevailed. E. A. Freeman's maxim "History is past Politics 
and Politics present History" became quite an official motto at Johns Hopkins, 
and this was similarly characteristic of Columbia, too.14 As an organizer. 
Burgess can be considered as the real founder of political science. However, 
he had not too much intellectual influence at all.15 The main reason was that, 
despite the impact of German learning, American thought could never absorb 
and accept that central role of the State that was contributed to it in Germany. 
In Germany, State stood definitely above society, sovereignty was regarded 
an overwhelming and unquestionable power. The concept of State formed the 
core of the German understanding of political phenomena. American theorists 
rejected this central role of the State. In general, English preferred "govern-
ment" to "state", and translated the German Staat into government.16 Thus, 
Burgess's definition of sovereignty as "original, absolute, unlimited, universal 
power over the individual subject and all associations of subjects"17 was just 
the opposite of American perception of politics and society. This was based on 
individualism and on the role of voluntary associations. The influence of 
German science was ended definitely by World War One: during the war the 
scientific approaches of the enemy became discredited, too. Nevertheless, during 
World War Two another wave of German political scientists and constitutional 
scholars arrived to the United States escaping from Fascism. The list of German 
emigrants, political scientists, or social scientists and philosophers who had a 
considerable impact on political science, too, include such famous names as 
Hanna Arendt, Karl Deutsch, Carl-Joachim Friedrich, Hans Morgenthau, Leo 
Strauss, Hans Kelsen. This gave a last significant impulse to American political 
science. 
However, as I am going to illustrate it with a few examples later on, 
empirical political science has always kept on the agenda the criticism and 
refusal of the concept of the State. 
14 WALDO, D.: "Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise", 
in: Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Handbook, of Political Science, Vol. I., Political 
Science: Scope and Theory. Reading (Mass.) etc., 1975. 29. 
15 CRICK: op. cil. 31. 
16 SARTORI, Ci.: Social Science Concepts. Beverly Hills, 1984. 19. 
17 Quoted in CRICK: op. cit. 31. 
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Progressivism and Realism 
At the end of the XIX. century two magic words spread around the new 
American political science departments and schools: Progress and Science (with 
capital letters). The two great social (first and definitely not political) thinkers 
were William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer. Both of them were also 
interesting because they tried to oppose a factor against State, so they 
contributed to the anti-statism of American social thought. Spencer, that very 
influential English import, taught to Americans, among others, that 
— progress and evolution have the force of laws of nature in society, similar 
to biology or mechanical sciences, and 
— State, or government must not encroach upon the natural laws of this well 
ordered social system. The title of his most famous book, Man versus State, is 
revealing in this sense. 
From this moment on laws pertaining to and regulating society were looked 
at as if they had been under the control of natural laws. This perception, mainly 
after the fall of the reputation of German historiography, became a main factor 
in American political science, too. Social sciences became ruled by the un-
questionable paradigm of a social-Darwinist concept of evolution (or progress), 
derived mainly from biology. Generally, the representatives and leaders of this 
new movement believed that research methods applied effectively in natural 
sciences like physics and biology would lead political science toward the 
discovery of true knowledge. 
It is difficult to quote a more adequate observation of this change that the 
words of Harry Elmer Barnes from 1919. Barnes emphasized that to the school 
of contemporary political theory "the State appears not as some metaphysical 
'ethical being' or as a purely legalistic entity emitting the commands of a 
determinate superior but as a purely natural product of social evolution".18 This 
sentence reveals us some remarkable features of the new social scientific 
approach. First, it turns against two basic features of German historiography and 
political philosophy that previously deeply influenced American understanding 
of politics: namely the Hegelian concept of the State as a superior metaphysical 
being, and the concept of sovereignty as a purely legalistic entity enforcing the 
commands of a superior. Secondly, it highlighted the new trend in understanding 
social phenomena, for which the State (as all social institutions in general) 
appears as a "purely natural product of social evolution". 
18 Quoted in CRICK: op. cit. 49. 
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William Graham Sumner, professor of Political and Social Sciences at Yale 
College (since 1872), with a similar intensity turned against the State. His main 
concern was the protection of individual liberty against any intervention by the 
State. 
Merriam: the Genuine Political Science 
This change in the approach to political science can be considered as a clear 
sign of a process that is rightly called the Americanization of political science. 
This was present in the decline of the historical-comparative method, as well as 
in the rejection of the central concerns of European (Continental) political 
theory: namely state, sovereignty and law.19 Historical, theoretical and philo-
sophical approaches to these three subjects were mingled together in political 
science. 
The objectives of political science—still basically under German influ-
ence—were focusing on research competence and on graduate training. 
Nevertheless, the definitely more practically oriented French example (École 
Libre des Sciences Politiques) gained also influence in educating for purposes 
of public service. After all, political science education at those times aimed at 
to train the leadership, for government service, and citizenship education.20 But 
political science was rarely taught on separate political science departments; 
they were usually combined with other disciplines, such as history, economics 
or sociology. 
Another decisive step in the formation of American political science 
occurred in 1903. The American Political Science Association was formed that 
year. 
We can assume that at the eve of World War I political science in the 
United States was not clearly differentiated from other social sciences and 
professions. It played different roles in academic and extrascientific field: 
research, higher education, training for public service, and active participation 
in political life. 
The interwar period can be characterized by the gradually diminishing role 
of history and theory. Nevertheless political theory, and a theory firmly based 
on past masters and the history of ideas, produced considerable results (Charles 
Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West, 1932, George Sabine, 
19 WALDO: op. cit. 30. 
20 WALDO: op. cit. 34. 
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A History of Political Theory, 1937). On the other side, quantitative methods 
gained ground, and became widely used in different investigations. The 
pioneering study in this field was Stuart A. Rice's Quantitative Methods in 
Politics (1928). Quantitative methods were to replace values. Rice demanded: 
"If social science is really to become a science, it must separate itself from 
religious and ethical endeavor and from all other efforts to set up values or 
ends of any sort."21 
But the really new age of American political thought, or, let us put in this 
way, the beginning of the "real science of politics" should be linked to the 
name of Charles Merriam. "As Lieber and Burgess had established political 
science as an academic discipline, so Merriam, more than any other, established 
it as a social science."22 Not only his studies, but also his life is symbolically 
representing the fate of political science in the twentieth-century America. His 
education was closely linked to the history of political ideas; he took Iiis 
doctorate in 1900 under William Dunning who was Professor of History at 
Columbia, and whose basic work was A History of Political Theories: Ancient 
and Medieval, published in 1902. Merriam himself published several books on 
the history of political theory following the tradition of his teacher (American 
Political Theories, 1903; American Political Ideas: 1865-1917, 1920; A History 
of Political Theories: Recent Times, with Harry Elmer Barnes, 1924.). Merriam 
joined the faculty of the University of Chicago, thus became a colleague of the 
famous pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey. He was actively involved into 
politics in Chicago, but he refused to accept important Federal positions. 
Despite his several works on political theory, he rejected the "traditional 
approach to politics". He made big efforts to create institutional framework for 
social science research. He was promoter in the founding of the Social Science 
Research Council, The Committee on Political Research, or the National 
Conference on the Science of Politics. Two excerpts from his reports to these 
organizations plainly reveal his objectives in replacing political theory with a 
scientific approach to politics: 
"Is politics making use of all the advances in human intelligence which the 
social and natural sciences have brought into the world in the last few genera-
tions? Astronomy, chemistry, physics, biology, and, in later days, psychology, 
have made rapid progress... 
Those who have been following the work of the committee on political 
research cannot escape the conclusion that the great need of this hour is the 
21 RICE, S.: Quantitative Methods in Politics, New York, 1928. 17. 
22 CRICK: op. cit. 135. 
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development of a scientific technique and methodology for political science."23 
Let us take into consideration that Merriam's efforts were not inspired by 
purely scientific motivations. World War I had a previously unimaginable 
impact on Americans in general, and especially on American liberals who 
understood that the great war marked the end of the classic era of liberalism. 
Merriam believed that the easily vulnerable liberalism should have been 
fortified by the power of science, otherwise the sinister forces, "jungle politics" 
would prevail. 
"The world will not put new wine into old bottles, politically or otherwise. 
Jungle politics and laboratory science are incompatible, and they cannot live 
in the same world. The jungle will seize and use the laboratory, as in the last 
great war, when the propagandist conscripted the physicist; or the laboratory 
will master the jungle of human nature and turn its vast, seeming futility to the 
higher uses of mankind."24 
These words are taken from Merriam's New Aspects of Politics. This book 
that can be considered as a program of the new, "genuine" political science was 
published in 1925. It emphasized the necessity of new scientific, mostly 
quantitative methods of inquiry, and thoroughly discusses the relation of 
political science to other disciplines as biology, psychology, sociology. He 
argued in favor of the co-ordination of Medicine, Psychiatry, Psychology and 
Political Science. He became the founder of the Chicago School of Politics, 
devoted to the ideals of liberal democracy, of Progress, of quantitative models 
of science. His work had anticipated Behavioral Sciences that have remained 
the leading paradigm of American political science. He educated a great 
generation of political scientists, mostly the leaders of the later behavioral 
movement. Nevertheless, the fate of Merriam revealed also in a quite tragic 
manner the ambiguity of American political science. He had to witness not 
only the overwhelming victory of his ideas, but also the tragedy of this 
approach. His ideals, Science and Progress, his tireless search for an adequate 
scientific methodology did not prove to be enough to stop certain political 
tendencies. The growing influence of Fascism let him return to a more 
traditional type of political speculation and philosophy (Systematic Politics, 
1945). 
23 American Political Science Review XVI (May 1922) 317, and American Political Science 
Review XVIII (Feb. 1924) 119. Both quoted by CRICK: op. cit. 138. 
24 MERRIAM, Ch. E.: New Aspects of Politics, Chicago, 1925. 247. 
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The Behavioral Movement 
After World War II the road opened by Merriam led to a successful end: the 
behavioral movement renewed the idea of taking the natural sciences as a 
model for political science. The subject of such a science was the observable 
behavior that, in their understanding, could be objectively studied. This stress 
on the technological side of political science was motivated by several 
historical, theoretical, technical, and pragmatic reasons. The New Deal, the 
second great war, the victory over fascism, the emergence of cold war formed 
the special historical circumstances. Logical positivism took over the place of 
pragmatism: it emphasized the separation and difference of fact and value. 
Technological development, especially the quick spread of computer technics, 
provided never seen and appropriate means for scientific inquire (survey 
technics, data processing, etc). Finally, pragmatical considerations urged 
political scientists to remain in race with other social sciences, and popularize 
themselves. It took nearly two decades until the behavioral movement gained 
an indisputably dominating position within all aspects of American political 
science, from the university departments to the Association. The basic 
presumptions of the movement were: application of proper scientific methods 
of research, focus on observable behavior that have political significance, 
careful gathering of data, use of statistical-quantitative methodology in 
explaining the data, generalizations from the data in order of explanation, 
prediction ad control.25 
Harold Lasswell is considered as the genuine behavioralist, and 
consequently political scientist of the postwar period. Lasswell is, indeed, not 
only one of the greatest but also a paradigmatic figure of American political 
science. He graduated at the University of Chicago, and also studied in 
London, Geneva, Paris, and Berlin. He contributed to the development of 
political science in different fields, with studies on power relations, on relation 
of person, personality and politics, on the role of elites. In his influential book 
published in 1936, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, he investigated the 
ways of distribution of power in society. Lasswell is also a preeminent 
representative of the psychological approach to politics. He was concerned with 
the natural desire of men for power. He saw in seeking for power the 
sublimation of personal frustration. 
25 WALDO: op. cit. 60. 
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The vast and highly appreciated works of Lasswell tried to combine 
empirical verification with theoretical concepts. In 1952 he formulated his 
methodological position as follows: 
"Theorizing, about politics, is not to be confused with metaphysical 
speculation in terms of abstractions hopelessly removed from empirical obser-
vation and control. Such speculation characterized the German Staatslehre 
tradition so influential at the turn of the century." Thus he condemns mere 
speculation, and by the same token attacks the enemy that at that could be 
considered already traditional, namely theorizing with the concept of State. 
Lasswell continues: "But this standpoint is not to be confused, on the other 
hand, with 'brute empiricism'—the gathering of 'facts' without a corresponding 
elaboration of hypotheses".26 Nevertheless, Lasswell methodologically drew 
clear distinction between political science and political theory. His ideal of 
science of politics was "positivism in its widest sense".27 
The behavioral movement became the mainstream of American political 
science in the 1950s. It tried to renew political science by the help of methods 
of natural sciences, and by the ideal of pure science. Its main methodical 
renovation was the wide-spread and successful use of quantitative and 
systematic methods. In the meantime, behavioralism aimed at conceptualizing 
the empirical findings. Theory should have become empirically oriented instead 
of sinking into useless philosophical speculations. Thus the sophisticated 
empirical technics could make possible to discover the laws of human behavior. 
The characteristic figure of this period was David Easton. His "The Political 
System" was, as its subtitle states, "an inquiry into the state of political science". 
The starting point of the thorough analysis was that "a major source of the 
shortcomings in political science lies in the failure to clarify the true relation-
ship between facts and political theory and the vital role of theory in this 
partnership."28 Easton contributed the poor conditions of American political 
science to the failure to address itself directly to the search for valid and useful 
generalizations about political life. "For the necessary task of developing 
verifiable theory, it has substituted the accumulation of facts and the premature 
application of this information to practical situations."29 
The other, even sharper criticism was directed against what Easton calls 
"modern political theory". His main problem with the name political theory 
26 KAPLAN, A.-LASSWELL, H.: Power and Society, London, 1952, x. 
27 CRICK: op. cit. 201. 
28 EASTON, D.: The Political System. New York, 1953. 4. 
29 EASTON: op. cit. 37. 
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was that political theory had an exclusive interest in philosophical problems, 
and it was equated with moral and value theory. Easton devoted long chapters 
to the decline of political theory into historicism. "Political theory today is 
interested primarily in the history of ideas. This preoccupation with problems 
of history, rather than with problems of reflection about the desirability of 
alternative goals, is that gives contemporary research in political theory its 
special significance."30 His main targets were three scholars of the history of 
ideas (mentioned above in this article), Dunning, Mcllwain and Sabine. "They 
have been learning what others have said and meant; they have not been 
approaching this material with the purpose of learning how to express and 
clarify their own values." Instead of the limited scopes of historicism, "history 
would be a means for informing the inquirer of alternative moral outlooks with 
the hope that this would aid him in construction of his own political synthesis 
or image of a good political life."31 
Easton suggested in his influential 1953 study to replace the traditional 
distinction between fact-gathering and value theory by a political theory that 
consisted of four major kinds of propositions: factual, moral, applied, and 
theoretical. He concluded, that the attainment of reliable knowledge about 
political life depended upon the development of the kind of analytical tool that 
he called a conceptual framework.32 
It is well-known the triumphal march of conceptual framework throughout 
the social sciences in the 60s. In political science it included, according to the 
vision of Easton, among others the common sense idea of political life, the 
authoritative allocation of values for a society, orientation toward policy 
activities.33 Easton did not miss the occasion to reveal the weaknesses of the 
concept of the State.34 He advised to avoid the word State because of the 
confusion and variety of its meanings. Thus he became part of the process that 
Passerin d'Entréves charactarized as "the disruption of the notion of the 
State".35 After the Marxist and non-Marxist revival of the concept of the State 
30 EASTON: op. cit. 236. The chapter on "The Decline of Modern Political Theory" was 
first published earlier in the Journal of Politics 13 (February 1951). 
31 EASTON: op. cit. 237. 
32 EASTON: op. cit. 310-317. 
33 EASTON: op. cit. 125-148. 
34 EASTON: op. cit. 106-113. 
35 D'Entréves 59. He draws attention to the "interesting and striking" parallel between 
American political science and the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce. CROCE: in his 
Elementi di Politico concluded that the very word State was misleading and should be 
shunned by the student of politics. Id. 65. 
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in the 1970s Easton reaffirmed his earlier position on the issue in his essay 
published in the journal Political Theory with the title "The political system 
besieged by the State".36 
Organizations, Publications and Fields of American Political Science 
Before we turn our attention to the tendencies of the last decades, it is worth 
to give a look to the organization of political science in the United States. 
The American Political Science Association at the end of World War II had 
approximately 3300 members; this has grown close to 20 000. The number of 
political science departments at universities and colleges is around 1500. 
Several regional political science associations were established, mostly 
publishing their own periodicals. Political scientist participate in great numbers 
in public affairs by consulting, aiding in campaigns, making public addresses, 
or running for office. 
As for the classification of the different branches or subdisciplines of 
political science, there is no generally accepted solution. A rather common 
categorization distinguished the following fields:37 
1. Normative and descriptive theory that includes history of ideas, 
normative political philosophy as well as descriptive political theory and 
political science methodology. 
2. Comparative government and politics, 
3. International politics, organizations and law. Both fields are consid-
ered very dynamically developing disciplines. 
American politics: 
4. Legislative affairs, 
5. Parties and pressure groups, 
6. Public opinion, voting, and elections, 
7. Presidency, 
8. Organization and administration, 
9. State governments, 
10. Judicial affairs, 
11. Public law and jurisprudence, 
12. Public policy analysis (health, education, welfare). 
36 Political Theory, 9 (1981), 303-325. 
37 WALDO: op. cit. 83-95. 
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I would like to draw the attention to the place given to political theory in this 
classification: it is considered a branch within political science. Developments in 
the 1980s and 1990s led to a different understanding of political theory as a 
discipline alienated from (empirical) political science. 
According to a survey, political scientists indicate as their primary work 
activity mostly teaching. The second most frequent occupation is management or 
administration. Research and development stands on the third place, while other 
registered activities include consulting, forecasting, reporting.38 
The Post-behavioral Revolution and the State of Art 
Paradoxically, it was Easton himself who launched the call for post-behavioral 
political science in 1969.39 This revolution can be considered as the admission 
of the methodological failure of the empirically oriented conceptual framework. 
Easton now urged political scientist to pay more attention to their responsibility 
toward the public policy problems and applied social science. The result was the 
growing popularity of "policy studies" that intended to combine the normative 
(preferred policies) and the scientific (inquiring how policy is made). The great 
expectation were not fulfilled: the integration of empirical policy researches and 
conceptual and normative insights remained exceptional, mainly in studies on 
democratic theory and rational choice theory. 
Paradoxically, when in 1987 at a conference Easton summed up the past and 
present of American political science, his final words after an overview of the 
developments of post-behavioralist political science were quite disappointed: 
because of the variety of the different directions it was difficult to draw general 
conclusions regarding the state of the art.40 
Despite the earlier victory of scientific philosophy and methodology the basic 
ambiguity of political science has not come to an end: in the last two decades 
political theory has had a great revival that Sartori calls the "Return of Grand 
Theory".41 More and more political scientists join the more or less organized 
38 WALDO: op. cit. 105. 
39 "The new revolution in political science". American Political Science Review, 68 (1969), 
1051-1061. 
40 EASTON: "La scienza politica negli Stati Uniti. Passato e présente." Fra scienza e 
professione. Saggi sullo sviluppo della scienza politica. Milano, 1991. 169-190. 
41 The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, ed. Quentin Skinner, Cambridge, 
1985. 
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dissenters who consciously profess their "postbehavioralism". They criticize the 
dominant behavioral movement because under their influence political science 
became too narrowly defined, morally insensitive, it is not concerned with values 
of justice, freedom, equality, the concentration on scientific methodology 
deprived political science of its imaginative and creative character.42 An 
important element of tltis change was the great influence of Thomas Kuhn's The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) that questioned that the scientific 
development would be a gradual accumulation of knowledge and understanding, 
it depends rather on the existing paradigm. This explanation fostered the efforts 
to attack the ideological presuppositions of the scientific method of social 
sciences.43 
Behavioralism, following especially Easton's critique of the history of 
political theory, excluded the discipline from political science in their sense. As 
a response, historians of political thought, generally sharply criticized the 
behavioralist approach, and they looked at it as a decline. In their view the 
decline of political theory was a consequence of the "purely" empirical scientific 
method of political science and the neglect of traditional concerns of political 
theory. Historians of political theory in their counterattacks emphasized that the 
study of political thought of the past was important also for understanding 
modern political problems. They condemned the attempt of modern political 
scientists to separate fact from value as an impossibility. Behavioralism for them 
was a false and truncated approach that neglected the wisdom of the past, itself 
a symptom of the decline of political theory.44 
The controversy between mainstream political science and the history of 
political theory led to a growing gap between them, that resulted separation of 
history of political theory from other disciplines of political theory. The time 
spent by political theorists in this sort of "reservation" strengthened their 
autonomy, and indirectly helped the revival of the study of the history of political 
theory. 
The 1970s led to an escalation of theorizing on politics but in a form more 
open in at least two senses. First, the reemerging political theory is 
interdisciplinary, closely connected to philosophy, history, analytical moral 
philosophy, legal theory, game theory, rational choice theory, etc. 
42 WALDO: op. cit. 114. 
43 This was noted also by EASTON: "La scienza politica negli Stati Uniti. Passato e 
présente." op. cit. 179. 
44 For a thorough discussion of the controversy, see GUNNELL, J. G. Political Theory: 
Tradition and Interpretation. Cambridge (Mass.), 1979, 4—11. 
Theory or Science of Politics: Ambiguities of American Political Thought 2 1 1 
Secondly, political theory is a multi-national discipline with an on-going 
dialogue among Anglo-American, German, French, etc. scholars. Political theory 
in this sense is not only simple a subfield of political science, as the above-cited 
classification would suggest but the more general discourse of an interdisciplinary 
and multi-national intellectual community. 
Nevertheless, the relation of political science and political theory has 
remained controversial in the American arena. John Gunnell pointed out three 
main features of this relation:45 
— first, the separation—or divorce—of political science and political theory, 
— secondly, the dispersion of issues and concerns, 
— thirdly, the alienation of political theory from real political life. 
Gunnell predicted the continuation of these three features through the next 
decades. In Iiis survey on political theory in the 1980s, William Galston verified 
the predictions.46 Political theorists continued to disengage themselves from 
empirical political science. The dispersion also continued; this is called by 
Galston the proliferation of theoretical genres during the past decade. In the 
bibliography attached to Iiis survey, he took into consideration the following 
subjects: feminist thought; democratic theory; utilitarianism; community—republi-
canism—virtue; civil society; socialism—Marxism; liberalism; liberal neutrality; 
liberal justice—equality of opportunity; and the Nietzschean—postmodern contro-
versy. And the list could be continued. 
As for Gunnell's third prediction, concerning alienation, Galston is more 
cautious. He rightly observes that the standard for engagement with "real 
politics" is hardly self-evident. "The distance between theory and practice cannot 
be measured as the crow Hies".47 Political theory is located between philosophy 
and politics. Theory must stand at some distance from the practice of politics. 
Present-day American political science is reflecting the historical ambiguity or 
bipolarity between a search for the genuine methodologically backed science and 
the belief in a value-oriented, creative theory. The positive feature of the last two 
decades was the rejuvenation of political theory, including the history of political 
45 "Political theory: the evolution of a subfield". Between Philosophy and Politics: the 
Alienation of Political Theory. Amherst (Mass.) 1986, ch. 1. 
46 GALSTON, W.: "Political Theory in the 1990s, Perplexity amidst Diversity." (Paper 
presented at a Wilson Center panel session on "Recent Trends in Political Theory", in 
Washington DC, on March 2, 1992). The following references are to this manuscript. 
47 GALSTON: op. cit. 14. 
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theory.48 The shortage of the changes is that the new integration has become 
more hopeless. At the end of the 1990s, both political science and political theory 
are divided in very complex subfields, and are developing as self-contended, 
autonomous disciplines. This autonomy is primarily strengthened and secured by 
the institutional background (university departments, journals, researches) and by 
the growing internationalization of the academic community. But independence 
and self-sufficiency works definitely against integration of the two great fields. 
Therefore it is not a great risk that in the next decade the gap between political 
science and political theory will not diminish considerably. 
48 It is enough to refer to the outstanding works of Dunn, I'ocock, or Skinner. 
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Csaba VARGA Autonomy and Instrumentality of 
Law 
in a Superstructural Perspective 
A paper to express the author's tribute to Professor ZOLTÁN PÉTERI, one 
of the influential organisers, scholars and teachers, who had a pioneering 
role to revitalize the ethos of the laws' comparison as a key methodological 
option for theoretical legal research in Hungary, a major success especially 
at those long periods of times when Muscovite-inspired socialism ruled the 
country with unreflected suspicion and antagonism toward ideas and metho-
dologies not genuinely inherent in Marxism. The way in which Professor 
Péteri approached basic—or, properly speaking, eternal—problems of law, 
especially ones relating to issues of local legal tradition, law and values, 
general principles of law, natural law, and fundamental rights, at a time 
when in response to the 1956 Revolt in Hungary oppression pervaded every-
day life, has had to remain a disciplinary pattern of intellectual reaction, 
combining reservation with standards set, to the present author who has 
happened to work in close relationship to him for more than thirty-five years 
at the Sections of Comparative Law, respectively Philosophy of Law, of the 
Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and has 
in the recent years faced the job to erect, in active co-operation with him, 
a new scheme for legal education and scholarship in theoretical subjects in 
law under post-communist conditions, by founding and operating the 
Philosophy of Law Institute at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University of 
Hungary. 
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Concepts may also have strange fate. This is even more true if the concepts are 
placed into different functions while maintaining the appearance of conceptual 
identity, thereby tearing them out from the functions they were initially meant 
to fulfil, and planting them into an environment alien to their true nature, 
where their actual determinations can no longer prevail—if not turn upside-
down. Well, if some concepts have to cope with such a fate, then they can 
surely meet the requirements arising from roles alien to their nature only 
apparently, more causing controversy than helping clarification within the 
medium they are placed in. We can defeat latent dysfunctions only by making 
them manifest at first. Similarly, we can clarify conceptual relations only after 
their original meanings and functions are disclosed in their original context. 
If we inquire about the teachings of Marxism—attempting to circumscribe 
what Friedrich Engels called the materialist conception of history1—, the 
response will surely rely on the categories of basis and superstructure, and 
formulate the conclusions that Karl Marx arrived at after decades of research. 
These two categories, however, initially being the concise fitting metaphorical 
formulations of a scholarly presupposition, started to walk their own inde-
pendent way already in Marx's time. This presupposition, driving the scientific 
inquiry, that is, a working hypothesis, has first advanced into a scholarly 
proposition taken as an axomatic statement sufficient in and of itself, and then 
into a doctrine, that is, the system of such fundamental propositions. This 
obviously implied complete change of functions. Since, whatever was the 
starting point now became the final conclusion. In consequence, their apparently 
concrete deduction is no longer a proof, because of being of one single chance 
as an illustration to something of a truth. Such a treatment of concepts naturally 
went along theoretical rigidification, with the consequence of further concepts 
being channelled to forced paths. When a theory infiltrated with such concepts 
intends to remain consistent with itself, these forced paths radiate in a chain-
like reaction, pervading the entire theory, ultimately only to lead to the 
deformation of the whole theory. This unavoidably brings full conceptual 
uncertainty forth. 
1 ENGELS, F.: "Karl Marx: 'Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie'" [1859] in MARX, 
K.—ENGELS, F.: Ausgewählte Schriften I (Moscow: Verlag für Fremdsprachige Literatur 
1951), 343: "materialistiche Auffassung der Geschichte"; or MARX, K.: Die Deutsche 
Ideologie [ 1845—46] in his Der historische Materialismus Die Frühschriften, lirsg. S. Landshut 
und J. P. Mayer, II (Leipzig, Kröner, 1952), 10 |Kröner Tauschenausgabe 92]: "Wir kennen 
nur eine einzige Wissenschaft, die Wissenschaft der Geschichte." 
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Considering that law is primarily a superstructural phenomenon for Marxian 
thinking tradition, the philosophical evaluation of the categories of basis and 
superstructure may, for long periods of times, directly influence the philo-
sophical explanation of law in the orbit of Marxism as well. On the other hand, 
however fundamental the conception of law as a superstructural component in 
Marxist legal theory may seem in principle, the uncertainty inherent in its 
theoretical content just grows, and the silence of criticism is about to transform 
into the criticism of silence. 
An acceptable clarification would again presume the cultivation of Marxist 
philosophy at the level of modern2 and post-modern3 times and the repeated 
analyses in all fields with the theoretical aim at returning to the origins of 
Marx's methodological thinking—in short, this would presuppose what George 
Lukács called the renaissance of Marxism. In absence of this, legal theory 
must, if at all, at least clarify for what reasons and in what ways did its concept 
on its own subject change, and what methodological presuppositions and 
theoretical results the expounding of law through the use of the categories of 
basis and superstructure have. 
In the following, after that in an earlier treatment of the subject the original 
meaning and functions of the categories of basis and superstructure were 
reconstructed and their deformations and distorting effects on the theoretical 
understanding of law through its rigidification into sheer doctrinairism were 
traced down,4 in the following I shall attempt (I) to survey some current issues 
2 For a comprehensive survey accompanied by the overall assessment of the theoretical 
contribution of Marxism to legal studies, cf. Marxian Ixtgal Theory ed. and introd. Csaba 
Varga (Aldershot, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, Dartmouth & New York, New York 
University Press, 1993) xxvii + 530 [The International Library of Essays in Law & Legal 
Theory, Schools 9]. For a report on the current state of legal theorising in the region, cf. 
VARGA, Cs.: "Jogtudományunk az ezredvégen" [with abstract "Legal Scholarship at the 
Threshold of a New Millennium", 347-349] in Iustum, aequum, salutare Emlékkönyv 
Zlinszky János tiszteletére, ed. Gábor Bánrévy, Gábor Jobbágyi, Csaba Varga (Budapest 
[Osiris] 1998), 298-314 [A Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem Jog- és Államtudományi 
Karának könyvei 1], forthcoming in English in Rechtstheorie Beiheft, ed. Werner Krawietz 
and Csaba Varga (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2000). 
3 For the chances of Marxism to continuation in the region, cf., e.g., VARGA, Cs.: 
Transition to Rule of Law On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary (Budapest 
[Akaprint] 1995), particularly at chs. on No-law and Rule of Law, 19 et seq. and 156 et seq., 
respectively [Philosophiae Iuris]. 
4 Cf. VARGA, Cs.: "A jog mint felépítmény: Adalékok az alap-felépítmény kategóriapár 
történetéhez" [Law as superstructure: A contribution to the history of the pair of categories 
basis and superstructure] Magyar Filozófiai Szemle XXX (1986) 1-2, 35 et seq. 
2 1 6 Csaba Varga 
of philosophical interpretation in relation to these categories, and (II) to outline 
some potential advantages and theoretical content when these categories are 
applied in and to legal theorising. 
I. A relational category 
As almost usual with this specific tradition of thinking, the categories of basis 
and superstructure have played an ideological role attached to varying political 
practices all through the one and a half centuries of their development. This 
explains why the categories of basis and superstructure have become core 
issues for historical materialism cultivated as a political practice itself; 
categories in case of which classification and labelling as superstructure imply 
consequences that do not require any further inquiry. 
The reconstruction of their genuine meaning, balanced so that they can at 
the same time display the optimum of both inessagefulness and justifiability in 
theory, is a task yet to be fulfilled, if at all—its final results having only been 
temptatively advanced as hints within the renaissance of Marxism as outlined 
by George Lukács's posthumous Social Ontology—and bears a double task 
within it. It firstly implies the reconstruction of Marx's system of ideas by 
returning to the identificaton of the methodological insights formulated in his 
oeuvre. Secondly, it requires the analysis of the past periods with prejudices, 
presuppositions and also the entire mentality characteristic of Marx, which 
obviously will result in new analyses and evaluations in accordance with 
present-day requirements towards old examinations. 
The philosophical literature, under the push of the last decades of "actually 
existing socialism" in Hungary to return back to Marx's own methodological 
considerations, first and foremost emphasised the relative character of the 
categories of basis and superstructure. Thus, basis and superstructure are not 
intelligible categories in and of themselves, but "as correlative categories, they 
give expression to the undetachable nature, objective in reality, of the 
relationship between two sides".5 They do not serve for the "inventorisation" 
of social reality, since they are merely dedicated to characterising phenomena, 
already circumscribed in other ways, from one given perspective: to express the 
"correlation and relationship" of heterogeneous totalities to one another.6 For 
5 RÓNAI, R.: Alap és felépítmény [Basis and superstructure], Budapest, 1973, 23. 
6 KALLÓS, M.—ROTH, E.: A társadalmi rendszer [Social system], Bukarest, Politikai 
Könyvkiadó, 1978, 156. 
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this reason, they do not have "autonomous and independent meanings", hence 
we ought to speak rather of the category of "relationship between basis and 
superstructure" instead that of "basis and superstructure".7 On the other hand, 
it is not necessarily a neglectable consideration that these metaphorical and 
illustrative8 expressions have once been borrowed from architecture.9 Recog-
nising the metaphorical origin, however, is not decisive in and of itself. It can 
only become decisive insofar as we place the expression into its original 
contextual environment. In such a case it becomes conspicuous that Marx 
actually did not exclude the relative autonomy of the superstructure (neither 
actually did he confirm it),10 that is, there is a difference between Marx's 
concrete inquiries and the theoretical generalisations concerning the issue of 
whether or not the effects of basis and superstructure are bilateral or mutual.11 
The last period of philosophysing in terms of Marxism in Hungary before 
the fall of die imposed regime of communism—as opposed to earlier periods, 
that is, ones of Stalinist simplification, which had accepted the superstructure 
only as the class-homogeneous formation of a basis bearing class-contents—, 
stated unambiguously that superstructure is multi-layered also from a class 
perspective.12 However strange it may seem, it still does not claim more than 
what Antonio Gramsci formulated half-a-century ago: "By basis and super-
structure forming a »historical block«, the complex, contradictory and 
heterogeneous totality of superstructure is the reflection of the totality of social 
relations of production."13 The circumstance that Gramsci speaks of super-
structures in plural in relationship to a given basis, is self-evident once we 
apply the concept of superstructure as a generic term from the beginning. It 
provides also a sensitive hint suggesting that superstructure can only exist as 
opposed to the basis. Namely, superstructure reconciles such heterogeneous 
7 BAUMAN, Z.: Általános szociológia [General sociology] [Zarys marksistowskiej teorii 
spoleczentswa, Warsaw, PWN 1964], Budapest, Kossuth, 1967, 117. 
8 BAUMAN: op. cit., 116-117. 
9 KALLÓS—ROTH: op. cit., 156. 
10 MAKEPEACE, R. W.: Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law, London and Totowa, 
New Jersey: Croom Helm, and Barnes and Noble 1980, 20. 
11 PHILLIPS, P.: Marx and Engels on Law and Laws, Oxford, Robertson, 1980, 201. 
12 KÁRPÁTI, S .: A társadalom gazdasági alapja és felépítménye [The economic basis and 
superstructure of a society], Budapest, 1982, 8 -10 and 9; Rónai, 21. 
13 GRAMSCI, A.: [Philosophical and historical problems, para, on Basis and superstructure] 
from his 'Il matcrialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce' in his Opere 2, 8th ed. 
(Rome, 1966) [Quaderni del carcere I], trans, in Filozófiai írások [Papers in philosophy], 
Budapest, Kossuth, 1970, 94. 
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phenomena that represent a kind of commonness only in one single respect: as 
totalities, they have particular relations to the group of social phenomena 
indicated as their basis. 
May I note that such a characterisation of superstructure excludes from the 
very start any other perspective from playing a role in the qualification of any 
phenomena as superstructure. The acceptable conceptual minimum is such as 
set by Lukács's Ontology as a requirement for all components of social 
existence, that is, to appear in a form exerting social influence whatsoever. 
Therefore, within this sphere, the actual influence will hardly limit the quality 
of superstructure, even if it is not to be felt in too wide of a range and not so 
much determinant for other superstructures and their basis as any one might 
consider typical in other cases. Consequently, it may be a major rhetorical or 
terminological success, yet it is not justified and does not have any theoretical 
content whatsoever, if the superstructure were degraded into a "substructure" 
in case of a phenomenon which one considers to have lesser social influence 
than what may have benn initially hoped for.14 
Conceiving of basis and superstructure as relational categories explains why 
a minimum of influence is already sufficient, or the historically concretely 
defined grade, character and quality of this minimum may make it suitable to 
surface in relation to basis and superstructure. The conceptual minimum aims 
at drawing external boundaries, therefore it does by far not limit the truth of 
the fact that the sole content of these relational categories is the connection of 
various areas, a fact which is precisely—and exclusively—manifest in their 
mutual influence. 
If we say, using the language of Lukács's Ontology, that social existence 
is such an irreversibly advancing process in which the mutual influence 
characteristic of the respective complexities takes place, then it becomes 
evident that basis and superstructure are just the area in which such mutual 
influence is manifested, this being equivalent to the social existence from the 
perspective of Lukács's Ontology. Whereas if the relative category receives its 
meaning from the fact of mutual influence and from the incessant motion 
manifest in the dynamism thereof, then it will be confusing, moreover, plainly 
misleading if, when describing superstructure, we suggest stand-still staticism 
or immobile objectivity expressed in form of states of rest, and not of dynamic 
functioning. This is typical for exemplificative definitions,15 which present the 
14 E.g., HERMANN, 1.: in Élet és Irodalom (26 January 1980), 4. 
15 E.g., ERDÉLYI. L.: "Alap és felépítmény" [Basis and superstructure] in Történelmi 
materializmus [Historical materialism], Budapest, Kossuth, 1980, 95. 
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superstructure more as an anatomical cross-section than an organism living by 
actually exerting influence (reminiscent of Lukács's characterisation of mecha-
nical materialism, according to which, after all, vulgar materialism uses patterns 
taken from a quasi-religious world-view in the form of metaphors of some 
active "creator", on the one hand, and passive "creatures", on the other).16 
Regardless of what criteria we set for such phenomena, their real presence 
and importance will only be seen in the motion and dynamism of the 
phenomena in question. This is clearly shown by Lukács's analysis of class-
character and ideology. For there can be no set boundaries, as humans take part 
in social struggles with their entire intellects, and for this very reason, any 
affirmation or negation of a statement is defined from the perspective of 
classes. Thus, no boundaries can be drawn where an ideology ends and some-
thing else starts—since the quality which would underlie such a disctinction "is 
not inherent in the abstract statement itself'.17 Response to such questions 
can always be revealed from the actual motion of the phenomenon and the 
historically concrete process of the course of how it will finally get defined. Of 
course, this is not a novel recognition but the sheer application of Marx's, 
methodological idea. It is also a fundamental principle of Lukács's Ontology, 
according to which social existence, similar to other types of existence, is 
process-like, manifest in its irreversible advancement. 
Emphasising the dynamic nature of superstructure excludes the possibility 
to conceive of it as a passive medium with respect to the basis, in which "the 
former defines the latter in an absolute manner, »by the force of the laws of 
nature«".18 Basis and superstructure are by no means opposable to one another 
on grounds of some sort of exclusivity, and also their treatment as relative 
categories is merely raisable upon the basis of their inseparability accepted 
priorly. "Basis and superstructure as correlative categories express the relation-
ship between two sides objectively inseparable in reality."19 This référés to the 
16 LUKÁCS, Gy.: A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról [Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen 
Seins] III [Prolegomena: Prinzipienfragen einer heute möglich gewordenen Ontologie], 
Budapest, Magvető, 1976, 350 et seq. 
17 HOLZ, H. H., KOFLER, L.—AB ENDROTH, W.: Conversations with Lukács, ed. Theo 
Pinkus, London, Merlin, 1974, 43-44. 
18 LUKÁCS: III, 349. ["die absolute »naturgesetzliche« Determiniertheit" Prolegomena, 520 
in the last MS in German, typed with autoraph corrections, in Lukács Archives and Library 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.] 
19 RÓNAI: op. cit., 23. 
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limits of the metaphor of "basis" and "superstructure", to the fact that their 
meaning borrowed from architecture cannot be transferred to furher areas.20 
In its architectural use, the basis does not bear an independent function, its 
function being only statical, that is, subordinated and merely instrumental one. 
It is designed to support the superstructure and to facilitate its self-realisation. 
In regard of the relationship between economics and other spheres, it is 
precisely the instrumental role of the latter that is relavant. The economic 
sphere bears relatively independent functions and values, and these were 
absolutised by the Stalinist conception, attaching a teleology borrowed from 
such a quasi-religious world-view to the process of history. At the same time, 
in architecture, the creation of basis and superstructure is a process following 
a strict succession, which, even if being irreversible, is still breakable at any 
moment. If this occurs, the construct will not be finished, yet it will be complete 
according to the level and measure of its readiness at any given time. Well, it 
was this notion of succession and previous foundation which led philosophical 
thought into a dead-end, when, instead of starting from unseparable inter-
twinement, it presumed that a basis can be created in and of itself, which itself 
will create a suitable superstructure for its own service. 
When speaking of the relationship between basis and superstructure, we have 
already established that raising these problems can only be done as the issue of 
total interrelations between totalities, being reasonable exclusively as the 
relationship between unseparable sides. How their relationship is apprehensible 
within this range is a fundamental question of Marxist philosophy, yet 
adequately not formulated to this day. We could see from the very beginning 
how subtle, and striving to unravel multiple interrelations, the answers outlined 
by Marx were when analysing socio-economic relations at early times; how and 
why these formulations on the system of relations later became one-sided in the 
generalisations by the classics of Marx ism; how the further simplification and 
usage leading to theoretical distorsion eventually convinced Engels to 
reconstruct this system of relations in his late letters also on the plane of 
theoretical generalisation in its actual complexity; and, finally, how it almost 
turned into mechanical determinism in the Stalinist theory21—first of all for the 
reason to justify the voluntaristic political practice, by drawing it into the mist 
of an almost automatically self-fulfilling necessity. 
In Hungary, beginning with the '80s (and practically ending by about the 
early '90s), after such antecedents, the philosophy of Marxism searched for 
20 KALLÓS—ROTH: op. cit., 160. 
21 Cf. VARGA: (1986), particularly at paras. 1-2. 
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points of references to correct the distortions incurred in the previous era and 
to reconstruct Marx's methodological ideas. The attempts were manifold 
indeed. In the present paper, I can only present but a few characteristic 
examples, worth of even to-day's philosophical reflection from a methodological 
perspective. 
One of the approaches seeked the modern formulation of the (after all) 
determinant role of the economy by comparing and reformulating the relevant 
stances taken by the classics of Marxism in this matter. "What we do not 
acknowledge is that ideas and opinions may have a development independent 
of the economic conditions. Ideas always originate on grounds of certain 
economic conditions—that is, the economic basis—, but after being born they 
react upon this basis, influence its development and play an active social 
role."22 This approach clearly shows the efforts at eliminating the relics of the 
mechanical deterministic approach and to show the interrelations manifest in 
the social existence in their dialectic interaction. Thanks to its subtleness, this 
formulation is hardly refutable, it is still questionable as a complete response, 
because it suggests that a system of economic conditions (as a kind of basis) 
could apparently be created alone, without any interaction with some sort of a 
superstructure, that is, as if something mutually exclusive could exist before 
and after in the course of the development of basis and superstructure. 
Another approach tried to provide an answer through the help of the 
Leninist theory of reflection. According to this, the basis of reference is the 
establishment of that "[t]he superstructure reflects the economic basis." The 
actual meaning soon came to light after the key-notion had been interpreted: 
"We call reflection the phenomenon when the processes within one given 
system have an impact upon another system."23 The notion of reflection thus 
defined is by far not problem-free. It helps the survival of the trend of ideas 
which, during the development of A/urxism in the 20th century, placed the 
epistemological approach more and more exclusively and distortingly before 
the ontologial one, and which exerted a strongly negative influence on Lukács 
when writing his Ontology.24 It is true, however, that we cannot speak of 
22 KÁRPÁTI: op. cit., 16. 
23 KALLÓS—ROTH : op. cit., 162. 
24 Cf., e.g., with my own efforts since the time of VARGA, Cs.: The Place of Law in 
Lukács' World Concept, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985 [reprint 1998]) 193, which was 
already qualified by one of its reviewers, namely, the editor of Lukács's works in German, 
as an early formulation of autopoietical theory. See BENSELER, F.: in Zeitschrift fur 
Rechtssoziologie 8, 1987. 2, 302-304. For the understanding of autopoiesis in an ontological 
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notional distortion in this case, as the definition we quoted of reflection 
ascribes both epistemological and ontological importance to this notion, but 
once providing that 'reflection' becomes a mere synonym of 'exerting 
influence*, it will necessarily lose its particularity and its quality to embody 
an independent category. On the other hand, it is also problematic if both 
expressions of 'reflection' and 'reaction' presume a previously existent 
agent, which could be born sufficiently in and of itself in order to enter into 
contact with other factors only later. This is to say that response through the 
help of the reflection-theory obscures exactly the most important factor in the 
relationship of basis and superstructure, namely the fact that this is a 
relationship between aspects that originally have developed together, mutually 
and bidirectionally from the earliest points of their development. 
Finally, there was an attempt which tried to provide answers based on 
Lukács's Ontology in opposition to the simplifications rigidified into 
prejudices within Marxism. Accordingly, "essentially we can distinguish two 
kinds of mutual aspects within the total interrelations of social complexity: 
mutual conditioning, on the one hand, and boundness to conditions, on the 
other, in case of the latter one moment irreversibly preconditioning the other." 
The first type of correlation is—in Lukács's terminology—characterised by the 
predominance of one moment, and the other, by ontological priority. Well, 
according to the conclusion, exclusively the latter can be the case with regard 
to the economy, since "[t]here was a period in history when the economy 
functioned without legal regulation, and even today there are numerous areas 
and relations of economic life which lack legal ordering."25 The efforts of the 
author of the quote in this case aimed at disproving the prejudice that wanted 
to express relationships between law and economy, and economy and other 
sectors, respectively, in the form of relationship between contents and forms. 
This attempt was fully successful, moreover, Lukács's standpoint too is 
unambiguous: "form and content ever and always, in the individual subject, 
complex, process, etc., determine together and only together its specificity, its 
being as it is [gerade-so-sein] (inluding generality). Bu it is for this very reason 
impossible that in the determination of real and separate complexes to one 
reconstruction of apparently epistemological (or, properly speaking, epistemology-bound) 
processes in law, cf. VARGA, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts, 
Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1995. vii + 249. 
25 PESCHKA, V.: "Ideologische Vorurteile über das Verhältnis zwischen Wirtschaft und 
Recht", Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiae Hungaricae, 1989, 3 -4 , 259-274. 
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another, the one should figure as content, and the other as form."26 My doubts 
arise in relation to the fact whether or not any distinction of the two types of 
mutual aspects derives from this. This is a decisive question, and the answers 
to it are hard to offer because they would presume a philosophically consistent 
and thought-through re-examination of the multi-directional reasonings in 
Lukács's Ontology. 
In past decades that had preceded the already achieved "after-Marxism" 
period, however, philosophy in Hungary had not made any serious step toward 
seizing one of the century's most significant Marx ist attempts. Thus, 
everything an outsider may say can be nothing more ambitious than the 
expression of own personal meditations. Accordingly, Lukács did indeed speak 
of ontological priority, but he had to do so independently of the merits of the 
question. For once he adopted Nikolai Hartmann's principle on the ontological 
construction of structures to build the ontology of complexes on grounds of 
distinction between the respective modes of existence, he could not avoid to 
raise the issue of ontological priority for that the separation of the respective 
spheres of existence was done. This does not necessarily imply that there are 
such comprehensive complexities within the given spheres of existence, about 
which the ontological [seinhaftige] statement is intelligible: "One of them can 
exist without the other, without the opposite being the case."27 
It will be the task of the still wanted LaMcs-philology to clarify these 
conceptual interrelations. In any case, it is a fact that ontological priority and 
the predominance of the role played by any one side within this relationship 
was formulated with contradictory inconsistence on the pages of Lukács's 
Social Ontology. Ontological priority is, on the one hand, the characterisation 
of a situation when one phenomenon can exist without another, but the latter 
cannot without the former; and, on the other hand, it is the characteristic of one 
given side within an interaction that (as the predominant moment) ultimately 
exerts the last and decisive influence. Lukács mentions ontological priority first 
when speaking of the distinction between the organic, anorganic, as well as 
social, modes of existence. Later he mentions it with regard to the relationship 
between being and consciousness, only to immediately make clear their 
relationship (again as ontological priority) with respect to basis and 
superstructure.28 He subtly states that Marx "does not reduce the world of 
26 LUKÁCS: I. 409. [LUKÁCS: G.: Marx's Basic Ontological Principles trans. David 
Fernbach, London, Merlin, 1978, 151.] 
27 LUKÁCS: I, 307. [LUKÁCS: Marx's..., op. cit. 31.] 
28 LUKÁCS: I, 147. 
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consciousness with its forms and contents directly to the economic structure, 
but rather relates it to the totality of social existence"; but he does so as if 
forgetting that "the totality of social existence" is rather inconceivable without 
"the world of consciousness with its forms and contents".29 The situation is 
rather similar when he emphasises that "the ontological priority of production, 
as a predominant moment, prevails everywhere", and he does not see any 
inconsistency in recording it through the next sentence that the relationship 
between production and consumption "stands very close to the reflexive 
determinations discussed with regards to Hegel",30 Ontological priority 
becomes the synonym of predominance manifest in the interaction when Lukács 
discusses the relations between material and "purely" mental processes in 
relation to production: "The more socialised a society is, the more unseparably 
intertwined—in the material production—the two processes are. Nobody denies 
their ontological differences, but the primary ontological fact of their effects 
in the field of social existence is that they unseparably co-exist [ . . .] . Issues of 
primacy can only be raised reasonably when the unseparable co-existence is 
recognised in the analysis of this group of phenomena."31 Finally, we can also 
find examples for the ways in which actual ontological priority slips into a 
medium where mere interactions prevail: "From the ontological priority of one 
mode of existence does by no means derive that this is evaluated positively or 
negatively from the perspective of some sort of a hierarchy of values. It is only 
about the bare establishment of the fact that the biological reproduction of life 
forms the existential basis of all manifestations of life, and that the former is 
ontologically possible without the latter, but not the other way round. The true 
opposition, as applied to this simple fact, does not derive from the fact itself, 
but from its specific nature realised within social existence, from the 
continuous socialisation of biological-human existence, as a result of which, 
with time, an entire complexity has taken shape from the ontogenetical 
reproduction within social existence, and this is the economic sector. The more 
socialised the human activities are, which, after all, serve to fulfil the demands 
29 LUKÁCS: I, 307. [LUKÁCS: Marx's..., op. cit., 32.] 
30 LUKÁCS: I, 331. 
31 LUKÁCS: III, 352. ["Je mehr die Gesellschaft sich vergesellschaftet, desto untrennbarer 
sind beide Prozesse, gerade in der materiellen Produktion, ineinander verschlungen. Ihre 
ontologischen Verschiedenheiten werden damit natürlich nicht geleugnet. Aber das primär 
ontologische Faktum ihres Wirkens im Bereich des gesellschaftlichen Seins (und ausser dessen 
Bereich gibt es weder etwas Geistiges, noch von teleologischen Setzungen in Gang gebrachte 
materielle Prozesse) ist ihre untrennbare Koexistenz." Prolegomena, 525.] 
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set by the human biological-ontogenetical reproduction, the stronger the mental 
resistance is to recognise the primacy of the economic sector over the 
others."32 As much as it is unambiguous that die biological reproduction of 
life has ontological priority in the sense that it forms the basis of all other 
manifestations of life, so much is the least evident that the economic sector—in 
the socialised forms of its development, or even at a primitive stage—could be 
born and function without the development of cognition, the concomitant 
formation of the complexities designed for the institutionalisation of regulation 
and order, and without interaction with these. Speaking of large and 
comprehensive complexes, for instance, the function of social regulation can 
surely be fulfilled not only by a given partial complex recognised as 
distinctively legal. It can be done as well by spontaneous forms (which Lukács 
already regarded as quasi-legal) that ensure, even in case of a simple co-
operation (as, e.g., the first Robinsonian act of labour), "the most precise 
regulation of the obligations of the participants on basis of the concrete labour-
process and the division of labour arising from it (beaters and hunters in 
hunting)".33 Thus, in this very context the question is entirely irrelevant what 
other complexities form the elements and functions which, surpassing the bare 
factual sphere of relations of production, are indispensable for the functioning 
of the economy. There is but one important fact, namely, that for the sake of 
their own reproduction, humans need to form and operate numerous other 
functions beyond production, which they cannot give up. At the same time, the 
self-reproducing human has a crucial role in the formation and operation of 
such functions. 
Returning to the answers concerning the relationship between basis and 
superstructure, we can establish that all these answers were in fact reductionist, 
as they tried to originate the superstructure from the economic basis. Therefore, 
if we accept the fact of their unseparable existence as a point of reference, then 
the only tiling we can examine within their relationship as basis and super-
structure is the dynamism of their interaction—being aware that "the basic fact 
of materialist dialectics is that there is no real interaction (no real reflection 
determination) without a predominant moment".34 
The previous development can hardly claim to have clarified the relation-
ship between ontological priority and the predominant moment inherent in the 
interaction, either by adopting Lukács's use of notions or by pointing beyond 
32 LUKÁCS: II, 237. 
33 LUKÁCS: II, 208 et seq. 
34 LUKÁCS: I, 333. [LUKÁCS: Marx's..., op. cit., 63.] 
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it. It is adequate only for raising doubts about the mutually excluding senses 
of the uses of these notions by sheding light upon their contradictory appli-
cations in Lukács's oeuvre. It does not propose anything with regard to the 
provability of their meanings according to Lukács's strict definition (ontological 
priority as the possibility of the existence of phenomenon not preconditioned 
by the existence of another phenomenon, and the predominant moment as the 
ultimate determining role exercised by one side within mutually precondi-
tioning interactions), and, providing that they are provable, whether they are 
provable as categories opposed to one another or merely in some different 
correlation. In the light of our initial question regarding the relationship 
between basis and superstructure, we can still establish that social existence is 
a complexity composed of further complexities already at the primitive stages 
of its development, the existence of which being manifest in its irreversibly 
progressing processual nature—in the form of interactions within which the 
complex chain of mediations and juxtapositions does not follow unilinear 
determinations, as everything that mediates (in a given direction) is itself 
mediated (in another direction). In Lukács's Ontology, it is the category of 
socialisation that marks the increasingly prevailing tendency of development, 
manifest in the increasing internal complexity of social existence, in the 
assertion of the particularities of its relatively independent components, and in 
the gradual coming to prominence of purely social determinations. In 
consequence, in the network of mutual correlations, the purely "material" and 
the purely "ideal", or the "economic" and other aspects—more comprehensively: 
the "basis" and the "superstructure"—cannot be separated from one another in 
a manner of the former being able to exist without the latter. This only holds 
for the greater comprehensive aspects of social existence (that is, for its 
functions and complexes), and not for the specific forms thereof, as religion, 
art, politics, law, or state, developing and differentating themselves from one 
another in a given phase of social development. At the same time, it holds for 
both that, taken as processes, they are irreversible. {Lukács's example relies 
on the quote taken from Marx's Grundrisse: "Man is a zoon politicon in the 
strictest sense of the word, he is not only a social animal, but an animal which 
can isolate only within society.")35 This is to say that once social existence 
has developed, the practical defiance of any of its forms can only be conceived 
35 "Der Mensch ist im wörtlichsten Sinn ein Çc0OV_roAmKOV, nicht nur ein geselliges Tier, 
sondern ein Tier, das nur in der Gesellschaft sich vereinzeln kann." MARX, K.: Grundrisse 
der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858, Berlin, Dietz, 1953, 6 [Marx-
Engels-Lenin-Institute-Moskau ]. Quoted also by Lukács II, 280. 
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as the realisation of one given concrete form of sociality. (Thus I can establish 
the absence of state, law, religion, or art, defined in one or another way, but 
this will not alter the necessity and factuality of that some form fulfils, or helps 
the completion of, the integration of society and the regulation of its 
fundamental conditions, as well as the transcendental and aesthetic self-
expression of human beings.) 
Lukács does not furnish a convincing answer on how the ultimate definition 
in any given interaction prevails and in what concrete way(s) it does. 
Nevertheless, he often states on the plane of principles that this does not take 
place in a mechanical way, neither in a necessarily and directly causal way. On 
the other hand, remaining true to the genuinely Marxian tradition, he seeks to 
present the theory of social action built upon alternative possibilities of 
decision through the empirical presentation of historical examples and concrete 
case-analyses, a theory in which from multiple mediation and juxtaposition 
(from the range of mobility of the alternative possibilities of decision, always 
given in their concrete uniqueness, but on a socially general plane, in every 
case having well-defined boundaries and drives) the actual decisions derive, 
pointing in a certain direction of development. Hence, in the process of social 
determination, it is by far not simply external factors—force, interest, etc.—that 
have a role, but this very concrete process of self-determination will actually 
take place through the mediation of social total determination in the recognition 
of the alternatives of decision, their circumscription, as well as in the 
evolvement and self-assertion of the qualities of human personality in the 
background (also preconditioned by the actual social total process). The variety 
of the factors of influence is well explained by Lukács: "Whatever may be the 
immediate relations of pure power, the fact remains that the men who represent 
these or who are subjected to them are men who have to reproduce their own 
life under definite concrete conditions, who accordingly possess definite 
aptitudes, skills, abilities, etc., and who can only behave and adapt accordingly. 
So if a new distribution of the population takes place from extra-economic 
power relations, then this is never independent of the economic inheritance of 
the past developments, and a double settlement of the future economic relations 
necessarily arises from an interaction between the human groups who are 
stratified in this way."36 Thus, whatever we called the predominant moment 
of the interactions prevails only through largely indirect channels—not always 
reconstructible by exact means. For tills very reason, it can by no means be the 
task of Marxist philosophy to flatten these complex phenomena into abstract 
36 LUKÁCS: I, 335. [LUKÁCS: Marx's..., op. cit., 65.] 
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principles, and to apply them deductively and simplifyingly to the various 
fields of human cognition. Its task is rather to investigate the concrete ways of 
their interaction—those mediations that lead to the ultimate determination 
within, and also to the emergence of the particular autonomy of, the examined 
field—by placing these areas into the actually prevailing social totality and 
unravelling their particular dialectic. 
The mutuality, from the very start, of the relationship between basis and 
superstructure is enough to explain why Marxism uses the categories of basis 
and superstructure within this mutuality as relative categories marking the 
predominant side. If we go further in the analysis of the complexity of this 
definition, and free their relationship of the remnants of teleology and of the 
wishful thinking to read any superior goals into it, furthermore, if we recognise 
in Lukács's Ontology the attempt at fulfilment of the old need not to rigidify the 
presentiments in philosophy into doctrines and apply them insensibly on reality, 
but to forge our own notions and tools from them to support our genuinely 
open inquiries, then we will also realise why Lukács did not undertake the 
continuation of the philosophical tradition inherent in the categories of basis 
and superstructure in Iris great synthetical work, crowning his oeuvre, and why 
he only referred to them critically, instead of using them in his own reasoning. 
I believe that this behaviour conceals a hidden stance, namely, the act of 
having returned to the original Marxist tradition. By this I mean the methodo-
logical stance taken by Marx in his Grundrisse.', the analysis of concrete 
correlations should always be done within the concrete set of categories of the 
given correlations. The categories of basis and superstructure should only be 
made use of in the simplifying and summarising characterisation of one given 
side or aspect of certain correlations. Lukács expressed himself in Iris own 
system of categories, in the language of the ontology of social complexes, with 
a previously unknown accuracy, and without actually scrutinising the 
Grundrisse or using methods of figurative description, reminiscent of Marx. 
From the numerous relationships between basis and superstructure, the 
following recognitions were of primary interest for Lukács: 
(1) The various sides of social existence—thus, especially, the pheno-
mena embodied by the categories of basis and superstructure—are in a 
relationship in which they mutually precondition one another. This is to say 
that once they are historically born and have unravelled their particularities, 
they have become such strong elements of social existence that no 
reasonable abstraction is any longer conceivable in relation to them. 
(2) This mutual preconditioning is characterised by the uninterrupted 
process of interactions, which becomes so complex with social progress 
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advancing that the ultimately determining side, that is, one playing the 
predominant role, can only prevail through multiple mediations. 
(3) The various complexities taking part in the process gradually 
develop their particularities with social progress advancing, thereby in-
creasingly re-asserting their relative separation and autonomy. Consequently, 
the truth will become more and more transparent (in a way to unravel further 
particularities) that "each complex bears the characteristic that allows it to 
react to the drives generated by the general motions of the social existence 
in economy in its own particular way".37 
(4) This will make the reaction by other social partial complexes not 
only particular (due to their structure and functioning), but it also implies 
that their own past (with all the eventualities included) plays a determinant 
role in shaping their aspects.38 The fact that the past continuously builds 
into the present is of an ontological nature, which we can only establish by 
subsequently reconstructing its concrete form, without being able to alter, 
in the name of any superior teleology, the ways and value-criteria of the 
selection one once made from the past. Thus, we can hardly state that 
"every concrete social superstructure integrates only those from its historical 
antecedents that correspond with its own basis in their content",39 unless 
we presume the existence of a superior guardian providing some rationality 
for the process itself. Certain possibilities of errors, distortions arising from 
the ideological way of thinking, and direct receptions and influences owing 
to impotence, and so on, may all be inherent in the experience of the past 
and in the actual process of the selection made from it. The fact that the 
various abilities, experience, ways of reaction, styles of action, moreover, 
the memory of the already experienced past, are all to build indestructibly 
in the social existence, inspired Lukács to strongly emphasise that 
restoration is possible only when mechanically objectified conditions are 
meant, it being entirely excluded in respect of social processes.40 Under 
given specific conditions, however, it is by for not excluded in point of 
principle for inadequate answers and solutions of the past to serve as 
building stones for the future, or eventually to become determining factors 
thereof. 
And at this point the author stops with his conclusions. 
37 LUKÁCS: II, 252. 
38. LUKÁCS: II, 189. 
39 ERDÉLYI: op. cit., 99. 
40 LUKÁCS: III, 115. 
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All these notwithstanding, I still think that it would be unreasonable an 
expectation to prove any correlation between the categories of basis and 
superstructure in Lukács's oeuvre, or to expound it philosophically in a way 
excessive to the above level. One of the reasons for this is that Lukács has 
created a general theory within the ontology of social complexes, without 
having drawn the outlines of the theories concerning its individual fields (or 
complexities) beforehand. Thus, as opposed to the methodological pattern 
followed by Marx, who always started mental constructions to erect from the 
bottom (searching for an answer to the historical problems of his time in the 
analysis of economic conditions, and, through continuous feedback to the 
concrete experience, arrived to such conclusions that presented history as the 
one of class struggles and indicated the fundamental driving force of history 
in the economic sphere), Lukács drew his constructions f rom the top, as if 
having inspired from previously established mental constructs, sometimes in a 
way clearly reminiscent of deductive thinking patterns. So, as opposed to the 
path Marx as a thinker followed, whose science-theoretical ideals and history-
philosophical recognitions were formed through a series of economic analyses 
dealing with the most minute details in his works ranging f rom A Contribution 
to the Critique of the Political Economy to The Capital, and the shortened and 
simplifying summaries and generalisations always relied on actual analyses; 
well, in case of Lukács, the line between the scholar and the ideologist is by 
far not this easy to draw. The areas, far from the political and economic, which 
stood in the centre of Lukács's professional interest—and I mean literature and 
aesthetics here—, relied on certain preferences and prejudices ever in work in 
his entire oeuvre, showing normative and preconceived judgement from the 
very start. At the same time, Lukács naturally accepts the fundamental principle 
of Marxism on the primacy of the economic sphere, when analysing the mutual 
conditioning and influence between the various complexities. Thus, what the 
Grundrisse speaks of as the determination "in the last resort" is neither 
expounded nor explained by the definition given by Lukács on the "pre-
dominant moment" in a mutual relationship. This means that he treated the 
actual question arising in the relationship between basis and superstructure as 
answered, without giving an explanation, except to its acceptance as the 
ontological characteristic of the social existence itself. He regarded this as the 
axiomatic principle of a system of thoughts. And a principle as such can only 
be asserted within deductive reasoning, yet this is not the kind of category 
which could be used for a genuine in-depth investigation. 
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II. The law's understanding 
The Marxist tradition, expressing relations within society through the categories 
of basis and superstructure, is so strong world-wide and especially in the 
Central and Eastern European region that legal theory must unavoidably face 
dealing with the conception of law taken as superstructure. The traditional 
paths of this conception—or the eventually inherited forced paths—are already 
so beaten that an outside viewer may sense the Marxist concept of law as if 
necessarily leading to some sort of a "general quasi-economic theory of 
determinism".41 It is a fact that in our region one of the core issues of all basic 
treatises within legal theory until these very days has been either the 
relationship between law and economics (in Marxism proper), or the theoretical 
explanation of how legal systems belonging to different social-economic 
formations can exert influence upon one another (in late periods of Marxism, 
when philosophysing on the senses and hows of legal development42 patterned 
by Alan Watson came to form an agenda43). It is also a fact that it would be 
an adequate task for Marxist jurisprudence (only provided that it can at all 
outlive the fall of "actually existing socialisms" in the Central and Eastern 
European region) to finally conduct historical research: to examine by 
comparative means, relying on concrete historical material, the development of 
the respective solutions of statutory regulations and judicial decisions, as well 
as the line and logic of this development. The analysis of various legal 
institutions would provide additional information to be able to answer the 
question of what the "ultimately" determinant role by the economy can at all 
mean in the legal sphere. 
Being able to explain the contradictory relationship between law and 
economics, on the one hand, and the effects of different legal systems upon one 
41 ERH-SOON TAY, A -KAMENKA, E.: "Marxism-Leninism and the Heritability of Law", 
Review of Socialist Law, VI, 1980, 3, 268. 
42 For general overviews of inter-cultural influences in legal development, cf. Comparative 
Legal Cultures ed. and introd. Csaba Varga (Aldershot, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 
Dartmouth & New York, New York University Press 1992) xxiv + 614 [The International 
Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory, Series ed. Tom D. Campbell, Legal Cultures 1] 
and European Legal Cultures ed. Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland, Csaba Varga (Aldershot, 
Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney, Dartmouth, 1996. xviii + 567 [Tempus Textbook Series 
on European Law and European Legal Cultures I]. 
43 The topic was introduced by Csaba Varga's review paper on Transplantation of Laws, or 
Borrowing as the Universal Factor of Legal Development [in Hungarian] in Állam- és 
Jogtudomány XXIII (1980) 2, 286-298. 
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another, on the other, requires in the first place the theoretical clarification of 
the concept of law as a superstructure, by making it properly differentiated and 
general. 
As to its differentiation, by the end of the '60s, socialist legal theory, 
keeping a distance from the last defenders of the Stalinist dogma on the total 
discontinuity between differing types of law,44 arrived at the conclusion that 
law is actually dichotonomous, being formed of both social and normative 
contents.45 This point of view was approached from various directions. Some 
started from the thesis that law is reflection of reality, thus seeing the mirror 
of reality in direct (social) contents that must be transformed into indirect 
(normative) contents to be able to express it as law, and thereby also to serve 
processes of legal influence.46 Other started from the dialectics of means and 
ends. These latter argued that law can achieve the fulfilment of its function 
only through its own technical-legal functions.47 Both the above arguments 
contained some elements of truth, but I still believe that neither of them 
provided sufficient explanation, because they conceived of law as the total of 
statutory and judicial instruments, and of the legal superstructure as static, 
being the mere set of legal enactments (either objectified as, or declared to 
embody, the law). 
As far as the general nature of the notion of legal superstructure is 
concerned, theory has just recently got to a point being able to recognise that 
qualities regarding the entire superstructure cannot be referred and related to. 
44 E.g., ARLT, R—LUNGWITZ, W.: "Die Entwicklung des sozialistischen Rechts und die 
bürgerliche Traditionen", Staat und Recht, 1963/5. 
45 E.g., PESCHKA, V.: Jogforrás és jogalkotás [Sources of law and law-making], Budapest, 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1965, ch. IV, para. 1; Victor Dongoroz 'Dreptul penal socialist al tarii 
noastre: Raportul dintre continutul normativ si continutul social-politic al dreptului penal din 
Republica Socialista Romanin' Studii si cercetari juridice 1965/3; NASCHITZ, A. M.: '"Le 
problème du droit naturel" à la lumière de la philosophie marxiste du droit' Revue roumaine 
des Sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques X (1966) 1, para. III; SZOTÁCZKI, M.: 
A jog lényege [The essence of law] (Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1970, ch. IV, 
para. 2; Neno Nenovski Priemstvenosta v pravoto [Continuity in law] (Sofia, Nauka i 
Izkustvo, 1975), ch. V. 
46 Particularly at PESCHKA: Jogforrás és jogalkotás, op. cit. 
47 Particularly at NENOVSKI; op. cit. In socialist legal theory, the basic reference is usually 
provided by the paper, of primordial importance at its time, of Traian Ionescu et BARASCH, 
E. A.: "Les constantes du droit: Droit et logique", Revue roumaine des Sciences sociales: 
Série de Sciences juridiques, VIII, 1964, 2, stating "the continuity of logic" in law (143) 
through the separation of "the essence to be realised" (as goal) and "the technique of 
realisation" (as instrument). 
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or deduced from, the individual components of a given superstructure. Thus, 
a formulation that claims that "ft]he superstructura] nature of the legal part of 
the superstructure cannot be considered as a disunity of individual statutory 
rules, neither can the statutory rules be weighed independently, taken in their 
uniqueness. The role of the superstructure concerns the entirety and the 
concrete generality of a given social phenomenon"48—well, such a formulation 
does not resolve the basic dilemma or show the way out of it. It merely 
substantiates the fact that the quality of superstructure is born from certain 
objectivations: partly the enacted rules and partly the official institutions of the 
law. 
Drawing conclusions from the legal-philosophical perspective elaborated 
within Lukács's Social Ontology,49 we might arrive at rather far-reaching 
results, new also in their methodological outlook and theoretical approach. 
Accordingly, law 
(1) is an irreversible process-like phenomenon from an ontological 
point of view. Its motion is defined primarily by its place taken in the total 
social complex, and, within this—through various socio-political and other 
kinds of mediations—, its relationship to the sphere of economy. 
(2) The motion within the total social complex displays, at the level of 
the given individual partial complexes, a continuously reproducing dialectic 
unity between stability and change. 
(3) From an ontological perspective, the social existence of the complex 
of law can be reduced to its actually exerting social influence. (Thus, the 
current Hungarian law is not only the sum of the statutory provisions in 
force, not merely the judicial organisation with its personal and institutional 
machinery, but the sum of these two in its actual operation, influencing 
social life and forming one of the factors thereof.) The same is not 
necessarily to be said, in the direct sense of actually exerting social 
influence, of each fundamental component, form of objectivation, or 
internal rule. 
(4) Therefore, there is and there can be no equivalence between the law 
as a functioning agent and the law as actual functioning—that is, between 
law taken as a store of technical instruments (the organisational-institutional 
background of the mechanism of exerting influence, i.e., legal provisions 
and the machinery dedicated to their enactment and enforcement), on the 
one hand, and law taken as the fulfilment of its functions (its actual motion 
48 SZABÓ, I.: Les fondenwnts de la théorie du droit, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973. 
49 Cf. VARGA: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept, op. cit. ch. VI. 
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and social effect, i.e., the actual form which it takes in the practical life of 
society), on the other. 
(5) The past at any given time is real for the present in so much as we 
draw from it. Thus, human progress—with regard to the available store of 
technical instruments as well—manifests itself rather in the placement of old 
elements into new context and influencing mechanisms than in the 
formation and use of quite new elements.50 
(6) From this derives that we can by no means leave the instrumental 
character of law out of consideration. At the same time, we must discuss 
with the same emphasis the various kinds of sociological and moral, 
economic and political components of the instrumental use of law, and the 
issue of adequacy between the goals to be achieved through law and the 
applied instruments. 
(7) From an ontological perspective, law is a unified phenomenon for 
two reasons, its internal complexity notwithstanding. For its forms of 
objectilication can only be assessed through their actual operation and 
action (on the one hand), in the same way as their internal principles, 
instrumental values and structurual complexity (independently of how much 
they are historically concretely well-defined without any alternative to 
appear on the scene) may gain exclusively ontological significance through 
their actual operation and realisation (on the other). That is, whatever 
boundaries the law's internal order draws between the respective processes 
of law-making and law-applying, only those implemented in actual social 
practice will prevail in fact so as to be sensed ontologically. 
(8) This also implies that the dialectic of stability and change can be 
caught in action only within the totality of the legal complex. For this very 
reason we cannot claim the exclusive trigger of change to be legislation 
(officially institutionalised for this very purpose)—that is, the enactment of 
law according to a procedure and in a form prescribed by previously 
enactments—, and its exclusive medium to be law-application (officially 
institutionalised for this very purpose)—that is, the establishment and 
enforcement of the legal consequences of a given action according to a 
procedure and in a form prescribed by previous enactments. On the final 
analysis, the motion at any given time of the social total complex and the 
50 According to Naschitz, "human factor", and according to Nenovski (ch. VII—VIII), "social 
existence", as well as the "sociological phenomenon of social control in all social formations", 
are the moments for establishments with differing traditions to necessarily arrive at common 
or, at least, similar solutions while legal problem-solving. 
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internal complexity of the legal part-complex (its tradition, structural 
complexity and relative weight, as well as its internal strength to function 
and exert a socially desirable influence through the fulfilment of its own 
enacted rules of the game) will define the way in which the legal complex 
reacts to the external challenges of continuity and change. 
In the domain of law as a field that operates a formal store of means in 
accordance with formalised procedural patterns, response by any one social 
partial complex to the challenges by any other complexes, that is, the way of 
its reacting, is mostly achieved through the manipulating operation of its 
already available set of means, instead of either individually generating or 
formally changing any such means. In its ontological reconstruction, however, 
the unceasing process of manipulation presupposes, and also results in, the 
unceasing process of transforming the actual characters—that is, the social 
significance and meaning—of the relevant instruments taken from the available 
store of means.51 
51 For the ways in which the law's complexity reproduces itself while responding variably 
to socially felt changing needs, cf. VARGA, Cs.: Paradigms of Legal Thinking, Budapest, 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1999, vii + 279, particularly at chs. V-VII [Philosophiae Iuris] and, as a 
collection of supplementary papers by the author, A jog mint folyamat [Law as process] 
Budapest, Osiris, 1999, 430 [Osiris-könyvtár: Jog]. 
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